

on a final radiological weapons initiative the earliest. Individual governments of course are major elements of an eventual treaty put forward in the CD during its 1980 session. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the United States is trying to minimize the importance of a ban on production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, not as important as a chemical weapons ban, or a nuclear test ban.

On chemical weapons, a progress report on the current work of the committee was recently presented to the committee.

The committee received a substantive bilateral report on the status of the talks. It came as somewhat of a surprise to many that there was agreement between the U.S. and the USSR, and they were on the whole quite happy with the report on chemical weapons. I certainly hope the U.S. and USSR will continue their chemical weapons initiative to the CD early in 1980.

The committee was also pleased with the report on the status of the CTB trilateral negotiations which was presented by the U.S., U.K. and USSR.<sup>4</sup>

The more satisfaction expressed on the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons than there was on the test ban. The report was not received that well, essentially because it was not as substantive as many had hoped. The committee expressed a feeling that it is not happy with the rate of progress on the CTB. Trilateral negotiations will continue to be a high priority of the CD as soon as possible, and incidentally the committee has a mandate of its ad hoc group of scientific experts to study radiological verification methods to monitor compliance with the CTB treaty.

The committee also renewed the mandate of its subcommittee to study effective international arrangements to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to agree on an agreement in this field?

It is a good start on what are also called negotiations with non-nuclear countries which do not possess nuclear weapons. The committee had not had enough time to reach a consensus on the issue. Security assurances are very important and so the committee on the approach to the problem of reaching agreement on this issue. The next session will be as complex as this approach has to encompass the views of France, which says it is only in favor of a ban on nuclear weapons, to the rather

presented by the British representative to the CD, printed

broad view of China which wants an agreement to ban all nuclear weapons immediately. The Soviet and U.S. and U.K. positions are in between these, and the United States has issued a presidential statement that nuclear weapons will not be used against states not in possession of them except in case of attack.<sup>5</sup>

*Question:* Was there much debate on the question of nuclear disarmament?

*Answer:* The committee discussed extensively nuclear disarmament, but nothing concrete emerged from the session in this field. The United States still stands by its opinion that a step-by-step process in negotiating nuclear disarmament, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT II), is a more realistic approach to tackling this problem. The committee did express its firm support for the signing of the SALT II agreements.

*Question:* Last year the Geneva Disarmament Conference was revamped to extend its participation to the five nuclear powers and changed the U.S.-USSR co-chairmanship to one which rotates monthly on an alphabetical basis. Has this change improved the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament?

*Answer:* Overall, I would say yes. The progress that has been made during this new session of the CD is, I think, substantially better than it was during the last year of the former Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). During this first year, France, which never took up its seat in the CCD, has participated very constructively which has been extraordinarily helpful to the work of the CD. China has not yet occupied the seat reserved for it on the Committee on Disarmament, but I hope it will participate actively in the next session of the CD beginning February, or March 1980. We will see more clearly next year what China's intentions are as by then the English alphabet will have come to China's turn to take the chair of the CD.

### **Working Paper Submitted by France, Italy, and the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament: Evaluation of the Discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 With Respect to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, August 13, 1979<sup>1</sup>**

Discussions on issues relating to a prohibition of chemical weapons were held in the Committee on Disarmament from 16-27 July, 1979, as well as after the presentation on 31 July of a substantial joint statement by the USSR and United States of America on their bilateral

<sup>1</sup> The statement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 384. CD 52.

eral negotiations with respect to an intended joint initiative on chemical weapons (CD/48).<sup>2</sup>

An exploratory discussion took place with respect to some elements of a prohibition of chemical weapons, including an outline for a convention on this question, in which several delegations participated, including some non-CD members. On certain issues similar views were brought forward while on others differences of view were apparent. The discussion also revealed that many technical and detailed problems had to be dealt with in the future. Although no consensus could be reached at this stage, the following could be tentatively distilled from the discussion.

(a) Views seemed to coincide that the objective is the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. The development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, and of chemical weapons would be prohibited. Although it was recognized that a prohibition of chemical weapons should not detract from the obligations assumed by states under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>3</sup> there were different views expressed whether the use of chemical weapons should also be covered in a ban.

(b) The scope of the prohibition would be based on the general purpose criterion. Other additional criteria could be used, in particular toxicity. A distinction would have to be made between chemicals which are primarily useful for chemical weapons purposes and chemicals which have peaceful applications.

(c) Activities would be permitted for non-hostile purposes (industrial, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes and for the protection against chemical attack), as well as for military purposes not related to chemical warfare. Activities relating to offensive chemical warfare, including training, would not be permitted.

(d) In the context of a prohibition of chemical weapons, there would be provisions for the declaration and destruction of existing stockpiles of chemicals acquired for chemical weapons purposes and of chemical weapons within a specific period. There would also be provisions for the declaration, shutting-down and destruction or dismantling of production facilities within a specific period. A period of ten years has been mentioned in this respect.

(e) The fulfilment of obligations under a prohibition of chemical weapons should be adequately verified. Verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures.

(f) International measures could include the creation of a consultative committee of parties to a ban, with a permanent secretariat, to help solve problems arising from the application of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

<sup>2</sup> The statement is printed above, Aug. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

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(g) Views seemed to differ under which circumstances and for  
 what purposes international verification procedures would be  
 employed, including on-site inspections. Although it was recognized  
 that on-site inspections by challenge could form part of the verifica-  
 tion arrangements, views were expressed that mandatory on-site  
 inspections would be necessary with respect to certain activities.

(h) Parties to a ban should not impede the national technical means  
 of verification of other parties.

(i) It was understood that there would be a need for national ar-  
 rangements for the implementation of the States' obligations under a  
 chemical weapons ban.

(j) A prohibition of chemical weapons should not interfere with  
 permitted activities, such as the industrial development and peaceful  
 international co-operation in the chemical field.

(k) It was recognized that measures to strengthen confidence could  
 help in the bringing about and application of a ban on chemical  
 weapons.

**Department of State Response to a Request by Sena-  
 tor Church: SALT II Negotiating Record on Various  
 Issues, August 15, 1979<sup>1</sup>**

*Article II.1*

*Issue.* — MPS system in relation to the Treaty.

*Discussion.* — This issue was raised by the Soviet Delegation in  
 Geneva in July 1978. Referring to newspaper accounts concerning  
 the multiple aim point system utilizing vertical shelters, the Soviets  
 stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the  
 ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on  
 deliberate concealment measures. The United States Delegation  
 replied that no decision had been made regarding a basing mode but  
 that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that  
 violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. They further  
 stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deploy-  
 ment, after Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles  
 and their launchers are moved from point to point. The subject mat-  
 ter was not addressed again by the Delegations. This issue was  
 discussed on several occasions through diplomatic channels along the  
 same lines.

Specifically, the United States has made clear to the Soviets that  
 the various mobile ICBM systems we are considering, including ones  
 in which the launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted dur-  
 ing the post-Protocol period. To emphasize this U.S. position, Secre-

<sup>1</sup> *Hearings . . . on Ex. Y, 96-1 . . . Pt. 5, pp. 291-298.*

The paper was an enclosure to a letter by the Assistant Secretary of State for Con-  
 gressional Relations (Atwood), responding to a request made by Senator Church on July  
 29 in his capacity as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.