

Resolution 33/58: Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 32/76 Concerning the Signature of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), December 14, 1978¹

Assembly,
 Resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967,² 3262 (XXIII) of 11 December 1974,³ 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,⁴ 3585 (XXXI) of 11 December 1976,⁵ 3685 (XXXII) of 11 December 1977,⁶ concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol I,

and that certain territories lying within the zone of the Treaty which are not sovereign political entities in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Additional Protocol I, to which the States that are internationally responsible for those territories

expressed their satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands had ratified Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively, and their satisfaction that the United States of America had ratified Additional Protocol I in 1977 and that the Government of that country had taken the necessary steps for its ratification,⁶ and the declaration made on 25 May 1978 by the President of the Republic before the General Assembly at its tenth session, regarding the adherence of that country to Additional Protocol I,⁷

and invited the United States of America to make every effort to achieve the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol I;

and expressed their satisfaction the declaration made by the President of the Republic on 25 May 1978 regarding the adherence of that country to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol I and invited that country to make every effort to adhere to that Protocol;

¹ A/RES/33/58, Jan. 10, 1979. The treaty and its protocols are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1967, pp. 69-83. The res. was introduced by Mexico on behalf of other Latin American countries. Both the First Committee and the G.A. adopted it by consensus.

² *Documents on Disarmament*, 1967, pp. 620-621.

³ Ibid., p. 621.

⁴ Ibid., p. 621.

⁵ Ibid., p. 621.

⁶ Ibid., p. 621.

⁷ Ibid., p. 621.

⁸ Ibid., p. 621.

⁹ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 621.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 621.

¹² Ibid., p. 621.

¹³ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 621.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 621.

²¹ Ibid., p. 621.

²² Ibid., p. 621.

²³ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 621.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 621.

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3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

General Assembly Resolution 33/59: Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, December 14, 1978¹

A²

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,³ 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,⁴ 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,⁵ 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,⁶ 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,⁷ 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973,⁸ 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,⁹ 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,¹⁰ 31/65 of 10 December 1976,¹¹ 32/77 of 12 December 1977,¹² and S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,¹³

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it affirmed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament, which should be accorded high priority in disarmament negotiations,¹⁴

Regretting that agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons has not been reached despite its numerous appeals,

Convinced that the continuing arms race calls for urgent disarmament measures and that the process of international détente is conducive to the achievement of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

¹ A/RES/33/59, Jan. 10, 1979.
² Pt. A was introduced by Poland on behalf of itself and 30 states, subsequently endorsed by 14 additional states, and adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the G.A. In the First Committee, China announced that it had participated in the consensus on either pt. A or B (A/C.1/33/PV.58, pp. 57-58).

Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 793-795.
³ Ibid., 1969, pp. 717-719.
⁴ Ibid., 1970, pp. 683-685.
⁵ Ibid., 1971, pp. 890-892.
⁶ Ibid., 1972, pp. 840-841.
⁷ Ibid., 1973, pp. 847-848.
⁸ Ibid., 1974, pp. 790-792.
⁹ Ibid., 1975, pp. 767-769.
¹⁰ Ibid., 1976, pp. 908-910.
¹¹ Ibid., 1977, pp. 825-827.
¹² Ibid., pp. 411-439.
¹³ Ibid., p. 425, par. 75.

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,¹⁵

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction¹⁶ constitutes an important step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States,

Recalling in that connexion the undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Stressing the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the risk of continued development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in the absence of such agreement,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,¹⁷

Noting that drafts of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and constitute valuable contributions to reaching agreement,

Taking into account the comments made on this item and relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Noting also that sustained and intensive efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have led to increased understanding in identifying practical approaches towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and towards their destruction,

Believing that future agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should meet the objective of complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as providing adequate methods of verification for the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons, and recognizing that arrangements for verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements,

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1972, pp. 133-138.

¹⁷ *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, 2 vols.

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of strict observance by all States of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,¹⁵ constitutes an important element on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

and the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general disarmament under effective international control, and the need for continued development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction in the absence of such agreement, and the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as well as other working documents, proposals and amendments submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament constitute valuable contributions to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The comments made on this item and relevant to the work of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, and the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have led to increased understanding and intensive efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have led to increased understanding and intensive efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

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¹⁵ *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁶ *Records: Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 1*, 1978, pp. 1-2.

Having in mind that agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction should not impede the utilization of science and technology for the economic development of States,

Desiring to contribute to an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

1. *Urges* all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives;

4. *Invites* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly relating to chemical weapons and to chemical means of warfare;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

B¹⁸

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1972 [1971], in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments;

¹⁸ Pt. B was introduced by the U.K. and sponsored also by 33 other countries, including the U.S. and the USSR. It was adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the G.A.

ical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction¹⁹ and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Convention,

Noting that article XII of the Convention provides as follows:

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a Conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention,

Believing that the availability of information as appropriate on any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention could contribute to the work of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention,

Bearing in mind that the Convention will have been in force for five years on 26 March 1980 and expecting that the Review Conference called for in the Convention will take place near that date,

1. *Notes* that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee of parties to the Convention is to be arranged;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference and its preparation.

General Assembly Resolution 33/60: Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 32/78, December 14, 1978¹

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, both as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful con-

¹⁹The res. with the text of the convention annexed to it, may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 884-889.

¹A/RES/33/60, Jan. 10, 1979. The res. was originally sponsored by Australia, Austria, Ecuador, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, and Venezuela. After its revision, it was sponsored also by Canada, Colombia, the Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Japan, Mali, Qatar, Singapore, and the Philippines. The original version urged the 3 negotiating nuclear-weapon states to transmit their results to "the multilateral negotiating body" before the end of 1978. The revised version, introduced by New Zealand, urged the 3 states to transmit their results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session. The amended res. was adopted by the G.A. by 134 votes to 1 (China), with 5 abstentions (Argentina, Cuba, Ethiopia, Fiji, France). The United States and France explained their votes in the First Committee (see *ante*, pp. 702-703, 703-704).

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² *Documen*
³ *Ibid.*, 196.
⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.
⁵ *General A*
(A/33/27), v