

the most obvious. Neither of
could cost the lives of tens of
powerful common interest in

the enormous cost of arms.
the opportunity to reduce the
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are major industrial powers,
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which the United States and
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learn to live and let live. It is essential not only in the interest of
the people in the Middle East themselves, but also because the
alternative could be a confrontation with disastrous consequences
for the Middle East, for our nations, and for the whole world.

Therefore we urge the continuation of the cease-fire and the
creation of confidence in which peace efforts can go forward.

In the world today we are at a crossroads. We can follow the old
way, playing the traditional game of international relations, but at
ever-increasing risk. Everyone will lose; no one will gain. Or we can
take a new road.

I invite the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in taking that
new road: to join in a peaceful competition, not in the accumula-
tion of arms, but in the dissemination of progress; not in the
building of missiles, but in waging a winning war against hunger
and disease and human misery in our own countries and around
the globe.

Let us compete in elevating the human spirit, in fostering
respect for law among nations, in promoting the works of peace.
In this kind of competition, no one loses and everyone gains.

**Revised Communist Draft Convention Submitted to the General
Assembly: Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weap-
ons and the Destruction of Such Weapons, October 23, 1970¹**

The States Parties to this Convention,

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of
eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of
mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons,

Guided by the desire to facilitate progress in the achievement of
the objectives of general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence
between peoples and the general improvement of the international
atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of chemistry and
bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used
solely for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing nevertheless that the development of scientific
knowledge throughout the world will increase the risk of the use
of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

¹ A/8136, Oct. 23, 1970. The draft convention was submitted to the Secretary-
General by the Polish representative on behalf of the following countries: Bulgaria,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian
S.S.R., and U.S.S.R. The original version of the draft convention appears in *Documents
on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 455-457.

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,² an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966³ and 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968⁴ which condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, and also resolutions 2603 A and B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969⁵ which, *inter alia*, confirmed once again the generally recognized character of the rules of international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Expressing their desire to contribute to the implementation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, or equipment or vectors specially designed for the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as means of warfare.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of—observing all the necessary precautions—or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in its possession, as well as equipment and vectors specially designed for the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as means of warfare.

Article III

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any individual State, group of States or

² *Ibid.*, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 798-799.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 793-795.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 716-719.

is repugnant to the conscience
and should be spared to minimize this

importance of the Geneva Protocol
regarding the Use in War of
Chemical, Gases, and of Bacteriological
Weapons, which embodies generally
accepted law, and conscious also of the
Protocol has already made, and
the horrors of war,
and the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations to comply strictly with

Assembly resolutions 2162 B
and 254 A (XXIII) of 20 December
1970, contrary to the Geneva
Protocol resolutions 2603 A and B
of 1970, *inter alia*, confirmed once
again the character of the rules of interna-
tional law of 17 June 1925,
and in the report submitted to the
General Assembly of the Disarmament Commit-
tee, that it might result from
the development of
(biological) weapons,
and in view of the implementation of
the Charter of the United Nations,

Each State Party undertakes not to develop,
produce, acquire, store, transport, use or
transfer chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons, specially
designed for the use of
(biological) weapons

Each State Party undertakes to destroy
and to dispose of all the necessary precau-
tionary measures and all previously accumulated
(biological) weapons in its possession,
and to prevent the use of
(biological) weapons as means of

Each State Party undertakes not to assist,
by any means, a State, group of States or

international organizations to develop, produce or otherwise
acquire and stockpile chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons.

Article IV

Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally
responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal and
physical persons exercising their activities in its territory, and also
by its legal and physical persons outside its territory.

Article V

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon
as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the
necessary legislative and administrative measures to prohibit the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons and to destroy such weapons.

Article VI

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one
another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise
in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

Article VII

1. Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions
of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations
assumed under articles I and II of the Convention may lodge a
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a
complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its
validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security
Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to
the Convention of the result of the investigation.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate
in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may
undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the
Council.

Article VIII

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological informa-
tion for the peaceful uses of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) agents.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed
to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of
States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in
the field of peaceful chemical and bacteriological (biological)
activities, including the international exchange of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) agents and equipment for the pro-

essing, use or production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article IX

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article X

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

Article XI

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by Governments, including the instruments of ratification of the Governments of States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of other Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, [the Convention] shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this, and shall transmit other notices to them.
6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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Article XII

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in _____ copies at _____, this
_____ day of _____.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 2, 1970¹

Today, the First Committee is beginning consideration of the question of disarmament, to which States Members of the United Nations and the United Nations as a whole unswervingly have attached great importance and great attention. This is quite understandable. The solution of these problems is related to the vital issues of our times, namely the strengthening of international security, the establishment of a sound and durable peace, and the raising of the standard of living of peoples.

The importance of the question of disarmament has grown immeasurably over the last ten years, during which tremendous changes have taken place in the world in the field of nuclear physics, chemistry, rocket construction and in other fields of science and technology, and also in military production. It is quite obvious that a nuclear war would cause tremendous losses and the destruction of many millions of people, of whole States and of invaluable sources of culture.

The Soviet Union considers that the problem of disarmament is a most important issue which requires an immediate solution. At all stages of its development, the Soviet Union has consistently attached great importance to action in favour of disarmament, and in approaching this task, the Soviet Union bases its actions upon the basic principle laid down by the founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who put forward the view that disarmament is the ideal of socialism.

The Soviet Union sees disarmament as an effective means of providing such a system of international security as will preclude the possibility of the resort to force for the solution of international disputes. We have been very much gratified to note that many delegations, in speaking in the general debate at this session of the United Nations General Assembly, have devoted a

¹ A/C.1/PV.1748, pp. 3-27.