Madam Chair, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

_Accountability_

Since the last Conference of the States Parties, remarkable progress has been made on the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. We congratulate all parties involved in this achievement. However, much remains to be done, particularly in terms of preventing further use of chemical weapons in Syria and establishing accountability for these crimes.

After last August’s preliminary report, the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons presented its final report on 13 December, concluding that chemical weapons were used in Syria between March and August 2013. Sadly, allegations of chlorine use were raised in 2014. The Fact-Finding Mission established by the OPCW stated in its preliminary report that there is “credence to the view that toxic chemicals… have been used in a systematic manner in a number of attacks.” Its second report from September this year included information constituting “compelling confirmation” that a toxic chemical was used “systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon.

During the Executive Council meeting on 26 September, States condemned the use of chemical weapons and many mentioned the need to establish accountability. However, despite the compelling conclusion that chemical weapons were used again in 2014, the international community has not succeeded in agreeing on the next logical step, namely ensuring that the perpetrators of these crimes are held accountable. In May this year, the UN Security Council failed to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose investigation powers cover any crime in its Statute, whether the suspected perpetrators are governmental or non-state actors.

The use of chemical weapons is a horrendous crime that threatens the very essence of the Convention. We therefore call on all States Parties to increase their efforts within the OPCW and other forums to agree on the start of a criminal investigation. Referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC by the UN Security Council should remain the objective.

_National implementation_

Madam Chair, we welcome the development of two new legislative drafting tools by the Technical Secretariat, namely the “Initial Measures” National Legislation Implementation Kit
and the Legislative Assistance Support Tool. We encourage States Parties to make full use of these tools during their legislative drafting process. VERTIC for its part has also continued to provide legal services to interested States. Since the last Conference of the States Parties, we have reviewed and commented on draft CWC legislation of States in the Middle East and Africa. We have also discussed the CWC laws and bills of four States in Southeast Asia as part of our project under the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence. Finally, we have provided surveys to two States in Asia of their current legislation relevant to the CWC.

We urge all States Parties to review and update their legal frameworks to fully meet their obligations under the Convention.

**Universality**

Madam Chair, VERTIC is pleased to inform you of our participation in a roundtable on the CWC in Israel, organized by Green Cross International and the Israeli Disarmament Movement in November. During this roundtable, we spoke on national implementation of the Convention and its verification mechanism. Similarly, VERTIC is participating this week in the second meeting of the so-called Non-proliferation Dialogue among Myanmar, the United Kingdom, and the United States, organized in Yangon by the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

We will be focusing on the implementation of both the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention during our presentations.

We will continue to reach out to the remaining non-States Parties in order to achieve universality of the Convention.

We hope all States Parties will continue doing the same in both their multilateral and bilateral relations with these States.

Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon. My name is Amelia Broodryk and I am a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) based in South Africa. ISS is an applied policy research institute working for the advancement of sustainable human security in Africa. It seeks to mainstream human security perspectives into public policy processes and to influence decision makers within Africa and beyond and as such, undertakes applied policy research, provides teaching and training as well as technical assistance.

Since 2007, our project’s aim has been to enhance Africa’s role in international efforts to strengthen weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of Africa’s developmental imperatives.

The near-universalization of the CWC in Africa is a testament to the continent’s commitment to ensuring that the misuse of dangerous chemicals never occurs in Africa or anywhere else in the world. We urge the remaining three African countries – Angola, Egypt, and South Sudan – to accede to the CWC, thereby reinforcing the African Union’s (AU’s) call for a Chemical Weapons-Free Zone in Africa, underscored by the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the OPCW. We also express our deep concern that a stockpile of more than 800 tons of industrial chemicals that could be weaponized remains undestroyed in Libya. This is an unacceptable situation given the deteriorating security environment in that country.

While it remains important to promote accession to the CWC, effective implementation of the Convention in the existing African States Parties continues to be a challenge. There is still a low number of African States Parties with implementing legislation covering all key areas of the CWC, and many states are unable to provide national authorities with the necessary financial and human resources to monitor appropriate implementation of the CWC.

As a means to address the challenge of CWC implementation in Africa, the OPCW created the Program to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa. The program, now in its third phase, has accomplished a great deal over the years, enabling Africans to participate in training courses, and workshops on relevant topics. The program has also provided employment to African interns, offered support to attend CWC conferences, and supplied functional equipment. As such, the OPCW’s programs yield direct economic benefits to a continent struggling to meet its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
From our experience, engagement in Africa must promote both the developmental benefits as well as the security dimensions of CWC membership. The complementary nature of the OPCW and African civil society’s activities in promoting international peace and security should form the foundation for increased cooperation.

Given the resource constraints faced by most African countries, the OPCW, together with African States Parties, the African Union (AU), sub-regional organizations, the chemical industry and representatives from African civil society, should combine efforts and coordinate activities in order to make the best use of scarce resources and build sustainable processes.

We recommend that all relevant stakeholders meet more regularly to discuss areas of mutual interest in order to determine priorities.

As a means to promote implementation of the CWC in Africa, we also propose that the OPCW meet and coordinate with other bodies, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, as well as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). Activities undertaken by these bodies, such as peer reviews between members, regional train-the-trainer courses, and private sector engagement could also be implemented within the context of the CWC.

As the OPCW moves towards a post-destruction era, it is important to take stock of whether all articles of the CWC are being implemented and whether the Convention is achieving its goals, not only in Africa, but everywhere in the world. The OPCW must remain a genuinely multilateral and legitimate forum where the decisions made by States Parties are fully implemented.

Any real or perceived political imbalances between Member States should be addressed without delay. As civil society, we are ready to partner with the OPCW to fulfil its mandate of ridding the world of chemical weapons.

Thank you.
Dr. Mark C. Cesa  
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC)  
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA

Presentation to 19th CWC Conference of States Parties  
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons  
The Hague, The Netherlands, December 3, 2014

Madam Chairperson, Director General Uzümcü, Excellencies, Delegates, and Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great pleasure to represent the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, IUPAC, here at the Nineteenth Session of the Conference of States Parties of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997. There are currently 190 Member States, who are working together to achieve a world free of chemical weapons. The OPCW Member States share the collective goal of eliminating existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and preventing chemistry from ever again being used for warfare.

The mission of IUPAC is to advance the worldwide aspects of the chemical sciences and to contribute to the application of chemistry in the service of humankind as a scientific, international, non-governmental and objective body.

IUPAC is recognized as the world authority on chemical nomenclature, terminology, standardized methods for measurement, atomic weights, and many other critically evaluated data. IUPAC is an organization of national and regional chemical societies, academies of science and similar Organizations that represent the chemists of the member countries. The scientific and governance work of IUPAC is done almost entirely by hundreds of volunteer scientists. IUPAC projects and conferences focus on all areas of chemistry, and in particular in areas such as health, safety, security and environment; green chemistry; education; agricultural chemistry; medicinal and pharmaceutical chemistry; and energy, among many others.

In recent years, IUPAC has been privileged to work with the OPCW, both in contributing technical expertise to the Review Conferences of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in developing educational resources on the multiple uses of chemicals. For example, the 2013 IUPAC Technical Report, published in the journal, Pure and Applied Chemistry, and titled, “Impact of scientific developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention,” was released in advance of the Third Review Conference of the CWC held in April 2013. This document represents the final report of discussions and conclusions arising from the OPCW workshop on Developments in Science and Technology Relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, held
in Spiez, Switzerland in February 2012. IUPAC produced similar technical reports in advance of the two first Review Conferences held in 2003 and 2008.

The OPCW has achieved a great deal towards its core mandate, the elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. As this process continues there can be a greater focus on ensuring that chemical weapons are never again developed to threaten humanity. To achieve this goal it will be necessary to ensure that scientists and engineers have a clear understanding of risks and of the requirements of the CWC, which are designed to ensure that chemistry in the future is used only for peaceful purposes.

Increasing awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the scientific community, facilitating the integration of issues related to the Convention into chemistry teaching, and promoting professional conduct of chemists and chemical engineers are all issues of common concern to IUPAC and the OPCW. This important area of endeavor is one on which we have been working for some time.

In 2004, the President of IUPAC and the Director-General of the OPCW agreed on a proposal for a joint project on chemistry education, outreach, and the professional conduct of chemists. Following the 2004 agreement a joint IUPAC/OPCW international workshop was held in Oxford, UK on 9-12 July 2005 with 27 participants from 18 countries. One of the key outcomes of this workshop was the identification of the need for peer-reviewed educational materials for chemists and engineers in training. Resulting from this early work was a joint project of IUPAC and the OPCW on Updating, Piloting, and Disseminating Educational Material for Raising Awareness of the Multiple Uses of Chemicals, an effort that serves to address the need identified by the 2005 Oxford OPCW-IUPAC workshop.

An initial set of web-based materials to be used by educators and students has been created. The approach taken is to start with the beneficial uses of chemicals, give examples of the misuse and abuse of chemicals, and then provide basic information about the Chemical Weapons Convention, ending with the need for and examples of existing codes of conduct. By addressing these key factors and drawing the attention of students to the potential misuses of chemicals, as well as to the international community’s premier mechanism for dealing with the misuse of chemicals, we can create a more aware and better informed chemical community for the future. The final report on this project was issued in the last few weeks.

The concept of a code of conduct is once again being explored, and IUPAC would be pleased to assist with this effort as it has in the past. In October 2013, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2013 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons. The CWC and the extensive work of the OPCW have defined the use of chemical weapons as a taboo under international law. IUPAC is proud to have contributed to the OPCW’s efforts in the past and we look forward to further collaboration in the future.
Most recently, the Director General, in consultation with States Parties and other stakeholders, decided that in order to create a lasting legacy of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize award to the OPCW, the Organization in partnership with the City of The Hague, has established an Annual “OPCW- The Hague Awards.” The purpose of the award is to honor and recognize individuals and/or non-profit, non-governmental organizations that have made an outstanding contribution to achieving a world free of chemical weapons by supporting one or more of the core objectives of the Organization. The inaugural awardees, Dr. Robert Mathews and the Finnish Institute for the Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, VERIFIN, clearly embody the selection criteria for this new and prestigious award, and IUPAC is proud to have been invited to play an integral part in this important initiative.

As President of IUPAC and as a chemist, I would like to convey the heartfelt congratulations of IUPAC to our OPCW colleagues for the 2013 Nobel Prize for Peace. We look forward to new and continuing collaborations with the OPCW and its member institutions and to continuing contributions from the world of chemistry that assist the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention in achieving its goals. It is an honor to represent IUPAC at the Conference of States Parties, and I wish you every success in your deliberations over the next few days.

Thank you to Director General Ambassador Uzumcü and the Technical Secretariat, and all of you, the States Parties to the Convention, for your kind and generous invitation to speak here today.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The following remarks draw upon a recent Bradford University study, being distributed today, which examines dual-use chemical and life science research potentially applicable to incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapons. Whilst the use in armed conflict of weapons employing ICAs is clearly prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention, there are differing interpretations as to whether such weapons can be employed for law enforcement purposes.

To date there has been one well-documented use by a CWC State Party of an ICA weapon in a large-scale law enforcement and hostage rescue operation in 2002. The State Party concerned has not publicly confirmed the identity of the ICA weapon employed nor whether it holds stockpiles of such weapons. Our study indicates that scientists in that country have subsequently undertaken research potentially applicable to ICA weapons, including computer modelling of so-called “calmative” “gas flows” in enclosed spaces, and the exploration of opiate receptors and their interaction with potential ICAs.

Our study also highlights the development and marketing by companies in a second State Party of an ICA weapon employing an unknown anaesthetic agent specifically promoted for use by security forces against individuals, and the possession of such weapons by the security forces of that country at least up to 2012. A third country has previously conducted research into ICAs, and on at least one occasion its security services employed an ICA weapon targeted against an individual, in 1997.

Although it is apparent that ICA weapons have been developed in at least three countries since the coming into force of the Convention, the situation in other States is much less clear, due to difficulties in establishing the nature and purpose of potentially relevant chemical and life science dual-use research. The potential for false perceptions about current State activities and misunderstandings about State motivations behind such dual-use research, are exacerbated by the lack of effective OPCW reporting or transparency mechanisms in this area.

In addition, and more critically, no OPCW policy making organ has issued clear guidance as to whether ICA weapons can be legitimately employed for law enforcement purposes and if so, under what circumstances, and with what constraints. Consequently, individual States Parties
are left to interpret the scope and nature of their obligations in this area, with the consequent risk that a permissive interpretation may emerge.

Recognizing the potentially dangerous implications of such developments, certain States, including Australia, Germany and Switzerland have rejected the option of weaponizing ICAs, formally declaring that the only toxic chemicals that can be employed for law enforcement purposes in their countries are riot control agents. In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons.

However, other States that do possess ICA weapons or that have conducted research that may be applicable to the study or development of such weapons, remain silent. In order to address concerns and prevent possible mis-perceptions, these countries should make formal statements during this Conference or in other appropriate fora clarifying the nature and purpose of relevant research activities and on whether they are developing, stockpiling or allow the use of ICA weapons for law enforcement or other purposes.

Furthermore, we recommend that CWC States Parties, individually or collectively, should:

(a.) Present proposals for a mechanism within the OPCW to collectively discuss whether or not the employment of ICA weapons in law enforcement is permissible under the Convention;

(b.) Affirm that current national practice is to restrict use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement to riot control agents. Where such restriction is not existing policy, States should introduce national moratoria halting the initiation or continuation of development, possession and use of ICA weapons intended for law enforcement. Like-minded States could also introduce a moratorium on such activities at the pluri-lateral level.

(c.) Fulfil existing CWC reporting obligations – including those under Article X requiring State Parties to report relevant research for “protective purposes” to the Technical Secretariat – and introduce additional transparency mechanisms.

Because the possession of ICA weapons currently appears to be restricted to a relatively small number of States, there is still time for the international community to take appropriate action. However, if the OPCW does not act decisively in the near future, there is a danger that an ever growing number of States will seek to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs, or may be perceived – rightly or wrongly – of doing so. This, in turn, may convince further States to conduct their own ICA weapons programs or potentially explore an even broader range of chemical agents, with the danger of a consequent spiral of actions and reactions that could weaken or eventually erode away the prohibition of chemical weapons.
Thank you for your kind attention, and I request that this statement be made part of the CSP record.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

ArgIQ is a non-profit organization with the objective of spreading, through academic activities, the Information Quality methodology to Argentina and other Spanish-speaking countries.

The Information Quality methodology provides us with new tools for managing information, creating a new concept that goes from data collection to its transformation into information, intelligence, and knowledge.

This work methodology is always advancing in all fields of knowledge, which can be used for business decision-making and applied in different types of scientific research.

The accessibility and availability of this tool for the academic and business worlds makes it a very interesting option, especially these days where information is overloaded.

The plasticity that provides for the selection of quality criteria makes it suitable for different disciplines in business, social, and natural sciences.

Since data are the bricks and pillars with which we construct knowledge and if they are not good, our building falls, like a house of cards.

The wide availability of current information generates a lot of complications when selecting, based on the objectives, the material used. This is where a discipline, emerged from the IT field, comes to our aid.

Considering that information is a valuable asset, it is the key for the decision-making process and scientific research. In all organizations, the planning process is directed to make decisions in different areas; that’s why information involved in them demands a standardized methodology to manage it.

While performing a research effort, to have quality standards and control of the information input from the beginning to the end of it will allow the development of a better study and evidence-sustained conclusions. This is particularly important when we deal with a lot of information from different sources.
In all organizations, the planning process is directed to making decisions in different areas; that’s why information involved in them demands a standardized methodology to manage it.

Applying the Information Quality method, and considering the different professional backgrounds of ArgIQ’s members, we do research and other academic activities in several areas, such as defense, bioethics, biosecurity, chemical and biological weapons, dual-use materials, and strategy.

The OPCW is constantly dealing with heavy loads of massive amounts of information, whether we consider annual reports from States Parties, data from on-site verification, or simply developing databases for initial declarations.

Our members are also trained to advise organizations on the implementation of this method. And we would be happy to work with the OPCW to improve its quality of information, and methodologies for productive use.

Thank you for your attention, and I request that this statement be made part of the final CSP record.
Nathalie Gysi
Green Cross Switzerland
Zurich, Switzerland

Presentation to 19th CWC Conference of States Parties
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
The Hague, The Netherlands, December 3, 2014

Madam Chair, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

For more than five years now Green Cross has supported the victims of Saddam Hussein’s poison gas attacks in Halabja in Northern Iraq. We do this via the local NGO, “Wadi.” The social and medical measures comprise mobile medical teams to treat physical and psychological health problems in the remote villages. The survivors and even the next generation are still today suffering a lot, more than 25 years after the attack. Because they are so much traumatized, but also because they are very poor, mothers cannot take care of their children normally. That is why we send play buses to these villages where children can play and have fun for a whole day. In the last year the play bus also visited Syrian refugee camps in the region.

Another important problem which prevents the people in Halabja to live happily is their fear that toxic pollutants from the poison gas attacks in 1988 are still present in the environment and that they contaminate food, drinking water, soil, and livestock in the region. Please help us with expert resources to clarify important questions for the traumatized victims of chemical weapons in both Iraq and Iran over the past 25 years or more.

As H.E. Mr. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OPCW, said: “…the inhabitants of Halabja were subjected to the most unspeakable atrocity – the use of chemical weapons against innocent and unprotected civilians.” This helped build the strong resolve of the international community to permanently rid our world from the threat of chemical weapons. It has thus played a crucial role in establishing the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention and in achieving near-universal adherence to it so that future generations are spared the horror and suffering that occurred in Halabja in 1988. And the Chemical Weapons Convention NGO Coalition (CWCC), which Green Cross helped to initiate and has supported ever since, supplements these efforts with focused civil society action aimed at achieving full membership of the CWC.

Sadly though, exactly 25 years after the poison gas attacks in Northern Iraq, several residential areas of Damascus, the Ghoutas, were hit by a major chemical weapons attack causing the death of an estimated 1,400 civilians and injuring many more in August 2013. The world was shocked, and under international pressure the Syrian government joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and assented to the OPCW-led destruction of its declared chemical weapons arsenals.
Internationally, the chemical weapons attack in Syria helped build the strong resolve of the international community even further to permanently rid our world from the threat of chemical weapons. This recent attack has thus played a crucial role for awarding the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for their "extensive work to eliminate chemical weapons." Consequently H.E. Mr. Ahmet Üzümçü, Director-General of the OPCW, told reporters that he hoped his organization’s work can help "achieve peace in Syria and end the suffering of its people." But over one year after these tragic attacks, the still-besieged Ghoutas have not received substantial international aid and the survivors are still suffering from heavy after-effects due to their exposure to toxic agents.

Therefore Green Cross has recently successfully implemented an emergency aid project in Ghouta together with the Syrian partner organization, Al-Seeraj. The project is aimed at providing urgently needed medicine against the further spread of diseases within the population already weakened by the chemical attacks. But the ill and traumatized people need much more support. Falah Muradkhin, survivor of the 1988 attacks and who is today project coordinator of the local partner organization of Green Cross, “Wadi,” mourns the victims of the Ghouta attacks and points out that “25 years ago the technology was not available to send immediate news and reports to the world about what happened in Halabja. Today, however, the situation is different. The horrible pictures from the Ghoutas were quickly disseminated and seen by many people. Yet no adequate response has been seen either from the United Nations or from countries which supposedly were involved in the development of Syria’s or Iraq’s chemical weapon arsenals, or from Muslim countries for helping their brothers and sisters in the region.” Green Cross is therefore calling for immediate international support of the forgotten victims of the Ghouta attacks.

As said, Green Cross is also supporting actively the establishment of a world truly free of chemical weapons. In view of the close relationship between all three classes of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological – Green Cross calls for the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-free zone as a next step, because there will be no real security for the people living in this politically tense region as long as there are any weapons of mass destruction stockpiled.

I hope you can help us support the victims of chemical weapons attacks as outlined; they fundamentally need and deserve such assistance. And thank you for your ongoing commitment and continued work so that future generations are forever spared the horror and suffering that occurred in Halabja in 1988 and 25 years later again in Syria.

I ask that this statement be made a part of the final CSP report.
Madame Chair, Distinguished Representatives:

The research program on chemical and biological weapons of PUC IRI greatly appreciates the opportunity to offer this statement.

Over the past 20 years, the Chemical Weapons Convention has been exposed to shocks and shifts in the external geopolitical environment and there are a number of challenges the Convention faces. These challenges have the potential to undermine the CWC if they are not adequately addressed by the State Parties.

In this statement I will only highlight one aspect of the numerous challenges that face the Convention and with it the norm against chemical weapons: the changing nature and character of conflict. The past two decades have seen a shift in the nature and mode of organized violence which has been characterized by a blurring of previously clearer distinctions between war, organized crime, and civil unrest.

We now live in a predominantly urban society. Urban environments are increasingly sites of international humanitarian action. Global trends of rapid and unregulated urbanization have and continue to create fragility and spaces where little governance exists or is possible in otherwise stable states. In these spaces violence can – in terms of lethality, intensity, and in the organization of armed groups – exhibit levels similar to war theaters. Conflicts and violence are often protracted, or even chronic.

It is a fundamental shift in the predominant forms of organized violence, away from major civil war and inter-state conflict towards various forms of, often internationally networked but also fragmented, organized violence: this includes violence involving militias, or between ethnic groups; local resource-related violence; gang violence; and violence linked to trafficking of arms, substances, and people; as well as violence associated with global ideological struggles and identity based conflicts.

The shift in the nature and character of conflict is mirrored by a change in the nature and character of law enforcement. Protracted violence and an accompanying lack of governance lead to situations where law enforcement becomes indistinguishable from military operations. The CWC permits the use of toxic chemicals against humans for purposes of law enforcement and
domestic riot control. However, not as a method of warfare. In the light of a changing geopolitical environment and a changing nature of conflict it is paramount that there is clarity in the interpretation of permitted uses in order to stem damage to the norm against chemical weapons from creeping legitimization. The use of toxic chemicals by militarized law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations responding to the security environment dangerously extends and undermines the intended exemption.

It is therefore important that the issue of toxic chemicals and law enforcement is actively engaged, and that a focused and explicit discussion takes place with the eventual goal of reaching a common understanding of the meaning of law enforcement including domestic riot control under the CWC.

Encouragingly, a number of States Parties have drawn attention to the issue of law enforcement and domestic riot control in their statements and working papers. Unfortunately, this attention has failed to translate into action or even significant language in the final documents of previous Review Conferences or other sessions of the Conference of the States Parties. We hope that renewed attention will lead to meaningful engagement with this important issue beyond focusing on so-called incapacitating agents.

Madame Chair, Distinguished Representatives:

Understanding the implications of the changed geopolitical context is an essential task, requiring careful study of the trends involved and their potential implications for the Convention. We stand ready to assist you in examining the issues involved in order to strengthen the Convention.

We thank you for your attention.
Madam Chair, Mr. Director General, Distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of Pakistan House, let me first thank you for this opportunity to speak. The successful implementation of partnership between States Parties and the OPCW has raised some interesting questions. There is a concern that the regime of chemical disarmament should not become only a legal affair. The final report of the Scientific Advisory Board shows that promoting a culture of “Responsible Chemistry” and peaceful use of knowledge is the key to promote coherent national policies. This clearly reflects the direct link between independent choice of studying chemistry, and hence not challenging rights of young generations to study and research in the field of chemistry. Pakistan House firmly believes that together with civil society, the OPCW can contribute toward promoting a culture of responsibility among students and policy makers. This soft safety and security approach will encourage the respective States Parties to incorporate the importance of non-proliferation and dangers relating to the misuse of chemical material. The multi-pronged approach to engage educational institutions and policy makers will open a new channel of communication.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

OPCW’s achievements and success in just seventeen years has created the need to introduce the much needed idea of partnership between states and non-states parties. It is no longer a desire; rather, a requirement that in the end would help promote the significance of the CWC discourse. This is exactly the initiative which Pakistan House supports and seeks to achieve through working-partnerships with other members of civil society organizations.

As an independent, non-partisan and non-political organization, Pakistan House has been contributing to an on-going discourse on implementing a coherent international non-proliferation regime, which must not impede the peaceful uses of chemistry, especially in the fields of research and development (R&D). This futuristic vision will only enhance the capacity and comprehension of emerging scientists and policy makers. A strict system to control and follow will only serve half of the purpose of a monitoring system. Therefore, promoting cultures of responsibility and outreach are crucial to further enhance the soft and security approach.

Let me take this opportunity and reaffirm that the platform of Pakistan House is available to further the noble cause of the OPCW and CWC and we look forward to participate in the on-going research projects and to help initiate new ones.
Let me conclude by saying that nothing is more positive than sustaining success. I believe the OPCW and CWC are on the way to that sustainability. The right to learn advanced knowledge should not be hindered in all fields including chemistry.

I thank you for your attention, Ladies and Gentlemen! And I request that this statement be made part of the final CSP record.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great honor for me to have the privilege of speaking before such a select group of distinguished personalities.

Allow me to begin, first, by congratulating the OPCW and its Director-General, Mr. Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, once again, for the Nobel Peace Prize awarded a year ago, which was certainly well-deserved.

Director-General Üzümcü and the Organization must also be congratulated for the extremely crucial as well as courageous mission that they accomplished over the last year and a half with respect to the complex and complicated process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. I’d like to take this opportunity to express my personal indebtedness in my own academic capacity. Thank You!

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I had the same honor and the privilege of speaking at this podium some 18 months ago, during the Third Review Conference held in April 2013.

I had briefly presented my thoughts on the implications of the Arab Spring for the universalization of the CWC by placing emphasis on the challenges and opportunities ahead.

I had said that it was difficult to be hopeful with regard to the goal of universality of the CWC, and, due to the turmoil in Syria, a growing concern was the safety and security of the chemical weapons arsenal as well as the possible use of these weapons that were at the disposal of the Assad government.

Hence, I had called for more effective involvement of the world’s leading powers, such as the United States and the Russian Federation, in the international efforts to settle the situation in Syria.

A little more than a year ago, in September 2013, this effective involvement of the two leading powers came, but unfortunately only one month after the tragic use of chemical weapons in the
suburbs of the Syrian capital city, Damascus, that claimed the lives of more than 1,500 innocent civilians.

In the aftermath of the tragic incident, the two leading powers have done a marvelous job by combining their efforts to compel the Assad government in Syria to accede to the CWC, thereby launching the process of dismantling the Syrian chemical weapons capability.

Since then, however, the world has undergone dramatic changes. The excitement about the popular movements that took place in the Middle East and North Africa, dubbed the Arab Spring, has been replaced with anxiety due to the developments in countries like Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria, in particular.

The hopes for transforming the MENA region to a more democratic environment have dissipated due to the military takeover (again) in Egypt, chaos in Libya, and the horrible acts of ISIS/ISIL, the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant,” in these respective countries.

The current situation calls for even more urgently than ever the concerted efforts of the civilized world against the medieval-age structures which may push the level of their atrocities to unprecedented extremes.

The possibility of unauthorized access to the chemical weapons and/or the chemical agents that could be weaponized, without much difficulty in the hands of such non-state actors who wouldn’t mind using them in their attacks against unprotected population centers, must be taken seriously into consideration. While the CWC was never designed to address non-state actors, as we now see in the Middle East and elsewhere, it places more burden on all of us to safely eliminate any remaining chemical weapons arsenals in a timely way before they are stolen, lost, or proliferated to non-state actors for nefarious purposes.

Nevertheless, it is unfortunate to see that, at this highly critical moment in history, the leading powers of the world have been falling apart due to the developments in Ukraine, whose implications are certainly serious.

I would like to conclude with a Turkish proverb, which I could translate as follows: “better to have a wise enemy, than an ignorant friend.”

Hence, it is time for the wise people of the world to get together again so that wisdom prevails in the civilized world in the fight against those who want to drag us toward the dark ages.

Thank you for your attention.
Madam Chair, Mr. Director General, Distinguished Delegates and Guests:

Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to talk briefly about the unique program in the United States that is designed to destroy chemical weapons by the use of a technology other than incineration. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program was established by the U.S. Congress in 1995 as a result of citizen pressure to provide communities a choice between incineration and a non-incineration technology. The Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Project, commonly known as PCAPP, is fully carrying out the principles of this program in Pueblo, Colorado.

Madam Chair,

While the mission of this program is like all other chemical demilitarization programs – to fully destroy the stockpiled chemical weapons in a safe manner, there are four additional hallmarks of this program that are important today.

1. Transparency
2. Community and citizen involvement
3. Education of the workers and public
4. Safety of the workers, the community and the environment

Transparency within the program was evident from the very beginning. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Dialogue was made up of individuals from each site as well as members of the Army, Department of Defense, and the numerous contractors who were intending to design and build this new type of facility. All of us together developed the criteria and vetted the proposals when they were submitted. While we all knew that the Department of Defense had the final authority to choose both a technology and a contractor, the members of the Dialogue were an integral part of the discussion every step of the way. We helped with funding from Congress and with the continuation of the program by Congress when things looked pretty bleak. We weren't always successful, and some would even say we were wrong, but here I stand before you today with a program that is successful and within weeks of beginning to destroy weapons in Pueblo in the eighth and next-to-last stockpile destruction program in the US.
Even today the community has input into almost every aspect of the program. Most recently we have participated in the choice of a second processing system to destroy damaged weapons in storage and to discuss with contractors and the Department of Defense a series of “what if’s.” What if different portions of the facility fail to perform as predicted?

Community and citizen involvement came into being with the establishment of Citizens’ Advisory Commissions by Congress. Creating commissions, however, did not insure that they would work as planned. Members had to be tenacious and ask questions and be willing to argue and speak up. Everyone had to be heard and every question taken seriously. Nothing was too insignificant or too far-reaching in the beginning. Today the Citizens’ Advisory Commissions in Pueblo and Blue Grass are active citizens groups, trusted by the community, state and federal regulators, and the Department of Defense.

Public meetings and tours of the construction site are also an important part of community involvement. Seldom does a month go by when there are not meetings and tours, from the local community clubs to visiting members of Congress and even the OPCW.

Education of the community is an equally important part of transparency and understanding. Both Pueblo and Blue Grass have an educational specialist who goes into the schools to teach about chemical weapons and the destruction programs at the Depots. They teach about job opportunities to the older students, as well as the history of chemical warfare, chemistry, math, and physics. Children down to the age of 10 learn about these programs.

Outreach offices are located in each community, where citizens can walk in and view displays and take away program information. The ACWA program has a website where anyone can look up information, view pictures and watch YouTube videos about the processes.

The final cornerstone of the program is the most important to the community – safety. No one wants to send their husband or wife, son or daughter, father or mother, or neighbor to work at a facility that is unsafe. No one wants to live near a facility that is unsafe. And lastly, while destruction of the weapons is of paramount importance, destroying the weapons and the surrounding environment at the same time is unacceptable. The workers must be kept safe, the nearby residents must be safe, and the environment must be protected. These factors must not be compromised in the course of destroying the chemical weapons in the stockpile.

Madam Chair,

Meeting the criteria of transparency, community involvement, education, and safety may appear on the surface to extend a very lengthy process, but community protests, arguments, and lawsuits are ugly and divisive and also extend the life of a project in a very negative way. The ACWA program allowed the community and the US Department of Defense to work together in a win-win effort to build a program that meets the needs of everyone by employing face-to-face discussion and consensus.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak about chemical weapons destruction in Pueblo from the point of view of an interested and involved citizen.

I ask that this statement be made a part of the final CSP report.
Your Excellency Madam Chair, Distinguished Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I deem it a great honor to attend and speak at the 19th Conference of State Parties on the Chemical Weapons Convention for the first time on behalf of the China Controlled Chemicals Association as an NGO. Now, please allow me to brief the Conference on the main work of the CCCA and put forward our suggestions on honoring the Convention.

The China Controlled Chemicals Association, founded in April 1996, was established on a voluntary basis by enterprises, social organizations and professionals engaged in the production, research, design, operation, utilization, and management of chemicals included in the CWC. It functions as the coordinator between the government and enterprises, and as a facilitator for better compliance with CWC. For 18 years since its establishment, the CCCA has made tremendous contributions to promoting the full implementation of the CWC and the sustained and healthy development of chemical industry through abiding by the requirements enacted by National Authorities and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

First, we actively carry out publicity and training on the Convention, and provide assistance and guidance to chemical enterprises for regular inspections. By setting up a Compliance Website to popularize the knowledge and obligations of the Convention, we vigorously promote responsible care and safety production. We have published the monthly professional journal, Controlled Chemicals Newsletter, for conservation of 221 volumes to provide a platform for enterprises to exchange experience on implementing the CWC. To date, we have held 20 training classes and 11 forums on CWC implementation with 2,500 attendees from 1,600 organizations. By the end of November 2014, China has received inspections for a cumulative 299 times, over 26 times on a yearly basis, 10% more than all other scheduled inspections by OPCW each year, taking first place among all the States Parties. Chinese enterprises provide all-round cooperation for OPCW’s on-site inspections with earnest efforts and an open attitude, which manifests our firm stand in fulfilling the international obligations and safeguarding world peace of our own accord.

Second, we actively urge enterprises to strengthen management to facilitate the sustainable development of industry. The production value of China’s petroleum and chemical industry has topped the world after decades of rapid development. In the backdrop of sluggish recovery in the world economy and the increased downward pressure on the domestic economy, China’s
chemical industry as a whole has maintained a steady development, contributing greatly to the national economy and social development. However, China’s chemical industry is large but not competitively strong, and problems such as low industrial concentration, severe overcapacity, pollutant discharge and occasional safety and environmental incidents have brought prominent negative impacts on the industrial development. As a result, CCCA assists companies in combining the compliance, responsible care, safety production, and HSE management system together to improve their overall stewardship and operation. In this way, fruitful results have been achieved with improved safety and environmental awareness, better comprehensive utilization of resources, year-by-year declines in pollution emissions, sustainable development, and inspiring progress in building up the resource-saving, environment-friendly, and intrinsically safe industry.

Your Excellency Madam Chair,

For 17 years since the Convention came into effect, it has made universally acknowledged contributions to world peace, but its verification regime also exerted extra burdens on the global chemical industry. We are convinced that we should strike a balance in handling non-proliferation and the development of chemical industry. For this purpose, we propose the following suggestions from the perspectives inside the industry:

Firstly, trade barriers that hinder international cooperation in the field of chemical industry should be effectively eliminated to embrace the co-prosperity benefiting the whole world. China's chemical industry is willing to keep closer ties with chemical industries in other countries and enhance international cooperation with States Parties.

Secondly, the verification regime should be further ameliorated. We should optimize the selection method of inspection sites, improve efficiency and pertinence of inspection, take account of equitable geographic balance, and reduce the burden on the inspected facility with necessary measures. We suggest to the Technical Secretariat that it enact the norms for announcing and accepting inspections, pool the common problems detected in various state parties, and formulate a Work Guidebook for onsite inspection to facilitate better compliance with the Convention among chemical enterprises.

Thirdly, the OPCW, States Parties, and International Chemical Industry Associations should strengthen mutual cooperation, actively explore the cooperative model and mechanism under normalization, and amplify the influence of the Convention in the chemical industry to promote successful compliance with the Convention.

Thank you, Your Excellency! And I request that this statement be made part of the final CSP record.
Hubert Mandery
International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA)
Brussels, Belgium

Presentation to 19th CWC Conference of States Parties
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
The Hague, The Netherlands, December 3, 2014

Madam Chair, Director General, Excellencies, Honored Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

First of all I would like to thank the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting ICCA – the International Council of Chemical Associations. As secretary general of the ICCA, it’s an honor to attend the 19th Session of the Conference of States Parties.

Representing ICCA means representing a truly global chemical industry association. The International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) is the worldwide voice of the chemical industry, with a membership (including observers & Responsible Care members) that accounts for more than 90 percent of global chemical sales. The ICCA fully supports the objective and purpose of the Convention, notably the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons. ICCA members must subscribe to the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC) as a condition for membership.

That said, the chemical industry is a key stakeholder with regard to full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. ICCA focuses on safety and security issues for the chemical industry through our industry-initiative – Responsible Care – which I hope to give you a better understanding of how it works in my remarks today.

We see safety and security as an integral part of Responsible Care, so we should work to ensure that the industry and OPCW efforts complement each other.

Cooperation between ICCA and OPCW

Given ICCA’s role as an international voice of the chemical industry, the partnership with OPCW is a natural fit. ICCA agrees with the note by the OPCW Director-General on engaging the Chemical Industry Associations. So my remarks will also focus on the importance of building up cooperation between the chemical industry and OPCW.

Before continuing on, ICCA would like to acknowledge and congratulate the OPCW in winning last year’s Nobel Prize for Peace. The Norwegian Nobel Committee noted at the time that disarmament “figures prominently in Alfred Nobel’s will” and that “The conventions and the work of the OPCW have defined the use of chemical weapons as a taboo under international law.”


Setting direction

Moving forward, we agree with OPCW to establish a "Chemical Industry Coordination Group.” It should include representatives of the Technical Secretariat and the global chemical industry (not limited to the ICCA member associations and companies). This group should meet once or twice a year to discuss topics of mutual interest such as:

i. Education and Outreach,

ii. Chemical Safety and Security,

iii. Implications of developments in science and technology, and

iv. Improvement of Verification.

Interaction with OPCW Member States is also important. We welcome the opportunity today to address the Annual Conferences of States Parties for the first time.

Responsible Care and “Safety and Security”

Now let me tell you more about Responsible Care. For almost 30 years, the Responsible Care program has promoted safety and security practices that safeguard our workplaces, communities and the environment. Responsible Care has since its launch in 1985 spread to nearly 60 economies throughout the world.

Responsible Care companies have management systems in place that are robust, well documented and most often verified or certified. Employees and contractors are quite clear about what to expect regarding products present on the CWC schedules. Ideally, for declarable and “inspectable” plant sites a single company policy on record-keeping, declarations and export controls should cover CWC and all other related restrictions to trade.

Additionally, the health, safety and environmental performance of companies that endorse the Responsible Care ethic generally exceeds that of companies that do not implement the program.

Governments see the difference

One major step forward could be for OPCW to recognize this by clearly assigning a lower inspection frequency to Responsible Care companies. Especially if they are involved with national authorities to improve the effectiveness of inspection, help with the training of inspectors and are proven “good” RC-performers.

An important aspect to Responsible Care is the introduction of the Security Codes of Conduct. The codes have been introduced during the past four years in major parts of the world. The codes help companies to achieve continuous improvement in security performance using a risk-based approach to identify access and address vulnerabilities, prevent or mitigate incidents,
enhance training and response capabilities, and maintain and improve relationships with key stakeholders and local and national authorities. Under the codes, Responsible Care companies require senior leadership commitment and companies are encouraged to undertake periodical analysis of threats and vulnerabilities. If security weaknesses are revealed then security measures must be developed and implemented. Maintaining open and effective lines of communication with industry partners and law enforcement officials is evident. The security code will be implemented with the understanding that security is a shared responsibility requiring actions also by other parties such as downstream customers, suppliers, service providers and governmental security agencies. Effectively assessing and reducing the global threat of international terrorism can only occur with the competent support of the responsible national and international counterterrorism agencies.

*Supply chains and Responsible Care*

Responsible Care also addresses security within the supply chain. Here, transport security and export and trade controls are especially important. The Responsible Care Security Code is intended to complement commitments already existing in those areas and aims to raise awareness of all involved parties. Only close interaction and regular assessment of security-related practices will improve the overall security performance. Responsible Care is about making sure that chemicals do not fall into the wrong hands and guidance is increasingly becoming available from a number of national chemical trade associations and States Parties national authorities.

The Responsible Care Leadership Group of the ICCA discussed the collaborative opportunities with the OPCW. All participating national associations and companies agreed that the opportunities should be explored. Allocation processes for Responsible Care capacity-building and outreach to new non-ICCA member countries have begun and will be explored in more detail following the approval of the Director General’s note. May I add that China, India, and Russia are now actively implementing the Responsible Care program.

We agree with OPCW’s proposed actions to further investigate public-private partnerships and thus strengthening the link with the regional and global chemical associations. We think it’s the most effective way to raise awareness, share information and disseminate best practices to all interested parties.

*Conclusion*

I would like to thank the Director-General for his efforts in crafting the note and we support its contents. I’m confident that follow up actions, based on the outcome of this conference, will guide companies, national and regional chemical industry associations to develop pragmatic cooperation with the OPCW. Follow up actions will need to support the outreach of responsible behavior by industry that is the key to non-proliferation.
The global chemical industry welcomes the next steps it will take with OPCW. We both see responsible behavior within industry as a primary objective to stop commercially available chemicals from getting into the wrong hands.
In the name of the God,

I am Dr. Ahmad Momenirad, representative of the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS) and one of the victims and survivors of the use of chemical weapons in the imposed war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am currently an academic member of the board of the faculty of law at the University of Tehran.

I am here to convey the voice of survivors to people of the world. It is a fact that the world does not know about the use of chemical weapons by Saddam against Iranian peoples.

Now I present a brief report of the Sardasht City disaster and imposed war against Iran:

It was a hot day of summer and the Sardasht city had a good silence. Some children had worn colorful shirts. They had just finished their school exams. They wanted to enjoy the holidays of summer. Many young girls were waiting for young boys to get married. Many young men had gone to the battlefields as the enemies of Islam were fighting with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The shopkeepers had opened their shops and they were waiting for customers to buy something. The warmness of weather could be barely tolerated. Yes we can say that our story was the story of Story's City, because this city was a city of war. It was a city that many weapons would be used against it. The sound of bullets and shots could be heard in this city during the Imposed War Era. Some had left this city for the purpose of staying in better and safer cities, but the majority people of this city had stayed and did not leave. It was as surprising as the people of this city thought that the weapons which are used against this city are like every day. But today the Baathist forces had used chemical weapons and the people of this city did not know this matter.

Some sounds were heard such as thunderstorms. The sounds were exactly like thunderstorms but there was no rain. There were no clouds in the sky but some whitish powders were dropping on this city. All the people of this city wondered and they did not know what to do. After a few minutes they felt difficulty in breathing. Their skins were blistered. They felt the warmness of weather not only by their eyes but also by their bodies. All the people of this city were exposed to chemical weapons. This city had been formed like a piece of crumpled paper. Many people left the city immediately and some stayed there as they did not want to leave the city without their parents. Some lost their family members and relatives. In fact it was the most disastrous chemical attack which had been directed against the innocent people of Sardasht. Yes, it is right
that Sardasht is the first city of the world which has been bombarded by chemical weapons during the Imposed War Era.

It is mentionable that many people of this city were martyred on the bombardment day and many were martyred later and some are being martyred day by day. Unfortunately chemical injury can last in the body of the injured for a long time and there is no good solution for this disease.

I'm a chemically injured patient and I have decided to express some of the realities which occurred during the Sacred Defense in our cities in Iran. The chemical bombardment which was directed by the Baathist forces during the Imposed War Era will never be forgotten by the people of Iran, and especially by the people of Sardasht.

Now I can say that everything is passed, but we have to tolerate many pains resulting from chemical weapons. We need to be protected. We have stayed alive with thousands of incurable pains. We have survived with thousands of speeches which cannot be answered.

One of the painful scenes, which was one of the violations of human rights as well, was the repeated attacks of Iraqi Baathist Forces on civilian areas and this crime was named the war of cities. When the Iraqi Baathist regime was defeated militarily, politically, and mentally, it attempted to attack the civilian areas of Iran.

Supporting non-military persons during the air raids, analyzing the military and non-military objectives and struggles to limit damage resulting from the war in the civilian areas, were the main principles and basis to compile rules and regulations related to the war rights.

But the Iraqi government would never obey any rules and regulations related to human rights. It increased its attacks against cities and defenseless people. The international organizations not only did not condemn this crime of Saddam Hussein, but they also provided chemical agents to Saddam's regime secretly. The Iraqi Baathist regime would be encouraged to continue its crimes against Iranian forces.

However the Islamic Republic of Iran did only military operations to determine the destiny of the war.

And finally:

- In total the cities of Iran were targeted by Iraq's air raids, missile attacks, and artillery attacks 4,769 times. Our society is very active against chemical weapons but we aren’t supported by any international organization. We deeply believe that the world should be free from chemical weapons and use all our capacity and attempts in this way.

- As you know maintenance of peace and security is one of the important duties of international organizations, but it is a fact that we cannot obtain peace and security without justice. Peace is important as well as justice. In my view, we should consider
these concepts together. Peace without justice is not a real peace and cannot be stable. Global peace and security are created when attached to justice.

- And finally I wish to spread peace and security in the world and we all must try to reach this goal.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The nineteenth session of the Conference of States Parties is meeting to take stock of the working of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention—a disarmament treaty of one of the three classes of Weapons of Mass Destruction—has promises for international security, global peace and prosperity if it is implemented fully. From its very inception, it has been considered a model treaty for disarmament because of its unique provisions.

Over the years, 190 countries joined the Convention representing 98 percent of the world population. Yet the treaty is not universal in nature. Some important countries have not joined the Convention and a couple of signatory countries are holding their ratification.

The Chemical Weapons Convention’s mandate for complete destruction of chemical arsenals has made impressive progress. On destruction of declared chemical arsenals and facilities, the OPCW records: “84.95% of the world's declared stockpile of 72,524 metric tonnes of chemical agent has been destroyed.” This also means around/over 15 percent of declared stockpiles still exist and some possessor states have missed even the extended deadline for complete destruction.

A country like India had completed the destruction of its declared stockpile before its deadline. A couple of other countries have also met their stockpile destruction timelines. However, a few countries are still struggling. The international community and the international organisations must encourage these countries to destroy their chemical arsenals. This is necessary for the credibility of the Convention and international law.

The Syrian chemical stockpile has been one of the challenges for chemical disarmament. Syria has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The member countries need to assist OPCW efforts to complete the safe destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons and related facilities in the next few months. Countries should contribute to the Trust Fund set up at the Organisation. The destruction process also needs expertise. Human resources from the member countries may smoothen and expedite the destruction process.

In recent years, the international community is worried about chemical arsenals falling into wrong hands. The governmental and non-governmental initiatives for chemical safety and security may address this challenge emanating not only from the Syrian stockpile but also chemical agents existing elsewhere, which are not secure.

The member countries should support outreach activities of the OPCW as well as take up national and regional activities for chemical safety and security. Gradually, NGOs are also becoming active with the OPCW for full implementation of the Convention. NGOs may work with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee’s outreach programmes as well.
The next phase should be international cooperation. However, new scientific and technological developments combined with the increased intensity of the global chemical commerce may raise further challenges for the Convention. The OPCW and member countries may have to be on alert. The verification architecture of the Convention needs to be continually strengthened.

The OPCW, the member countries and the civil society have to work together to make the Chemical Weapons Convention a sustainable success. This success will truly make the Convention a model treaty for other classes of weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I ask that these remarks be included in the CSP official record.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, OPCW and CWC Coalition
Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am pleased to be able to speak on behalf of Green Cross International and our CWC Coalition, an effort to promote public awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to facilitate the productive involvement of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, experts, and industry in the CWC and its implementing agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Madam Chair,

The OPCW deserves much congratulations for two major recent breakthroughs: (1) the safe and timely demilitarization of another large stockpile of chemical agents, weapons, precursor chemicals, and related facilities in Syria; and (2) the global acknowledgement with the Nobel Peace Prize just one year ago of the importance of abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. I was very grateful to be able to join our OPCW colleagues and Director-General Ahmet Uzumcu in Oslo last year, and let me reiterate my congratulations to all of our OPCW colleagues and delegations for this well-deserved recognition.

I also want to express my congratulations to Dr. Robert Matthews from Australia and Dr. Paula Vanninen and her Finnish colleagues at VERIFIN for their much deserved OPCW-The Hague awards yesterday. Dr. Matthews also deserves much credit for contributing his financial award to the Chemical Weapons Survivors Fund at the OPCW; the CWC Coalition now would encourage the Technical Secretariat to begin to use these funds for timely and productive projects with chemical warfare survivors.

Madam Chair,

The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic last year as the 190th CWC State Party has been an historic moment in the strengthening of the global chemical weapons abolition regime. I want to note the importance of the many CWC States Parties who contributed to this ambitious undertaking to safely secure, transport, and eliminate the 1,308 metric tons of declared chemical agents and precursor chemicals in Syria. Of particular note is the timely intervention of both the Russian Federation and the United States of America in facilitating the accession of Syria last September to the CWC; as many of us know, we’ve all helped with both Track I and Track II diplomacy around universality in the Middle East for several years now, so there are many countries and individuals who deserve credit for this important step forward in global security.
I also want to acknowledge the important contributions of Denmark, Norway, and the United States for committing their ships to sea transport and neutralization of most of Syria’s chemical stockpile; we know that these ships and crews spent much more time in and around the Mediterranean than initially planned, so this was a critical commitment on their part. Also deserving mention are the two dozen or more countries who have contributed to the OPCW Trust Fund, raising over 50 million Euros for these operations. And I want to note the important cooperation of Syria as well for its efforts to secure and safely transport these many chemical stocks to the port of Latakia.

Madam Chair,

It is now important not only to continue to push forward with completing the verified destruction of Syria’s former production and storage facilities, but to also resolving any outstanding discrepancies in Syria’s CWC declaration. I must also underline the importance of continuing the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission to better understand the recent use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria. And now that one of the few remaining non-member countries has joined the CWC, it is incumbent on both government and non-government organizations and individuals to press the remaining two non-member states in the Middle East, along with the other four in Africa and Asia, to join the global ban on chemical weapons. These weapons are now totally taboo, precluding any possible use by a State, and there no longer remains any excuse for any State to remain outside the CWC. The CWC Coalition and Green Cross just last month organized a roundtable discussion in Tel Aviv, Israel, and in the Knesset in Jerusalem, to discuss options for Israel to ratify the CWC; such efforts must continue.

Madam Chair,

I would be remiss if I did not also mention the importance of involving civil society in the ongoing work of the CWC and OPCW. The CWC Coalition, which we founded five years ago here in The Hague, has been successful in involving about 150 NGOs and experts from every continent of the globe now, thanks especially to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has helped fund our recent efforts. We all must recognize that the continued and expanded involvement of non-governmental experts in the works of the OPCW remains very important to a strong and effective organization in future years, and to precluding the re-emergence of chemical weapons around the globe.

On a final note, I would like to acknowledge the excellent work of an OPCW colleague, Mr. Michael Luhan, head of Media and Public Affairs, who will be leaving the OPCW in the next few months. Mr. Luhan has been a major reason our CWC Coalition efforts have been so successful to date and deserves our sincere and lasting thanks.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record.
Madam Chair, Director-General, Madam Deputy Director-General, other OPCW Division Directors, OPCW Staff, and esteemed Representatives of States Parties, and fellow CWC Coalition representatives:

May I first congratulate the OPCW and the Director-General on being the recipients of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the OPCW for providing the opportunity for NGO presentations during these Conferences. Too often it is forgotten or overlooked that people in communities are directly impacted by the Treaty obligations of their governments often without a voice in where, when and how these obligations are to be carried out.

It was to give voice to these civil societies that I formed the Chemical Weapons Working Group consisting of citizens and NGOs in the U.S., the Pacific and Russia in 1990.

Emphasizing protection of the health of the public and the environment, while undertaking the safe destruction of chemical weapons was, and remains, our primary objective.

However, we recognized that while struggling to ensure these goals, that the effort to implement the Convention was equally important. That is why, in spite of the strategic value that may have been realized in the dispute over technologies in the U.S., the CWWG openly and enthusiastically supported ratification of the Treaty by the U.S. Senate in 1997 and has been credited with delivering several key votes during the controversial ratification process.

It is the recognition of this unique effort, the first of its kind, to rid the planet of an entire class of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that propelled us to not only support the Treaty, but to work for its adoption.

I am pleased to say, coming from the final chemical weapons destruction site in the U.S., that there continues to be outstanding progress towards our mutual final objective. Construction at the Blue Grass, Kentucky disposal facility is now 90% complete with Systemization approximately 30% complete.
Importantly, unlike two decades ago, since the government program has adopted the approach in which civil society plays a fully participatory and intimate role, the progress has encountered little controversy and no legal challenges. All regulatory requirements are being met or surpassed and challenges that historically would likely have caused antagonism between the project and the community have been cooperatively dealt with in reaching acceptable resolutions.

It is the considered opinion of the NGO community that on the current trajectory, completion of operations at Blue Grass, the 7th and last chemical weapons stockpile in the US, could occur before the official projected completion date of 2023.

In closing, let me state again my appreciation for this opportunity and reemphasize the distinctive nature of what this Body is close to achieving – global disarmament concerning chemical weapons. Each member should believe this is a model for future success in efforts to do likewise with other weapons of mass destruction.

I thank you for your contribution to a more civil and peaceful world. And I kindly ask that this statement be made part of the final CSP record.