

ance of functions under either the Act or the 1954
 ayed pending the development of procedures, even
 20 days are allowed for establishing them. Except
 inconsistent to do so, such functions shall be carried
 th procedures similar to those in effect immediately
 date of the Act.

JIMMY CARTER

**Chancellor Schmidt to Parliament: European
 Disarmament [Extract], May 11, 1978¹**

intense talks on disarmament and arms limitation
 that lasting impetuses will emanate from these
 international disarmament discussions.

the Soviet Union also has manifested toward us
 te on the weapons not covered by the negotiations
 nitiation, called SALT, and in the negotiations in
 the sphere at times referred to as the grey zone—
 m-range missiles. This opens the prospect that
 in this sector, which is so momentous for Europe,
 his would meet a requirement to which we have
 n attention in the talks with the Soviet leadership.
 ents may seem significant to us because the West
 the premise that the Soviet Union at the time
 ment discussions with the objective to perpetuate
 e it exists. We know, and we are aware of from
 tradition of declarations of principle to practical
 foregone conclusion nor something that proceeds
 o note with satisfaction that these talks have pro-
 points for continuing the discussion.

R, meaning the Vienna negotiations, we have
 lieving a more stable situation on a lower military
 undiminished security of the parties involved. We
 he Soviet Union, to participate in the reduction
 in accordance with the modalities negotiated on
 nna. This, by the way, is in keeping with the last
 iative in which, as you know, the Federal Repub-
 Mr. Genscher and I personally had a considerable
 l the importance of the further development of
 measures in Europe. It would be another im-

service, May 11, 1978; *FBIS Daily Report*, May 11, 1978.
 Chancellor was reporting to the Bundestag on President
 Federal Republic.

portant contribution toward the mitigation of military confrontation
 in Europe.

**Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
 ment to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted
 to Disarmament: State of Questions Under Consideration by
 the Committee [Extract], May 11, 1978¹**

55. There follows a brief descriptive account of the state of each of
 the various principal questions under consideration by the Commit-
 tee. Members' views on those questions may be found in volume II of
 this report.

QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE
 NUCLEAR TEST BAN

General

56. Questions of nuclear disarmament, including the conclusion of a
 comprehensive nuclear test ban and substantial reductions of nuclear
 armaments with the ultimate goal of their complete elimination, con-
 tinue to be the highest priority items on the agenda of the Committee.
 The Committee also maintains a strong interest in the non-prolifera-
 tion of nuclear weapons and members have frequently stated their
 positions on that issue, as well as on the question of the establishment
 of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.

57. Other nuclear disarmament issues before the Committee include
 a proposal by the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on a simul-
 taneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States, and
 also on the assumption of an obligation by the nuclear States to pro-
 ceed to a gradual reduction of the already accumulated stocks of those
 weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction;² a sug-
 gestion by Japan that the cut-off of the production of nuclear fission-
 able materials for nuclear weapon purposes be reconsidered with a
 view to contributing to the cessation of production of nuclear weapons
 and to bringing more countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation
 Treaty;³ a number of proposals by Romania, beginning with the non-
 use of nuclear weapons and the banning of the deployment of nuclear
 weapons and their withdrawal from the territories of other States,
 within a programme aimed at the complete elimination of such weap-
 ons;⁴ and a draft convention prohibiting nuclear neutron weapons,

¹ CCD/573, vol. I, pp. 23-36.

² See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1977, pp. 679-680.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

⁴ CCD/553.

results of the new phase of its work to the Committee during its 1979 spring session.

“Nuclear Neutron Weapon” or “Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation Weapon”

67. On 9 March 1978 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559).¹⁹ The co-sponsors considered that production and deployment of such a new weapon, which they consider to be a new weapon of mass destruction, would have a destabilizing effect on the current politico-military situation and on disarmament negotiations, and would escalate the arms race to a new and more dangerous level.

68. The United States,²⁰ the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany rejected that proposal mainly on the grounds that nuclear neutron weapons are nuclear weapons, which they do not consider to be new weapons of mass destruction, and that such weapons should be dealt with along with other nuclear weapons rather than separately.

69. Several other States also expressed views on the issue and on the proposed draft convention.

QUESTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

70. Since the conclusion, in 1971, of the Committee's work on the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975,²¹ the Committee has continued consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (the use of such weapons is already banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol,²² but many States have reserved the right to retaliate in kind and some maintain chemical weapons for deterrence and retaliatory purposes). Since the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention also covers toxins, which are chemical substances, it, in essence, constitutes a first step towards a prohibition of chemical weapons.

71. Consideration of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction has been influenced largely by three draft conventions and detailed working papers and statements presented to the Committee by various members, as follows: (a) a draft convention submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the

¹⁹ *Ante*, pp. 167-168.

²⁰ *Ante*, pp. 114-118.

²¹ The convention is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133-138.

²² *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

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THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

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15.

Ukrainian SSR, providing for a comprehensive ban on all chemical
weapons (CCD/361),²³ (b) a draft convention submitted by Japan
providing for a ban on all chemical weapons in principle, but with a
phased application of the various categories of chemical agents as their
prohibition became verifiable (CCD/420);²⁴ (c) a draft convention by
the United Kingdom based on elements from the drafts in (a) and (b)
above, together with certain new ideas (CCD/512);²⁵ and (d) a work-
ing paper submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia, containing detailed sug-
gestions for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons (CCD/400),²⁶
as well as working papers and statements containing proposals for the
elaboration of a draft treaty presented by various Committee members,
including Canada, Italy, Japan, United States and Yugoslavia.

72. During 1977 Italy, supported by a number of delegations, put
forward a proposal for establishing a working group with the partic-
ipation of experts, in order to begin the consideration of the basic
principles of a draft convention pending the joint initiative announced
by the United States and the Soviet Union. In its resolution 32/77 of
12 December 1977 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weap-
ons, the General Assembly requested the Committee to continue nego-
tiations, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of
an agreement on chemical weapons, taking into account all existing
proposals and future initiatives, and to report on the results of its
negotiations to the General Assembly at its Special Session.²⁷

73. In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union announced in
Moscow their intention to consider a joint initiative for presentation
to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of
chemical weapons.²⁸ On 9 May 1978, those two States informed the
Committee that they had held intensive bilateral talks since 1976 on
a joint initiative to assist the Committee in achieving early agreement
on a complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, as well as pro-
viding for the destruction of existing chemical weapons.²⁹ The two
parties have also informed the Committee that agreement in principle
has emerged on most, although not all, points in the area of scope.
They have also reported that they are in agreement that the conven-
tion should contain provisions clearly specifying the procedures for
declaring chemical-weapons stockpiles and making declarations relat-
ing to the means of production of chemical munitions and chemi-
cals covered by the convention. However, measures relating to the
disposition of those means of production require further negotiation.
The two parties have further informed the Committee that they share

²³ *Ibid.*, 1972, pp. 120-124.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1974, pp. 99-106.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1976, pp. 520-525.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1973, pp. 206-209.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1977, pp. 825-827.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1974, p. 236.

²⁹ *Ante*, pp. 284-285.

the view that arrangements for adequate verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements, including the creation of a consultative committee. The Committee has also been informed that, while the two parties have agreed on some arrangements and procedures in the area of verification, no agreement has yet been reached on certain important issues, including specific methods of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the disposition of the means of production for chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. The United States and Soviet Union have stated to the Committee that they will continue their best efforts to complete the bilateral negotiations on a joint initiative on this important and extremely complex problem as soon as possible.

74. In the Committee, numerous formal and informal meetings with experts have been held on a chemical weapons prohibition. These meetings have covered discussion of the draft proposals before the Committee and the possible consequences of a treaty on chemical weapons, along with technical matters considered necessary for evaluating the drafts, especially the scope and verification provisions of a treaty on chemical weapons. In the course of these discussions with regard to the scope of prohibition to be contained in a treaty, a narrowing of the views towards a nearly comprehensive ban has developed, while differences remain with respect to verification issues.

75. In keeping with its own agenda and resolution 32/77 the Committee has continued to treat the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as a high priority item.

QUESTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF NEW TYPES AND NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

76. During the last three years, the Committee has considered various issues relating to new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In 1976, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention (CCD/511)³⁰ to the CCD proposing a comprehensive prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and indicating that the weapons to be covered would be specified through negotiations. Several members of the Committee supported the draft convention. Some members, including the United States, rejected the approach of an omnibus treaty. In 1977, the Soviet Union submitted a revised version (CCD/511/Rev. 1)³¹ of its draft convention which was based on 1948 United Nations definition of weapons of mass destruction as ". . . atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above . . ." .³² This draft convention included

³⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 516-519.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1977, pp. 493-496.

³² *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, p. 176.