Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The following remarks draw upon a recent study undertaken by Bradford University and the Omega Research Foundation, the results of which are being distributed today, in a report entitled “tear gassing by remote control.”

The use of riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare is prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention, however, permits the employment of such chemicals for law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes, provided they are used in “types and quantities” consistent with such purposes.

Whilst CWC States Parties are prohibited from developing RCA munitions for use in armed conflict, they may manufacture, acquire and utilise delivery systems to disseminate appropriate “types and quantities” of RCAs for law enforcement. However, there is continuing ambiguity as to the nature and specifications of those means of delivery that are prohibited under the Convention. This ambiguity has potentially dangerous consequences, allowing divergent interpretations, policy and practice amongst States Parties to emerge.

Of particular concern – given the current widespread State and commercial research and development of unmanned systems - are the implications for the regulation of “remote control” RCA means of delivery. These are dissemination mechanisms incorporating automatic or semi-automatic systems where the operator is directing operation of the platform and/or RCA delivery device at a distance from the target.

Our investigations have uncovered the development and promotion by a range of State and commercial entities of a wide variety of “remote control” RCA means of delivery including: indoor fixed-installation dispersion devices; external area clearing or area denial devices; automatic grenade launchers; multiple munition launchers; and delivery mechanisms mounted on unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles or drones.

Inadequate regulation of such “remote control” RCA means of delivery has potentially serious consequences, including:

*Proliferation to and misuse by non-State actors:* Current commercial availability of “remote control” RCA means of delivery including, for example, via drones raises the danger of their acquisition and employment by a range of non-State actors including armed opposition forces, unregulated private military and security companies, and terrorist organisations.
Employment in armed conflict: In previous conflicts RCA means of delivery were employed to drive enemy forces from fortified positions; to disable and incapacitate large numbers of combatants; or in conjunction with conventional arms as a “force multiplier”. More recently, a range of contemporary RCA means of delivery, including certain “remote control” devices, have been promoted for use in counterinsurgency operations or urban warfare.

Misuse to facilitate large scale human rights abuses: This could include the blanket application of significant quantities of RCAs against large peaceful gatherings resulting in en masse ill-treatment or punishment; or the employment of RCA means of delivery in conjunction with firearms as a “force multiplier”, making such force more deadly.

Facilitate development and proliferation of autonomous weapons systems: Continuing research and development of “remote control” RCA delivery mechanisms and unmanned systems more broadly may potentially contribute to the future development, proliferation and use of fully autonomous weapons systems, i.e. unmanned systems with on-board computers, that once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention.

Despite the ongoing development and promotion of a range of “remote control” RCA means of delivery of potential concern, none of the OPCW policy-making organs have effectively addressed this situation to date.

We therefore recommend that the OPCW and its Member States should:
- Conduct a review of the existing constraints, under relevant international law, upon the use of RCA means of delivery in law enforcement;
- Develop a process for determining which means of RCA delivery are prohibited under the CWC;
- Strengthen existing RCA declaration and reporting measures, and explore the feasibility and utility of introducing appropriate monitoring and verification measures;
- Utilise existing CWC consultation, investigation, and fact-finding mechanisms where activities of potential concern come to the attention of Member States, such as the reported development, production, marketing, transfer, stockpiling or use of inappropriate RCA means of delivery.

Given the evident dangers arising from the unregulated production, proliferation and potential misuse of “remote control” RCA means of delivery, we believe that the OPCW should address this issue as a matter of urgency. This Conference provides an appropriate forum to begin this process.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I request that this statement be made part of the CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

ArgIQ is a non-profit organization with the objective of spreading, through academic activities, the Information Quality methodology to Argentina and other Spanish-speaking countries.

The Information Quality methodology provides us with new tools for managing information, creating a new concept that goes from data collection to its transformation into information, intelligence, and knowledge.

This work methodology is always advancing in all fields of knowledge, which can be used for business decision-making and applied in different types of scientific research.

Considering that some of our members combine the information quality knowledge with the chemical weapons one, we have been able to carry out several interesting projects.

Since our presentation last year at CSP19, we started several projects along with colleagues we met here. Among them we can mention:

- The development of a form to report CW attacks in Syria. This scheme allows the reporter to mention facts to be reported separately from their comments and feelings of the event. In this way, the facts are easy to be included in a database and make it clearer to present the local situation. This project was made with Kaspar Haller from Green Cross Switzerland.

- The development of a framework to report local implementation of the CWC. This project was developed with Danilo Campisi from the OPCW. We started with the GRULAC region as a pilot case study.

- The development of a special Course for the African NGO on CW prevention and raising awareness. We developed this project with Barthelemy Tchepnang from CAJAD, Cameroon. He is here as well and we plan to continue working in this project, raising funds to make it a reality.

Besides these three endeavors, we continue working to monitor and report the situation regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons by the FARCs and ELN in Colombia.
We also received a proposal for the development of a special course on Non-Conventional Risks in Cities focused in Buenos Aires. We are working on this and we are planning to start it during 2016.

Participating in the annual Conference of States Parties has allowed us to grow and to combine our experience with other representatives of the NGO community. Thank you for allowing us to be part of this and to present our work.

Thank you for your attention, and I request that this statement be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, OPCW and CWC Coalition Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am pleased to be able to speak on behalf of Pakistan House again this year. Let me first thank you for this opportunity to speak. I must congratulate H.E. Mr Ahmet Üzümcü who recognized the potential of the CWC Coalition, and also congratulate Dr. Paul Walker for leading the CWCC, and helping to promote public awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to facilitate the productive involvement of civil society, including non-governmental organizations.

Mister Chairman, the Paris terrorist attacks stunned the entire international community. According to the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, authorities must imagine that the grimmest threats are possible. “We know and bear in mind that there is also a risk of chemical or biological weapons.” There is a serious concern that Da’esh may use chemical material and weapons to inflict mass causalities in the Middle East, in European cities, and possibly elsewhere. This development can only create extreme challenges for both the OPCW and security apparatuses.

Mister Chairman,

Pakistan House firmly believes that together with State Parties, the OPCW can contribute towards a more effective safety mechanism for the world’s citizens. Building capacity of State Parties to prevent such attacks should top the agenda, thereby encouraging respective partners to incorporate the importance of non-proliferation and dangers relating to the misuse of chemical material. The multi-pronged approach to counter threats of chemical terrorist attacks would also grant the OPCW a new role in the field of preventing asymmetrical threats to chemical industry, research and development, although this does not allude to policing of the existing mechanisms.

Mister Chairman,

The partnership between the OPCW, civil society, academics, and safety and security organizations is a requirement that in the end would help prevent future threats to citizens and chemical installations. The significance of public awareness about chemical terrorism links with future strategy and collaborative measures under the umbrella of the OPCW. This is precisely the approach which Pakistan House supports and seeks to achieve through working-partnerships with other members of civil society organizations.
As an independent, non-partisan and non-political organization, Pakistan House has been contributing to an on-going discourse on implementing a coherent international non-proliferation regime, which must not impede the peaceful uses of chemistry, especially in the fields of research and development (R&D). Pakistan House is to undertake a research project in the field of “promoting a culture of responsible chemistry.” This futuristic vision will only enhance the capacity and comprehension of emerging scientists and policy makers in respective countries.

Let me take this opportunity and reaffirm that the platform of Pakistan House is available to further the noble cause of the OPCW and CWC Coalition and we look forward to participate in the on-going research projects and to help initiate new ones.

Mister Chairman,

Before I close, I want to express our congratulations to this year’s winners of the OPCW-The Hague Award – Dr. Alastair Hay from the United Kingdom and Dr. Mahdi Balali-Mood of Iran – who both have worked for decades in the non-governmental sector to promote the abolition of chemical weapons and to care for those individuals who’ve been victimized by toxic chemicals.

Let me conclude: It is my hope that the threat of chemical terrorism will rather unite the OPCW and the CWC Coalition and together we can counter these threats and help advance the field of peaceful uses of chemistry. Building capacity in the area of responsible chemistry and “educational engagement” will supplement the implementation process.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Jonan Kandwanaho,  
Chemical Analyst, BSc. Chemistry, MSc.TIID (MUK)  
Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS), Uganda

Presentation to 20th CWC Conference of States Parties (CSP)  
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons  
The Hague, The Netherlands, December 2015

Past, Present and Future Involvement of UNBS in Ensuring a World Free of Chemical Weapons and Peaceful Use of Chemistry

The Chairman,  
The Vice Chairman,  
Excellencies,  
Distinguished guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I also add on the voice of the previous speakers to congratulate the chair and his team upon assuming those positions, and pledge necessary support as part of the NGO coalition.

Introduction

I stand here to represent, the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and speak about its past, present and future involvement in ensuring a World Free of Chemicals Weapons and peaceful use of chemistry.

UNBS is mandated to provide sustainable standardization services and ensure good quality & safe chemical and non-chemical products on the Ugandan market. It also ensures safe production, transportation, storage, use and waste disposal of chemicals and non-chemical products in tandem with National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), which is an environmental watchdog.

Due to inadequacy of NGOs in the chemical related fields, (most of the NGOs cover political, marriage & family, education and other related issues), UNBS plays most of those roles and it has actively participated and ensured achievement of the following:

- Advocacy for Toxic Chemicals Prohibition and Control Bill, 2015 that has just been passed in parliament to become an act pending signing by the President, plus involvement in other relevant policies, bills and amendments.
- It has also actively participated in development of the CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear) National Action Plan (NAP), 2011 under the EU arrangement,
• It has also advocated for proper chemical use and disposal among others activities’.

This presentation is summarized with chemical incidents in Uganda, Uganda’s preparedness for any future chemical miss-use, UNBS’ sustainability strategy, prevailing capacity at hand, the gap and conclusion.

**Chemical Incidents in Uganda**

Most of the chemical incidents in Uganda do not involve chemical warfare agents like Soman, Sarin, Masturd gas, VX among others but rather involves chemicals like concentrated Sulphuric acid, Hydrochloric acid, Chloroform that are used to attack people especially in marriages and other domestic violence related issues. The biggest problem has been open market access of such chemicals without any control and accountability on the buyer. However, with the passing of the Toxic Chemicals Prohibition and Control Bill 2015, such gaps will be bridged. On average over three(3) acid attacks and related chemical miss-use incidents happen in a month making a total of about 36 cases in a year.

Due to many acid attack incidents, an Acid Survivors’ Foundation was established in 2011 to arbitrate in acid related cases and give a hand in treatment and caring for the victims.

**Uganda’s Preparedness for any Future Chemical Miss-use**

With the help of the EU under project 33: Building Centres of Excellence in African region and ensuring preparedness of such States for any CBRN related incidents. Such centres will help to train the first responders like Police, Army and other relevant stakeholders as may vary from State to State.

I along with other colleagues from relevant stakeholder organizations formed a national committee that formulated and developed the National Action Plan (NAP), 2011. Several meetings and workshops were held in Kampala, Uganda in which OPCW Assistance and Protection Division for EAC States was ably represented.

This has further fueled government’s effort to participate in such activities through construction of some required facilities.

Stock control and inventory of the chemicals that are locally produced and imported were taken to track the final users; several facilities for destruction of chemicals were constructed like industrial furnaces among other activities.

**Prevailing capacity at hand**

UNBS has several departments like **Standards, Certification, Inspection** and **Testing** though the most relevant department in the chemical field is **testing** where chemistry and microbiology labs fall.
We have several instruments that we use in analysis like GC, GC/MS, HPLC, UV-VIS spectrometer, ICP-OES among others, most of which were donated by UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) while others were acquired through several running projects.

**The gap**

- Inadequate facilities and capacity required to execute the required tasks
- Lack of enough equipment to perform some of the advanced analyses like LC-MS/MS
- Lack of access to some forums where relevant information, literature, methods and experiences are shared that could be borrowed and applied to expedite the execution of prevailing tasks.

**Conclusion**

Given the prevailing conditions and level of State awareness of the dangers associated with unpreparedness and miss-use of chemicals and chemical related products, more public and government awareness and involvement in peaceful use of chemicals and chemistry is expected thus easing the work for the advocating NGOs in that area. In addition to that, if such identified gaps as highlighted above are addressed, peaceful use of chemistry will be an inevitable result. We look forward to participate in the Proficiency Testing exercise and we hope our laboratory is considered as a designated lab for use by the OPCW.

I thank you!
Mister Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

My name is Homayra. I am 26 years old, the daughter of a family who has lost 11 members in Sardasht’s 1987 Chemical Bombardment. I would like to tell you a brief story of this event. Sardasht is a small city located in the northwest of Iran, close to the border with Iraq. Between 1980 and 1988 the territory of my homeland was invaded by Iraqi Baath military forces and this imposed war lasted 8 years. During this period of time the non-militarized city of Sardasht was subjected to sudden assaults. Sardasht is the third city in the world, after Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to become the target of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the first civil human community that fell victim to a chemical attack. Hundreds of civilians were martyred and about 8,000 injured as a result of this brutal action.

When I asked my father about this disaster, he replied; disappointed from overcoming Iran in the war fronts, the Iraqi Baathist Regime imagined that it would be able to impose its demands on the Iranian nation through chemical attacks. Hence, on June 28 and 29, 1987, Iraqi bombers attacked four crowded parts of Sardasht with chemical bombs and engulfed its residents with fatal chemical gases.

Unfortunately, this awful and disastrous chemical attack brought many negative effects and consequences for residents, animals, birds, and the environment. Still many resistant and noble citizens of Sardasht are suffering from negative effects of this attack.

Aiming to support the rights of victims, 14 years ago an NGO under the title of the Organization for Defending Sardasht Victims of Chemical Weapons known as (ODVCW) was established. From then on, according to its mission, ODVCW followed all issues related to chemical warfare victims, fully recognized as injured by the government and other official support organs, and to help bring these victims some necessary health care, general support, and insurance. Every year coincident with these sinister days, we celebrate the memory of those martyred and injured, and of those who still suffer the effects of that event including long-term respiratory problems as well as immune system and genetic disorders.
ODVCW participates in the OPCW’s annual conference and follows the decisions made by member states of the CWC. A few years ago we offered our city to be named as a “city of peace” and we propose it once again.

We brought a lawsuit against Frans Van Anraat, a Dutch businessman who sold raw materials for the production of chemical weapons to Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein. We also filed claims against Saddam Hussein in Iraqi trial courts. In addition to these actions, we will be taking further such steps in the futures.

Despite the passage of 28 years from the chemical bombings in Sardasht, the families of victims urge the international community to bring the main perpetrators of these crimes against humanity to justice, but their calls seem to have been futile so far.

We again call on the international community to carry out their “legal and moral responsibility” towards the victims of chemical warfare and their families and to facilitate the punishment of the perpetrators and supporters of such inhumane acts.

And now, last but not least, I would like to thank the Secretary General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, for his annual statements on behalf of the OPCW to commemorate the chemical weapons attack on Sardasht in 1987.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, OPCW and CWC Coalition Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great honor for me to have the privilege of speaking at this podium, once again, on behalf of the Center for International Security Studies and Strategic Research, also known as MEF Strategy, which was established last year at MEF University in Istanbul.

Mister Chairman, as the Director of MEF Strategy, allow me to say a few words about our center first. MEF Strategy aims to carry out elaborate and comprehensive research on world affairs with special emphasis on the developments taking place in the realm of international security and military strategy. In accordance with this objective, MEF Strategy will convene workshops and conferences by bringing together academics and experts working in these fields and will also take part in the realization of similar gatherings by sister organizations, such as the ones that are represented here. We are, therefore, grateful to the OPCW for giving us this unique opportunity to expand and consolidate our network by inviting me to participate in this extremely important event.

I would like to take this opportunity to also express our gratitude to Green Cross International, the CWC Coalition, and to Dr. Paul Walker in particular for doing everything in their power for cementing the cooperation among us.

Mister Chairman, we are pleased to see that every passing year the CWC is getting closer to its goal of universality.

The recent accession of Myanmar and Angola increased the number of states parties to the Convention to a record high 192 states and thus making it the most successful multilateral disarmament treaty. We are looking forward to the accession of the hold-outs, namely Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan to the Convention at an early date. In this regard, the efforts of the OPCW and the CWC states parties must be acknowledged and highly praised by everyone.
Hence, allow me to congratulate once again the OPCW and its Director-General Mr. Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for the well-deserved Nobel Peace Prize awarded two years ago.

Director-General Üzümcü and the OPCW must also be congratulated for the extremely crucial mission of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. It’s relieving to know that 99 percent of Syria’s chemical weapons stocks have been eliminated. But, the remaining 1 percent must remain to be a serious concern for the 100 percent of the world community.

Earlier this year, Director-General Üzümcü has reportedly “revealed in a press conference during his visit to Japan in February that Iraq had reported to the Organization that ISIS members have attempted to obtain chemical weapons.”

More recently, it was stated in the Decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW, which was adopted by consensus last week on November 23 that the report of the OPCW’s Fact-Finding Mission confirmed “with the utmost confidence that at least two people were exposed to sulfur mustard” in the town of Marea, north of Aleppo, in Syria, on August 21.

I remember, in my short presentation at this podium exactly a year ago, I had pointed at the possibility of unauthorized access to chemical weapons and/or chemical agents that could be weaponized by non-state actors who wouldn’t mind using them in their attacks against unprotected people. We’re living in a world where our greatest fears, rather than our dreams, started to come true.

This, in my view, is primarily because of failing to achieve effective and comprehensive international cooperation in the fight against non-state actors. Needless to say, the CWC has not been designed to address non-state actors. It is the task of the international community whose 192 member states have been gathered in this forum with a view to eliminating the remaining chemical weapons before they are stolen, lost or proliferated to medieval-age structures like ISIS, which may push the level of their atrocities to unprecedented extremes.

Unfortunately, we have seen such atrocities over the past year, not only in Iraq and Syria where ISIS has managed to maintain its control over large territories, but also in capital cities like Ankara, Beirut, Paris and Bamako.

Had these attacks been carried out with chemical weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, the result would have been catastrophic. There is no guarantee that no such an attack will ever occur in other population centers anywhere in the world, given the rapid expansion of the zone of operation of ISIS.

Hence, it is time for the members of the civilized world to get together more urgently than ever in the fight against those who want to drag us toward the dark ages. One of the first steps should be to publish the six Fact-Finding Mission reports and to support the new Joint Investigative Mechanism established by the United Nations to determine accountability for chemical weapons use in Syria.

Thank you for your attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Director General, Distinguished Delegates and Guests,

Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to speak about the chemical weapons demilitarization program in Pueblo, Colorado that will destroy chemical weapons through the use of neutralization and bio-treatment. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program, established by the U.S. Congress in 1995, provided communities a choice between incineration and non-incineration technologies. The Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Project, commonly known as PCAPP, is fully carrying out the principles of this program in Pueblo, Colorado.

Mister Chairman,

Imagine a small city situated along the Rocky Mountains, a community known for its steel mill, agriculture and tourism. Imagine the fear and anger displayed by the citizens as they are told 25 years ago that the weapons stored at the Pueblo Chemical Depot will be destroyed by incineration. Fear was for their crops, animals and environment! Fear for their families and livelihood over concerns that no one would purchase their crops or animals because they might be contaminated by emissions from the incineration facility. Anger that they had no input into this decision!

Now imagine this same community today, comfortable with the neutralization-biotreatment facility on the verge of destroying the weapons. There is no fear, no anger, and no distrust. There is understanding and almost complacency. This is what the principles of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program have done in Pueblo, Colorado.

The four hallmarks of this program are: transparency, community and citizen involvement, education of the workers and public, and safety of the workers, the community and the environment that have transformed the Pueblo community.

Transparency within the program is still the most important aspect of the program. The citizens of Pueblo continue to have input into almost every aspect of the program and have had from the beginning. Currently we are meeting to discuss a series of “what ifs” in dealing with the biotreatment system. The biotreatment system has many units that are critical to successful weapons destruction and the questions are “What should be done if one or more of the units fail?
What are the criteria to determine success or failure? What are the alternatives?” These are questions that do not have easy answers, but are being discussed as a community.

Community and citizen involvement came into being with the establishment by Congress of Citizens’ Advisory Commissions. Commission members in Pueblo are tenacious, ask questions, and are willing to argue and to speak up. Today the Citizens’ Advisory Commissions in Pueblo and Blue Grass are active citizens groups, trusted by the community, state and federal regulators and the Department of Defense. Public meetings and tours of the construction site by citizens, Congress members and the OPCW are also a hallmark of community involvement.

Education of the community is an important part of transparency and understanding. Both Pueblo and Blue Grass have an educational specialist who goes into the schools and universities.

Outreach offices, located in each community, are where citizens can walk in and view displays and take away program information. The ACWA program website is where anyone can look up information, view pictures and watch YouTube videos about the processes.

The final cornerstone of the program is the most important to the community - safety. No one wants to send a loved one to work at a facility that is unsafe. No one wants to live near a facility that is unsafe. And lastly, destroying the weapons and the surrounding environment at the same time is unacceptable. The workers must be kept safe, the nearby residents must be safe and the environment must be protected. These factors must not be compromised in the course of destroying the chemical weapons in the stockpile.

Mister Chairman,

Early in the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program, and still in some areas, the concept of providing communities with the tools to assist the Department of Defense and Department of the Army in making decisions was very controversial. The issue was power and the idea that power had to be closely held and not shared. Few could conceive of the idea of providing transparency and education to citizens without losing power. Today, there has been a reversal of this thought process. Transparency, education and mutual understanding of decisions has led to shared power and increased power for our leaders, because they know that not only is a decision their decision, but the decision of the stakeholders as well.

Mister Chairman,

Through meeting the criteria of transparency, community involvement, education and safety, the ACWA program allowed the community and the Department of Defense to work together to build a program that meets the needs of everyone by employing face-to-face discussion and consensus.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to provide you with a glimpse into the chemical weapons destruction effort in Pueblo. I ask that this statement be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mr Chairman, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a pleasure to speak on behalf of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) from New Delhi, India. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is a non-partisan, autonomous think-tank dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence, security and strategic studies. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. IDSA, is one of the oldest and renowned think-tanks form India and is celebrating its Golden Jubilee this year.

IDSA has a well-qualified multi-disciplinary research faculty drawn from academia, defence forces and the civil services, representing a diversity of views. Research at the Institute is driven by a comprehensive agenda which includes issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Through its various publications, IDSA provides impartial analyses and presents wide-ranging policy recommendations.

The Institute publishes a biannual journal called *The CBW Magazine*. This journal has been published since 2007 and is the first of its kind in India. It offers a forum of debate for highlighting and analysing issues concerning chemical and biological weapons.

Mr Chairman,

Since its inception, IDSA has served as a forum for debating important aspects of national and international security. The Institute conducts several national and international conferences every year, and regularly holds round-tables and workshops on important themes. On 3rd September 2015, the OPCW Director-General had visited IDSA and addressed us on various matters concerning the chemical weapons’ convention.

Mr Chairman,

The OPCW, the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize awardee, deserves credit for handling the Syrian chemical weapons issue very professionally. Although the bulk of the Syrian challenge with regard to the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles is over, there is still a need to ensure that the remaining chemical weapons from Syrian soil are completely eliminated. It is well understood that the OPCW alone cannot handle this challenge and would need assistance from other important agencies.
Today, the challenge posed by the terrorist organisation ISIS indicates that there is no scope for complacency about the chemical weapon threat in spite of the Chemical Weapons Convention being the most successful multilateral disarmament treaty in history. The danger from any possible covert CW proliferation by terrorist organisations should not be underestimated.

Mr Chairman,

The CWC and OPCW have greatly contributed to norm-building against chemical weapons. The process of destroying chemical weapons needs to be given the highest priority. It is expected it may take a few more years for the complete destruction of the chemical weapon stockpiles with Russia and the United States. The destruction and related activities in the recent past demonstrate that both these states are serious about their responsibilities to the CWC. I am positive that by the beginning of the next decade these states would be able to fulfil their treaty obligations.

Various think-tanks, NGOs, civil society groups, and academicians are playing an important role in debating the agenda of the CWC and OPCW and raising public awareness. I am sure that these organisations would also play a vital role towards ensuring the growth of chemistry and developing international cooperation in sponsoring chemical research and sharing of best practices amongst the agencies.

Finally, I would like to appreciate the efforts make by the OPCW for engaging various non-governmental stakeholders to play a constructive role towards fulfilling the CWC’s mandate. I thank you, Mr Chairman – and thank you all for your kind attention. I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

My name is Margaret Muturi from Kenyatta University, Kenya.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak during CSP20 as a member of the academia

Mister Chairman,

The accession of Angola as the 192nd State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention this year has been a remarkable breakthrough for Africa and the world. The number of the African countries that are members to the convention are now 52. With only two countries in Africa still remaining outside the Convention, Angola’s accession shows progression towards universalization of the treaty, towards a full Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in Africa. At this juncture I encourage Egypt and South Sudan to accede to the treaty.

Mister Chairman,

Since joining the CWC, My country Kenya has actively participated in its activities and continues to reiterate its support by fulfilling the mandates and goals of the Convention; by ensuring peaceful uses of chemicals and preventing production and use of chemical weapons. Although Kenya has no chemical weapons and does not intend to produce, stockpile, or use such weapons, Kenya recognizes the need to enforce strong legislation, human capacity building, and the necessary infrastructure so as to meet her conventional obligations and ensure the safety and security of her people.

Mister Chairman,

Out of the 52 African Member States to the Convention, 19 have already completed their administrative frameworks on the global law. However, Kenya is among some of the 23 countries that have no legislation, making it difficult to guard against the misuse of the chemicals. Kenya being a transit route for five countries; Uganda, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Rwanda, is more vulnerable especially to non state actors. In this regard there is urgent need for legislation to control the movement of chemicals across the borders.
Mr Chairman,

Kenya has made some progress through a number of processes including initiating a Chemical Weapons Control Bill. In addition, the Kenyan program on Chemical Safety and Security, spearheaded by the Polish International Center for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS) is evidence of this progress by creating awareness among the stakeholders.

I would like to underscore the fact that the implementation of article VII has been slow and unpredictable. The majority of Kenyans are not aware of the harmful use of chemicals and the urgent need for legislation to guard against their misuse. The country is aware of the fact that chemicals such as ammonium sulfate, widely used as fertilizer, have also been misused by terrorists to make home-made bombs. It is critically important to raise awareness among the Kenyan population and lobby the government through civil society groups.

The complementary nature of the OPCW and Kenyan civil society’s activities in promoting international peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation should enable us to embark on mutually reinforcing actions, for example, in promoting public awareness and for the enactment of domestic laws. It is my hope that through the continued cooperation between the OPCW and African States Parties, we can together achieve the continent’s universality and national implementation goals.

Thank you for your attention, and I request that this statement be made part of the final CSP record.
Mister Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

Global efforts in chemical disarmament and preventing the re-mergence of chemical weapons have registered unprecedented achievements under the leadership of the OPCW leadership, for which it was recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

The OPCW’s successful functioning today, despite the fact that is a treaty-based organization, depends on the ability to find its place in the world of the global spread of chemical manufacturing and use. There is also a global spread of threat of use of toxic chemicals as a means of warfare or terror. The recent use of chemical weapons and chemicals as weapons in Syria, and terrorist attacks against chemical infrastructure are visible confirmations of a growing threat of misuse of chemicals. The chemical threats are global in reach and require global responses. To meet these challenges we have to move beyond traditional arms control and disarmament.

We have to build a global movement to reduce chemical threats, free from political biases, with the OPCW in the center of these efforts.

In the process of renovating the OPCW agenda and accommodating the OPCW to join international efforts to meet these challenges, the OPCW should embrace chemical safety and security. Chemical safety and security should be a vehicle which will allow the OPCW to assist its member states to reduce chemical threats and increase international cooperation.

The Third Review Conference recalled that chemical safety and security, while being two distinct processes, are the prime responsibilities of States Parties. It encouraged the promotion of a safety and security culture regarding chemical facilities and of transportation of toxic chemicals. The Third Review Conference welcomed the role of the OPCW as a platform for voluntary consultations and cooperation among the States Parties and the relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and academia, to promote a global chemical safety and security culture.

These approaches and the OPCW accumulated experience have been imbedded in the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS) – [www.iccss.eu](http://www.iccss.eu). The ICCSS is today a leader in global efforts to enhance safety and security in chemical production, storage, use, transport and waste disposal. Founded and led by former senior OPCW officials, the Centre is making rapid progress by catalyzing cooperation across a broad range of
stakeholders in government, industry, academia and civil society. We offer an inclusive participatory program development. We avoid divisive political concepts and language that hinder progress in nuclear and bio safety and security.

We continue the efforts to enhance chemical safety and security globally. This global process started in November 2012 with an international meeting on chemical safety and security co-organized by the OPCW and ICCSS in Tarnow, Poland with participants from 56 countries and over 20 international organizations. This was followed by the OPCW’s Third Review Conference in April 2013, which provided consensus support for efforts to promote global chemical safety and security culture. The Warsaw Conference on chemical and ecological safety and security, held in May 2014, then proposed that ICCSS and its national and international partners organize a global chemical safety and security event.

This process is continued with the Global Chemical Safety and Security Summit (www.chemss.2016.org) and accompanying Fair to be held in Kielce, Poland on 18-20 April, 2016, as the first global multi-stakeholder event dedicated to addressing chemical safety and security solutions in the supply chain of raw materials, production, infrastructure, transportation and use of chemicals in all areas of chemical activities, and to promoting development of a global chemical safety and security culture.

The Summit and the Fair aspire to be a tipping point for national and international efforts to develop a global chemical and ecological safety and security market through internationalization and operationalization of the best existing national and international best practices, capacity building, solutions, and technologies.

There are 2 most innovative concepts behind the Summit. It is not a government-led initiative. It is an initiative coming from the grassroots level, from those who are directly engaged in meeting chemical threats. Governments support the initiative but they are partners of industry, academia, and civil society in the preparation and running of the global summit. This multi-stakeholder ownership of the Summit confirms an emerging whole-government or whole-society approach in meeting chemical threats. Secondly, the summit is going to be a truly global event, free from political limitations. We believe the Summit will be another step in building global responses to the global threat of misuse of toxic chemicals, with the OPCW in the center of these efforts.

I invite the OPCW community to join the process of global summit preparations and conduct, and to jointly assist in reducing chemical threats. Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mr Chairperson
Director General
Your Excellencies
Ladies and Gentlemen

I am pleased to speak at the plenary session of the 20th Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, on behalf of the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support, from Iran.

Allow me to extend my appreciation to the Director General Ambassador Üzümcü and the Technical Secretariat as well as to the states parties to the CWC for their efforts in implementing the Convention. Indeed, winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 has been a significant success for the OPCW and is in accordance with Alfred Nobel’s will, where it says that: “the most or the best work for fraternity between the nations and the abolition or reduction of standing armies”.

We also believe that the accession of two new countries to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2015 is one big step towards universalizing the convention.

In addition, the establishment of the, “International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons,” as well as the “Trust Fund for the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons” and recent activities of the Technical Secretariat in this framework, is highly appreciated especially so, since thousands of Chemical Warfare survivors are still suffering in my country, Iran, decades after exposure to chemical warfare agents.
Excellencies

By the tremendous efforts of the international community and civil society, the use of chemical weapons is highly condemned today. But it doesn’t mean it has ended.

Chemical weapons are still a threat to humanity. We have witnessed the use of different chemical agents in the recent conflicts in the world. The chemical weapons’ stockpiles still exist in some countries and the Chemical Weapons Convention is not yet an entirely universal treaty.

On behalf of tens of thousands of Victims of Chemical Weapons in my country, we urge all the non-member states to join the Chemical Weapons Convention immediately. We urge the states parties who possess chemical weapons to fully destroy their stockpiles and we request the international community and civil society to continue raising awareness about the consequences of chemical weapons.

Mr. Chairperson

As a young person, I strongly believe that the young generation who are going to be the future leaders; need to know more about the disastrous effects of chemical weapons on the humankind and the environment.

It is regretful today that our children and youth all around the world are playing violent video games, including those that endorse the use of chemical weapons under euphemistic names such “poison spell,” in order to exterminate their cyber enemies.

We are very close to complete destruction of the declared chemical weapons arsenals and yet, our young people are learning – through their play - to deploy them. This is unforgivable and needs the immediate action of all governments, civil society and individuals.

Mr. Chairperson

The history of the use of the chemical weapons needs to be kept alive in order to save the succeeding generations from such horrors. The Oral History Project of the Chemical Warfare Survivors in the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support and the Tehran Peace Museum is an effort in this regard.

Considering the histories, recollections and perspectives of victims of chemical weapons in our future programs and supporting the victims through their lives are our responsibilities. Choosing Professor Mahdi Balali-Mood, who is a distinguished medical expert in treating these victims, as one of the winners of the OPCW-The Hague Award in 2015, reflects the OPCW’s tendency as well.
In conclusion, Mr. Dehkordi- a survivor of chemical warfare who has also travelled here from Iran - wishes to share some of his personal reflections. I invite you all to listen to him:

“Mr Chairperson
Director General
Your Excellencies
Ladies and Gentlemen

I was exposed to chemical weapons 31 years ago and this has changed my whole life. I cannot count the number of times I have been hospitalized and I cough very painfully every day. I have suffered from burnt eyes, I have struggled for my every breath and I have watched many of my friends who have died in silence in recent years. This has not been my choice.

Now, on behalf of all fellow victims, I’m here to ask each one of you to take every necessary step for the abolishment of chemical weapons.

I am also here to pass a peace message from my fellow victims who are working hard to raise awareness on consequences of the use of chemical weapons to save our future generation from reemergence of such disasters and to spread friendship among all the people around the globe.

I wish you all success in your important responsibility in this regard.”

Thank you very much for your attention.
Mr Chairman, Director-General, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

My name is Animesh Roul, presently serving as the Executive Director of the New Delhi-based policy research group, the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict (SSPC). SSPC is a network member of the CWC Coalition and the Bioweapons Prevention Project (BWPP) along with other international policy research and civil society groups.

On behalf of my organization, I thank the OPCW and the CWC Coalition for this opportunity to speak at the plenary meeting at the CSP 20.

Mr Chairman,

We at SSPC aim to carry out research, advocacy, and dissemination of information on subjects relating to arms control, non-proliferation, armed conflicts, and counterterrorism issues. Over the last few years we have been regularly publishing research works, opinion pieces, and news digests on weapons of mass disruptions (CBRN) with particular focus on chemical and biological weapons and materials. In the near future, we are looking forward to undertaking similar activities for better information dissemination within the larger strategic community and for the benefit of general readers.

Mr Chairman,

In his recent visits to India and Pakistan, the Director-General, His Excellency Ahmet Üzümcü, underscored the imminent dangers posed by chemical weapons emanating from Non-State Actors (NSAs), a matter which is virtually posing new challenges before the international community and before the OPCW at present.

In reality, this Non-State Actors (NSAs) phenomenon, primarily related to the terrorist groups with Jihadist orientations, has been plaguing the South Asian region and elsewhere for decades. Leading transnational terrorist groups are presently attempting to legitimize the use of chemical and biological weapons against population centers as permissible weapons of war by distorting religious treatises and Jihadi war manuals. We
have witnessed this situation taking roots in the conflict zones in the Middle East. SSPC is working relentlessly to monitor and document these CBW events, Jihadist motivations, movements and capabilities with critical assessments and analyses. In this regard, in February this year (2015), SSPC had the opportunity to participate and present its research on Chemical and Biological Dimensions of Jihadi Terrorism in the 17th Asia Security Conference organized by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. SSPC research on CBRN issues are presented and published occasionally in various forums, particularly in the CBW Magazine published by the IDSA in New Delhi from time to time.

Mr Chairman,

I would also like to take this opportunity to draw your attention towards some of SSPC’s present activities and future plans on CBRN-related research works: firstly, SSPC is engaged in building a strong database in order to regularly monitor CBRN events. For this, publication of a monthly newsletter, CBRN Digest, with the aim to document chemical, biological and radiological events is under consideration at present. We have in fact already published two issues of this monthly digest earlier this year and plan to give continuity to this on a regular basis in the future. Secondly, in the coming year, SSPC also plans to publish a Historical Fact book on Chemical Biological weapons’ use by Non-State Actors as well as a series of Issue Briefs and opinion pieces on CBW arms control and proliferation issues. Our earnest endeavour would remain to bring these issues into the public domain to raise awareness and to initiate a dialogue among various stakeholders, including industry, the scientific community, and civil society members.

On behalf of SSPC, I am very much looking forward to the meetings, side events, and discussions scheduled for this week.

Thank you, Mr Chairman, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mr. Chairperson, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Good afternoon. My name is Noel Stott and I am a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) based in South Africa. ISS is an applied policy research and technical assistance institute working for the advancement of sustainable human security in Africa. We seek to influence decision makers within Africa and beyond and as such, we undertake applied policy research, provide teaching and training as well as technical assistance. Since 2007, one of our project’s aims (with Norwegian funding) has been to enhance Africa’s role in international efforts to strengthen weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of Africa’s developmental imperatives.

The near-universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Africa is a testament to the continent’s commitment to ensuring that the misuse of dangerous chemicals never occurs in Africa or anywhere else in the world. We were pleased to see Angola becoming a State Party to the CWC this year, bringing the total number of OPCW Member States to 192 and we concur with the statement by Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OPCW, that “Angola's accession to the Convention brings this important treaty a further step towards complete universality”. We share his “hope [that] this will encourage those countries which remain outside the Convention to join the global consensus against chemical weapons”. Angola deposited its instrument of accession on 16 September 2015 and the Convention entered into force for it on 16 October 2015.

We therefore urge the remaining two African countries, Egypt and South Sudan, to join the CWC, which will reinforce the African Union’s (AU) designation of Africa being a Chemical Weapons-Free Zone – which is underscored by the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the OPCW.

While universalization is important, so too is the effective implementation of the Convention in the existing African States Parties. In 2015, some progress has been made to increase the number of African States Parties with implementing legislation covering all key areas of the CWC, and to provide national authorities with the necessary financial and human resources to monitor appropriate implementation of the CWC.
The OPCW’s Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa has accomplished a great deal over the years, enabling Africans to participate in training courses and workshops on relevant topics. The programme has also provided internship opportunities, offered support to attend CWC conferences (CSPs) and supplied functional equipment. As such, the OPCW’s programmes yield direct economic benefits to a continent struggling to meet our national developmental goals. From our experience, engagement in Africa must promote both the developmental benefits as well as the security dimensions of CWC membership.

Strengthening the human resource pool of National Authorities in African Member States is crucial and the offer of internship programmes such as the programme in chemical engineering, currently being held at the Beijing University of Chemical Technology in Beijing, China, from September 2015 to February 2016 is welcome and indeed appreciated - as were the workshops on ‘Security, the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and cooperative threat reduction in Africa’, held in Pretoria, South Africa, from 2-6 March 2015 and hosted by the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the training course for customs authorities on technical aspects of the transfers regime of the CWC held in collaboration with the World Customs Organization (WCO) in October 2015.

The complementary nature of the OPCW and African civil society’s activities in promoting international peace and security should form the foundation for increased co-operation. Given the resource constraints faced by most African countries, the OPCW, together with African States Parties, the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations, chemical industry and representatives from African civil society, should combine efforts and co-ordinate activities in order to make the best use of scarce resources and build sustainable processes. The ISS stands ready to create ‘safe-spaces’ for relevant stakeholders to discuss areas of mutual interest, determine priority areas and build the necessary knowledge base within African States.

Too often, the implementation of the various non-proliferation and counter-terrorism instruments tends to happen in silos, depriving national stakeholders from possible synergies and resulting in duplication of efforts and a waste of scarce resources. ISS recently (14-15 September 2015) hosted, with the financial assistance of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), a workshop to assist the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states and the IGAD Secretariat, in particular its Security Sector Programme, in building chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) non-proliferation capacities, in the context of resolution 1540 (2004), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as relevant international counter-terrorism conventions, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation.
The workshop, which was organised in partnership with the IGAD Secretariat and the AU aimed to: raise awareness of the above-mentioned instruments and of the cross-cutting obligations stemming from them; promote their universalization; facilitate the exchange of experience and effective practices in implementation efforts; address coordination matters; and, discuss co-operation efforts at the sub-regional level.

Complementarities/overlaps/synergies between the CWC and these other international disarmament, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism instruments with CBRN dimensions need to be highlighted especially in a continent with scarce resources and overstretched person-power. As a means to promote implementation of the CWC in Africa, we propose that the OPCW continue to meet with, and co-ordinate with other bodies, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, as well as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) – the oversight body for the Treaty of Pelindaba.

As stated last year in this hall, we continue to believe that it is important to take stock of whether all articles of the CWC are being implemented and whether the convention is achieving its goals, not only in Africa, but everywhere in the world. The OPCW must remain a genuinely multi-lateral forum where the decisions jointly made by States Parties are fully implemented. Any real or perceived political imbalances between Member States should continue to be addressed.

Finally, as an African civil society organisation, we are ready to partner with the OPCW to fulfil its mandate of ridding the world of chemical weapons. In this regard, we will continue to implement the co-operation agreement that we have with the OPCW (signed in July 2014) in order to collaborate in areas of mutual interest, including promoting awareness and universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Africa, national implementation and comprehensive national legislation and the OPCW Programme for Africa as well as education and outreach.

We believe that better co-operation and co-ordination between the OPCW and African civil society (such as the ISS) will enhance Africa’s engagement with the CWC and will support the goals of the OPCW’s Programme for Africa.

Thank you, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome the opportunity to speak today in plenary session about the management of chemicals exposure fatalities from a forensic pathology point of view.

First a statement of purpose.

Forensic pathology deals with chemicals exposure fatalities on a daily basis. In this short presentation, the approach of forensic pathology towards chemicals exposure fatalities will be outlined.

Let me describe a typical case.

A 65-year-old woman died shortly after cleaning her bathroom with a mixture of various chemicals including bleach and an acid-containing product. According to witnesses, her symptoms included a cough and shortness of breath along with red tearing eyes. She was a non-smoker and had no significant medical history other than asthma.

Her autopsy showed marked pulmonary edema, congestion, and hyperemia. The heart and the brain were congested.

Histological examinations showed edema, fresh intra-alveolar bleeding, and emphysematous changes in both lungs, perivascular interstitial fibrosis in the heart, and that her brain, kidney, and liver were also congested.

Toxicological analysis showed that paracetamol, methylprednisolone, venlafaxine, and its metabolite O-desmethylvenlafaxine were detected in her blood. These drugs and their levels can be explained by the drugs she received for her asthma and depression.

Now the structure for how the deaths were documented.

Accurate death certification begins with a thorough account of what was observed at the scene and an inquiry into the decedent’s past medical history. The forensic pathologist report also contains findings from the postmortem examination, postmortem toxicology, histopathology, genetic examination, etc.

So what is the applicability of these procedures to other chemicals exposure investigations?

First, analysis protocols.

There is an expectation that the results of analysis by a forensic laboratory are reliable and accurate. In order to set standards, accreditation of the laboratory is an important step. So all forensic analysis should be performed at an accredited laboratory.
Next come documentation and forensic investigation protocols.

There are at least two main internationally-accepted standard autopsy protocols – the Minnesota Protocol, a detailed set of international guidelines providing instructions for conducting forensic autopsies and analysis of skeletal remains. The Minnesota Protocol was adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1989/65 on 24 May 1989. A second widely employed international standard is the European harmonization of medico-legal autopsy rules.

In conclusion, while a conventional toxicologist is mainly concerned with the detection of substances, a forensic pathologist is concerned with the detection of drugs or poisons in samples and is capable of defending his/her result in a court of law. In terms of Chemical Warfare Agents, forensic pathology has an important role to play, and the potential for providing clear evidence for international criminal courts and international organizations.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mister Chairman, Director-General, Distinguished Delegates, OPCW and CWC Coalition Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am pleased to be able to speak on behalf of Green Cross International again this year. As many of you are aware, we have spearheaded an effort, the CWC Coalition, over the past six years to promote public awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to facilitate the productive involvement of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, experts, and industry in the CWC and its implementing agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Mister Chairman,

The OPCW and the CWC States Parties deserve much credit for their steady and ongoing progress in safely eliminating declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Since entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention over 18 years ago, over 90% of declared chemical weapons in eight countries has been verifiably destroyed – over 65,000 metric tons in millions of deadly munitions. This is an extraordinary accomplishment which we should not underestimate, and served as the basis for the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize. Green Cross is proud to have played a major role in helping facilitate this lengthy disarmament effort over the last twenty years, especially in our involvement at every chemical weapons stockpile site in Russia and in the whole US program.

We are most recently pleased with the very timely removal of all declared chemical agents and precursor chemicals from Syria last year, and want to congratulate and thank all countries who were engaged in this massive effort. With about 99% of Syria’s chemical weapons now destroyed, we look forward to eliminating the final 1% this year.

Also deserving of recognition is the major progress made in universalizing the Convention. The accession of Syria in 2013, and both Myanmar and Angola in 2015, now points to only four countries outstanding – Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. With 192 States Parties today, the CWC has become the most successful multilateral disarmament treaty in history and has truly made a whole class of weapons of mass destruction taboo. It is a remarkable model of non-discriminatory disarmament to emulate in other important areas of global security.

Mister Chairman,

In spite of the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention, many significant challenges lie ahead. The first which I would note is the completion of safe destruction of declared
chemical weapons stockpiles. Although there has been significant schedule slippage in all destruction programs to date, the two largest possessor countries – Russia and the United States – have both made impressive progress and expended extraordinary amounts of resources to complete their demilitarization programs. I remain optimistic that these Cold War arsenals will finally be fully destroyed in the next 5-8 years.

Second, we all must work to fulfil the 2003 Action Plan for universality, bringing in the last four outstanding countries, noted earlier, as well as geographic areas which are not yet under OPCW verification auspices, so that the Convention truly becomes universal.

Third, the six Fact-Finding Mission reports of the OPCW regarding allegations of use of chemicals in the Syrian conflict have been very important in confirming the use of sarin, mustard, and chlorine over the past three years. The use of chemicals in warfare, banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention, by either government or non-government forces, must be stopped and those individuals, groups, or governments held accountable. The recently established Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) under United Nations auspices will hopefully help in this regard. I would urge the OPCW to publish all of these FFM reports and the forthcoming JIM report on its website as soon as possible, given that they are already in the public domain.

Mister Chairman,

Before I close, I want to express our congratulations to this year’s winners of the OPCW-The Hague Award – Dr. Alastair Hay from the United Kingdom and Dr. Mahdi Balali-Mood of Iran – who both have worked for decades in the non-governmental sector to promote the abolition of chemical weapons and to care for those individuals who’ve been victimized by toxic chemicals.

Mister Chairman,

Finally, I want to emphasize the importance of involving civil society – non-governmental organizations, academics, industry, and other interested stakeholders – in the work of the OPCW and the CWC. Only by engaging all stakeholders globally will the OPCW retain its relevance and public awareness. The recent establishment of an Advisory Board on Education and Outreach has been a major step in the right direction, as well as expanding access for non-governmental experts to the OPCW, to its staff, and to States Parties; while this has been a long road since we first organized an “Open Forum” at the Peace Palace over a decade ago, real progress has been made in transparency, inclusiveness, and media access. An important sign of this progress is the fact that our CWC Coalition has since increased registered NGOs for the annual CSPs and five-year RevCons by a factor of ten in recent years. We look forward to further expanding this global network, and to engaging our Coalition members in regional outreach and research efforts in addition to here in The Hague.

We thank the States Parties, especially the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the European Union, and Green Cross Switzerland for providing funding for the CWC Coalition and non-governmental stakeholders, and hope that these funds will continue into the future.
We all must recognize that the continued and expanded involvement of non-governmental experts in the works of the OPCW remains very important to a strong and effective organization in future years, and to precluding the re-emergence of chemical weapons around the globe.

Thank you for your kind attention, and I wish for this statement to be made part of the final CSP record and posted on the external server and website.
Mr Chairperson, Mr Director-General, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am Yiqun Wang, speaking on behalf of the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions, a Dutch and Canadian Foundation. Yesterday, the International Technology Advisory Board on Sea Dumped Weapons had a meeting at the Lithuanian Embassy. It was a very fruitful meeting and the Technology Board will continue to address issues on sea dumped weapons.

It is my pleasure to be invited to talk about the obligation of the OPCW and its States Parties to recover and destroy chemical weapons dumped in water. First, I shall introduce a few technical terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention that seems applicable to this analysis, thereafter I will use certain provisions to elaborate on the obligation to recover and destroy sea-dumped chemical weapons.

I identified the following terms in the Convention, and considering this is the end of your third day, I shall not go into details on the definitions of:
- Chemical Weapons;
- Old Chemical Weapons; and
- Abandoned Chemical Weapons.

The term jurisdiction as mentioned in the Convention shall be interpreted in accordance with international law, i.e. territorial jurisdiction, including internal waters, and the jurisdiction in accordance with the law of the sea.

This means that the areas that remain uncovered in the Convention are the chemical weapons before 1925, and those that are dumped, especially in the high seas.

In the Verification Annex, Part 4, section C, it is specifically stated that dumping in any body of water may not be used as a method for destruction of chemical weapons. However, this provision is weakened by Art. 4, paragraph 17 of the Convention, stating that it shall not apply to the weapons dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. That basically covers all those sunk after WWII, which covers most sea-dumped weapons. For example, the Potsdam Agreement, Chapter 4, gives an idea of what the Allied Nations agreed to do with the German Navy.

Luckily for the achievement of common objectives, the OPCW’s website recognised the protection of human health and preservation of the environment as one of the primary obligations for all States Parties. It stated that the deterioration of chemical weapons that have
been dumped at sea prior to 1985 contaminates the water. In light of this, “although the Convention does not apply to such munitions, this environmental concern may require the recovery and disposal of such munitions.” The experts amongst us can obviously detect the weak language used in this formulation, so here is some work to be done.

This statement on the OPCW’s website is in line with Art. 7(3) the Convention, which assigned States Parties with the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment in implementing its obligations, and called the SP to cooperate in this regard.

What was not mentioned is that there is also a security concern when these chemical weapons are not recovered and properly destroyed. For example, the risk of explosions, such as the recent one that took place near the Canadian coast, and if they fall into wrong hands, such as those of terrorists who are becoming more resourceful by the day.

In addition to SP obligation, the OPCW may recommend collective measures to redress this situation and to cooperate with the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council on addressing this situation that is a serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention, which in accordance with the Preamble, includes the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction as well as the complete and effective prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. These are considered necessary steps to achieve the common objectives. As a matter of fact, in 2003, the Canadian Senate decided unanimously that the Government should immediately call the United Nations for a conference with all coastal states. Sadly, to this day, this has not yet taken place.

In addition to the Preamble, Article 1 paragraphs 2 and 3 to underline the general obligation of SP to destroy all chemical weapons it owns or possesses, under its jurisdiction or control, as well as those abandoned on the territory of another SP. This includes the jurisdiction of coastal states. The only missing element is those that are “dumped,” especially when they are dumped at high seas, which is not owned by any State.

Consequently I would like to propose that the OPCW adopt an additional annex to include the obligation to recover and destroy sea-dumped chemical weapons, and to cooperate with the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions in adopting a treaty on the regulation of prevention, recovering and destruction of all sea-dumped weapons, and include your official support for our technical and legal projects in your budget. These projects involve a repository with the locations of all munitions-sites in addition to our continued technical research on cleaning up underwater chemical weapons in a sustainable and safe way, and the amount of legal work required to get things done.

IDUM has not officially announced it yet, but we are having a Young Scientists Summer School on Sea Dumped Chemical Weapons in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and I would like to invite every State Party to send your young scientist to cooperate on a global scale.

Such support is in line with the provisions on “Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons” as well as “Economic and Technological Development.” I would like to thank you for listening to this short presentation, which due to limited resources, is pro bono work. Therefore, I would like to end my presentation by calling for your much needed support in the continuation of our work towards clean and safe water.
I want to thank Mr Terrance Long for giving me this opportunity to call upon States Parties to safeguard the world for succeeding generations, a world where the conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.