None of the previous radiological weapons initiatives have been successful. Individual governments of course, major elements of an eventual treaty put forward in the CD during its 1980 session. On the one hand, minimizing the importance of a ban on nuclear weapons, stockpiling, and proliferation of radiological devices is not as important as a chemical weapons ban, or an early test ban. Therefore, a report on the current IRR talks was recently presented to the Committee.

If there is a substantive bilateral report on the status of IRR, it was expected that there would be a report on the whole quite happy with the current status of CTB trilateral negotiations which was satisfactory. The United States and USSR expressed more satisfaction with the bilateral status of the test ban than with the current status of the test ban. The committee was not happy with the rate of progress of the CTB. Trilateral negotiations will continue as soon as possible, and incidentally, the mandate of its ad hoc group of scientific and technical experts to monitor chemical weapons issues.

The committee also renewed the mandate of its subcommittee on the existing effective international arrangements to combat the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons.

People are discussing the need to agree on a final radiological weapons initiative. The earlier, Individual governments of course, major elements of an eventual treaty put forward in the CD during its 1980 session. On the one hand, minimizing the importance of a ban on nuclear weapons, stockpiling, and proliferation of radiological devices is not as important as a chemical weapons ban, or an early test ban. Therefore, a report on the current IRR talks was recently presented to the Committee.

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eral negotiations with respect to an intended joint initiative on chemical weapons (CD/48). An exploratory discussion took place with respect to some elements of a prohibition of chemical weapons, including an outline for a convention on this question, in which several delegations participated, including some non-CD members. On certain issues similar views were brought forward while on others differences of view were apparent. The discussion also revealed that many technical and detailed problems had to be dealt with in the future. Although no consensus could be reached at this stage, the following could be tentatively distilled from the discussion.

(a) Views seemed to coincide that the objective is the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. The development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, and of chemical weapons would be prohibited. Although it was recognized that a prohibition of chemical weapons should not detract from the obligations assumed by states under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, there were different views expressed whether the use of chemical weapons should also be covered in a ban.

(b) The scope of the prohibition would be based on the general purpose criterion. Other additional criteria could be used, in particular toxicity. A distinction would have to be made between chemicals which are primarily useful for chemical weapons purposes and chemicals which have peaceful applications.

(c) Activities would be permitted for non-hostile purposes (industrial, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes and for the protection against chemical attack), as well as for military purposes not related to chemical warfare. Activities relating to offensive chemical warfare, including training, would not be permitted.

(d) In the context of a prohibition of chemical weapons, there would be provisions for the declaration and destruction of existing stockpiles of chemicals acquired for chemical weapons purposes and of chemical weapons within a specific period. There would also be provisions for the declaration, shutting-down and destruction or dismantling of production facilities within a specific period. A period of ten years has been mentioned in this respect.

(e) The fulfilment of obligations under a prohibition of chemical weapons should be adequately verified. Verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures.

(f) International measures could include the creation of a consultative committee of parties to a ban, with a permanent secretariat, to help solve problems arising from the application of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

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7 The statement is printed above, Aug. 7.
8 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 764-765.
Despite an intended joint initiative on this question, the discussion took place with respect to some of chemical weapons, including an outline question, in which several delegations participated non-CD members. On certain issues similar standards while on others differences of view were raised: also revealed that many technical and political issues had to be dealt with in the future. Although no consensus was reached at this stage, the following could be tentatively discussed:

- It is necessary that the objective is the general, complete, and irreversible elimination of chemical weapons. The development, acquisition, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons for destruction or for use should not detract from the obligations assumed under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). There were different views on the use of chemical weapons that should be provided under the CWC.

A prohibition of chemical weapons would be based on the general prohibition criteria and could have to be made between chemicals that are not suitable for chemical weapons purposes and applications, such as medical, industrial, and other peaceful purposes. The provision of non-hostile purposes (industrial, medical, and other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement, etc.) and the prevention of an attack against chemical attack, as well as the destruction of chemical warfare, including training, would not be affected.

In a prohibition of chemical weapons, there should be a declaration and destruction of existing stocks and facilities within a specific period. There would also be provisions for measures to ensure that chemical weapons are not used. The measure of a specific period is the one mentioned in this respect.

Obligations under a prohibition of chemical weapons should be verified. Verification should be based on international and international measures. Measures could include the creation of a committee to a ban, with a permanent secretariat assisting from the application of the prohibition.

The Department of State Response to a Request by Senator Church: SALT II Negotiating Record on Various Issues, August 15, 1979

Article II.1

Issue: MPS system in relation to the Treaty.

Discussion: This issue was raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in July 1978. Referring to newspaper accounts concerning the developments, the United States has stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silos and the ban on deployment. The United States has further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment, after the Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the Delegations. This issue was discussed on several occasions through diplomatic channels along the same lines.

Specifically, the United States has made clear to the Soviets that the various mobile ICBM systems we are considering, including ones in which the launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted during this period. To emphasize this U.S. position, Secre-