

carcinogenicity and teratogenicity of expansion of modern chemical industry much later, people began to realize the danger to chemicals. We feel that to disregard the problem would amount to a dangerous

completely new dimensions in the use of herbicides, which considerably changes the importance of individual factors. The herbicides used in chemical warfare, are substances commonly applied for their task is to destroy weeds in agriculture. Therefore, applied highly diluted and with protective measures. Nevertheless, it is clear that even this careful mode of application carries significant risks. The same substances, when used for the purpose of destroying all vegetation in a hurry and speed. The actually used doses are much higher than those for agricultural purposes. The dose used in the Vietnam War was about 30-times higher. The fact that Perry Robinson recently mentioned, that during the Vietnam War, the daily American consumption of CS was about 100 times that of the CS that has yet been used in

to what extent the military approach to the use of these substances.

That we still have very incomplete information of damages to the genetic apparatus, and of teratogenic effects. The laboratory studies are complicated and their results are only preliminary. The effects are always multifactorial. They depend solely on the chemical character of the agent, but also on other additional factors, such as the duration of the agent in the human body. There are differences in the metabolism of the agent. This is one of the reasons of the extreme variability of the results in the laboratory. In addition, the response of an individual is influenced by a number of factors. For instance, hundreds of thousands of people die each year with a poison, because their insulin is insufficient. This substance cannot be "normally" used. One of the reasons why it is extremely difficult to detect in time the delayed effects

is to demonstrate that—in addition to nerve agents have also other characteristics which are extremely important. One ought also to

be aware that there is no correlation between toxicity and delayed effects. There is no doubt, however, that the organophosphorus CW agents and also herbicides and incapacitating agents all belong to the category of chemical substances with a great risk of carcinogenic and teratogenic activities.

We intend to focus attention on the fact that the problem of CW has still other aspects of increasing importance. There are, in fact, many identical features in CW problems and in the problems of the misuse of new scientific developments for military purposes. These great problems need adequate solutions.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 13, 1976¹

Since the last few weeks of the spring session, the CCD's discussions of chemical weapons limitations seem to have taken on a new vigour. This morning I would like once again to address this question, and in particular to comment on the results of the informal meetings with chemical weapons experts which took place last week.

Coming at a time when there seems to be renewed optimism that effective solutions to the remaining problems can be found, these meetings were particularly appropriate. I would like to express my appreciation to the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, which first suggested that the meetings be held, as well as to all the experts who participated.

A most important contribution to the growing feeling that progress is being achieved was made by the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, in his statement just before the informal meetings began. My delegation welcomes his announcement that the United Kingdom delegation plans to table a draft comprehensive CW convention later this session.² I believe that the British effort to bring elements of previous drafts together with fresh ideas for effective limitations is the sort of pragmatic, constructive approach which is most likely to lead our work to a successful result. My delegation will look forward to the introduction of the United Kingdom draft.

Past informal meetings with chemical weapons experts have laid a sound and impressive technical foundation for the Committee's work. My delegation believes that the meetings last week, in which 22 experts from 13 countries took part, advanced our work in a number of important respects. Valuable contributions were made in 11 new

¹ CCD/PV. 711, pp. 7-9.

² *Ante*, pp. 432-441.

working papers and in the comments of the experts on previous proposals.

In reviewing the experts' comments, my delegation was struck by the similarity of views on the question of defining the agents subject to limitation or prohibition in an initial CW measure. As I have indicated several times recently, this is one of the aspects of CW restraints in which the United States believes an adequate technical basis exists for reaching agreement in the near future. In our view, the experts' comments lend further support to this conclusion, which we reached tentatively after reviewing past CCD discussions. The results of this review are embodied in working paper CCD/499 which we introduced in the Committee on 29 June.³

Briefly stated, the principal conclusions of our review of the definitional question are:

1. There appears to be broad support, perhaps even a consensus, for incorporating a general-purpose criterion in any CW agreement.
2. The use of toxicity as an additional criterion has general applicability and has received broad support.
3. The applicability of the other approaches that have been suggested is less general. A judgment on the need for such additional criteria can best be made once a consensus is reached on the types of agents to be covered in an agreement.

To my knowledge no disagreement on these key points was expressed during the experts' discussions.

A closely related issue concerns the agents to be covered in a first-stage agreement. My delegation and a number of others have expressed the view that less toxic lethal agents should not be exempted from prohibition. We appreciate the willingness of the Japanese delegation to take these views into account by agreeing that all lethal chemical agents could be included in an initial ban.

In this connexion it is important to note that my delegation has adopted a slightly different terminology in working paper CCD/499. In that paper the term "lethal and other highly toxic CW agents" is used. We believe that since the word "lethal" is ambiguous from a technical standpoint, the phrase "lethal and other highly toxic CW agents," defined by appropriate toxicity criteria, better expresses the scope of the agents which should be covered. For the sake of convenience, we shall continue to use the word "lethal" by itself, but it should be understood that the two terms are equivalent.

During the informal meetings, a number of experts emphasized the importance of including such dual-purpose lethal agents as hydrogen cyanide and phosgene in an initial prohibition. None of the participants disagreed with the general proposition that all lethal agents should be included in a first-stage agreement.

³ *Ante*, pp. 376-381.

comments of the experts on previous

comments, my delegation was struck by the question of defining the agents subject to an initial CW measure. As I have indicated, this is one of the aspects of CW restraints which we believe an adequate technical basis exists for in the near future. In our view, the experts' support to this conclusion, which we reached in past CCD discussions. The results of this working paper CCD/499 which we introduced

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and support, perhaps even a consensus, for these criteria in any CW agreement.

Additional criterion has general applicability and support.

Other approaches that have been suggested on the need for such additional criteria, a consensus is reached on the types of agents.

Agreement on these key points was expressed

concerns the agents to be covered in a first-aid kit and a number of others have expressed concern that agents should not be exempted from prohibition by agreeing that all lethal chemical agents be included in an initial ban.

It is important to note that my delegation has used the terminology in working paper CCD/499, "lethal and other highly toxic CW agents" is a better word "lethal" is ambiguous from a technical point of view. "lethal and other highly toxic CW agents," is a better criteria, better expresses the scope of the agents covered. For the sake of convenience, we will use the word "lethal" by itself, but it should be understood to be equivalent.

As a result, a number of experts emphasized the need to include dual-purpose lethal agents as hydrogen cyanide in the initial prohibition. None of the participants proposed a proposition that all lethal agents be included in the agreement.

Much of the discussion concerned the area of verification, where the technical foundation for the Committee's work is not yet firmly established. Judging from the views expressed, there is general recognition of the importance of verification questions but as yet no consensus on their solution. For its part, the United States submitted two working papers which describe how certain verification procedures might be employed.

Our hope is that this information will assist members to make judgments concerning the adequacy and acceptability of these procedures.

With the same objective in mind, my delegation has also suggested that it might be useful to consider the feasibility and utility of technical exchange visits to selected chemical production or disposal facilities of various types in different countries. Because of the complexity of the CW verification question, it has been difficult to gain a clear picture through working papers and discussions alone. The United States believes that first-hand knowledge could help to provide a fuller understanding of the proposals which have been made. In our view such visits could not only help point the way to sound provisions in an eventual CW agreement, but could also serve as confidence-building measures in their own right.

My delegation believes that a programme of technical exchange visits would be most successful if it were broadly based, not only in terms of participation by CCD members but also with regard to the types of facilities visited and kinds of information exchanged. Undoubtedly, visits to the few facilities used for detoxification of CW agents could be especially useful. But much relevant information could be gained by visits to other types of facilities in which procedures similar to those proposed for CW verification are already employed. Among the industries where such control methods are commonly used are the nuclear, drug and alcoholic beverage industries.

Furthermore, one of the important tasks in verification would be to confirm that activities conducted for ostensibly peaceful purposes are in fact legitimate. Procedures which do not place an undue burden of intrusiveness on the chemical industries of States must be developed to accomplish this important task. One way to acquire a fuller understanding of this issue might be to visit an organophosphorus insecticide plant.

My delegation is willing to work with others this summer in exploring a programme of technical exchange visits. In this regard we appreciate the positive reaction of the Swedish delegation during the spring session. We are also gratified that the experts from several other delegations have already spoken positively about technical exchange in the area of chemical defence.

We hope that in the coming weeks the concept of technical exchange will receive general support and that it will be possible to begin technical exchange visits early in the fall of this year. We believe that

a programme of visits later this year would substantially facilitate the Committee's discussions at its first session in 1977.

Agreement Between France and the Soviet Union on the Prevention of the Accidental or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 16, 1976¹

As a result of our conversation of 28 April 1976, we considered it desirable to reaffirm the importance attached in the USSR and in France to the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Such an initiative is in keeping with the special responsibilities incumbent on the Soviet Union and France as nuclear Powers.

Having regard to the views exchanged concerning measures to avoid any accidental occurrence on any other unexplained incident that the following provisions should be adopted :

1. Each Party undertakes to maintain and, possibly, improve, as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.

2. The two Parties undertake to notify each other immediately of any accidental occurrence or any other unexplained incident that could lead to the explosion of one of their nuclear weapons and could be construed as likely to have harmful effects on the other Party.

3. In the event of an unexplained nuclear incident, each Party undertakes to act in such a manner as to avoid, as far as possible, the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or request such information as it considers necessary.

4. For transmission of urgent information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Direct Communications Link between the Kremlin and the Elysée Palace.

5. The two Parties shall consider together the possibility of further improving, by mutual agreement, their means of direct communication.

If the above points meet with your approval, I have the honour to propose that this letter and your reply should constitute an agreement between the Soviet Union and France.

This agreement shall enter into force on today's date.

¹ The agreement was constituted by an exchange of substantially identical letters between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries. (S/12161, Aug. 4, 1976.) The French letter was signed by Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues and the Soviet letter by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.