s typical of this method. In om seismograph, suggested may also offer an effective , since the ocean bottom is suitable for the detection d furthermore the installatom is less liable to intrude that on land, so it may be States.

f on-site inspection in some considered in this respect. d by the representative of ch admits on-site inspection urred. Another solution is to frequency, irrespective of

r not. ification of the underground States other than the United are actually launching such ailed information about this capacity of these satellites is onsiderable use as a means of derground nuclear tests. As ntries other than the United pe they will furnish us with Japanese delegation strongly immediately examine such ave the way for the earliest on a comprehensive nuclear

nical questions, I have stated rehensive nuclear test ban step tion of underground tests of a d which it is now possible to by the teleseismic observation egard to the nuclear tests of a which cannot be detected and hod, the United States and the gotiations as early as possible to test ban, duly taking into s and proposals made by many to emphasize here specifically s advanced above bears close was discussed at the Geneva of Nuclear Weapon Tests held s of opinion was almost reached Inited Kingdom and the Soviet treaty should ban tests in all rground tests below the seismic Powers concerned will conduct

common researches on the detection of the small-scale tests, during the course of which they will voluntarily suspend all testing below the threshold of 4.75.10 Final agreement was not reached between the Powers concerned; but I am convinced that the kind of approach suggested by these three Powers will enable us to take measures very close to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in the light of the subsequent remarkable progress made in the seismological techniques of detection and identification, and also of the result of assiduous research by experts of many countries on other effective means of verification.

I wish to point out also that the installation of a seismograph network for detection and identification even for a partial underground nuclear test ban will mean preparing now in advance the seismograph network for detection and identification which will be needed when agreement is reached on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Japanese delegation wishes to reiterate that it is high time that both the United States and the Soviet Union reached a definite political decision toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban in the firm resolve, tiding over the difficulties. It is my earnest hope that both Powers meet our long-cherished desire by adopting concrete measures.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10, 19721

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925,² and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with

¹⁰ See Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Department of State pub. 7258, 1961), pp. 84 ff. S. Ex. Q., 92 Cong., 2d sess., pp. 8-11.

Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 764-765.

BIC

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international

atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins

being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

ARTICLE III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any

Each State I constitutional and prevent th or retention o of delivery sr territory of su anywhere.

The States another and t in relation to provisions of pursuant to priate intern United Nation

(1) Any S other State 1 the provision Security Cou include all p request for if

(2) Each ate in carryi may initiate the United I Council. Th the Convent

Each Sta support assi to any Part Council de result of vic

Nothing limiting or under the Asphyxiati Methods of of the United Nations has ary to the principles and 17, 1925,

ngthening of confidence ement of the international

alization of the purposes ed Nations,

gency of eliminating from measures, such dangerous sing chemical or bacterio-

ne prohibition of bacteriorepresents a first possible ment on effective measures lopment, production and determined to continue

ind, to exclude completely logical) agents and toxins

epugnant to the conscience be spared to minimize this

on undertakes never in any ockpile or otherwise acquire

agents, or toxins whatever to of types and in quantities ylactic, protective or other

of delivery designed to use sees or in armed conflict.

on undertakes to destroy, or on as possible but not later of force of the Convention, all at and means of delivery on, which are in its possession in implementing the provisions ecautions shall be observed to nent.

III
on undertakes not to transfer
or indirectly, and not in any

way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

ARTICLE V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

ARTICLE VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

ARTICLE VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

ARTICLE VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

ARTICLE IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

ARTICLE X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

ARTICLE XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

(1) The (2) Each national Convention Subject of the Standard Security include a jeopardiz

(1) T Any Sta into for accede to

(2) T States. shall be America Ireland hereby

(3) T instrum the Gov

(4) I are dep tion, it instrum

signator date of and the receipt

(6) Govern Nation

This Chines the arcof the Gover States

In signed

ARTICLE XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may

accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

ARTICLE XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

ntion undertake to facilie in, the fullest possible cientific and technological cal (biological) agents and to the Convention in a contributing individually tional organizations to the cientific discoveries in the vention of disease, or for

affirms the recognized nical weapons and, to this

in good faith with a view

ctive measures for the

ction and stockpiling and ate measures concerning

ifically designed for the

weapons purposes.

nted in a manner designed hnological development of cernational cooperation in ological) activities, includacteriological (biological) r the processing, use or al) agents and toxins for h the provisions of the

Iments to this Convention. each State Party accepting by a majority of the States or for each remaining State

ree of this Convention, or of Parties to the Convention effect to the Depositary Parties to the Convention to review the operation of the Convention, including the Convention, including the chemical weapons, are being account any new scientificant to the Convention.