

percent for the West German ones. This example requires no comment.

If the data discussion is to bring the results all participants profess to desire, i.e., to reveal the causes of discrepancies between Western figures and our official data, then the West should avail itself of our suggestions and show readiness to critically review their exaggerated estimates of our forces.

In sum, seen in the list of justified expectations, heightened by the Vienna summit, the results of the present round do not as yet give ground for satisfaction. The basic truth remains as was indeed underlined by the recent initiative of Socialist countries that one does not and shall not move the Vienna negotiations forward by efforts of one side alone. Concrete manifestation of the Western goodwill and initiative which, we believe, we have now even more reason to expect, is what is really necessary for movement towards agreement. Our three unresponded proposals outline the framework for this.

**Statement by the French Representative (de la Gorce)
to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical
Weapons, July 19, 1979¹**

Since the beginning of our work, the French delegation has on each occasion emphasized the importance it attaches to the question of chemical disarmament. This does not mean that it considers other aspects of disarmament less important. However, we are anxious to embark on this most difficult undertaking with due consideration for all the realities: the political and strategic situations, the dictates of balance and security, and the technical facts. In the light of these realities, it seemed to us that chemical disarmament might, in present circumstances, offer the best change [*chance?*] of progress and we found that this opinion was shared by many here.

Moreover, the question of chemical disarmament is of direct, or virtually direct, concern to many States: the chemical weapon is accessible to all those with a suitable industrial capability, and there are many today; this weapon is neither very costly nor very difficult to manufacture; its use does not require very sophisticated technology; it is easy to conceal.

In the opinion of all the experts, the chemical weapon can cause appalling ravages and therefore deserves to be classed among the weapons of mass destruction. Its deadly efficiency might well tempt those without it to acquire it. Its very nature should lead us not only to prohibit its use, but to exclude it entirely from all arsenals.

The prohibition of its use is already embodied in the Geneva Protocol,² of which France is the depositary. We hope that all States which have not acceded to it will sign it without delay to give that prohibi-

¹ CD/PV.43, pp. 15-18.

² The Protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

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French Representative (de la Gorce) Statement on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, 1979¹

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hibit it entirely from all arsenals.

The principle is already embodied in the Geneva Proto-
col on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope that all States which
have not signed it without delay to give that prohibi-

tion universal effect. Obviously chemical disarmament itself should
be equally universal in effect. The negotiations in progress for the
past three years between the United States and the Soviet Union
have also been directed towards a universal commitment. The two
Powers have often emphasized this. That self-evident objective is
basic to this Committee's competence. As this is a matter which con-
cerns the entire international community, the Committee has the
right and the duty to discuss it fully and to negotiate on all its as-
pects. It cannot play a supporting or subordinate role.

The delegations of the two Powers have indicated, in slightly dif-
ferent terms, that they are prepared at this stage to hold discussions
on points of substance and even negotiations on certain preliminary
aspects. We welcome these more open attitudes; we are well aware of
the inherent difficulties of this undertaking and of the problems
which may arise out of the interaction between bilateral and multilat-
eral negotiations on the same subject. We are convinced that these
problems and difficulties will be solved if all parties show the will to
do so.

We have seen a token of this will in the many useful contributions
already circulated by several delegations and in the statements made
during this debate. We earnestly hope that the two negotiating
Powers will justify our confidence here and now by making a very
substantial contribution to this debate.

I should now like to outline the preliminary views of my delegation
on the principles, objectives and provisions of a convention on chemi-
cal disarmament.

The convention should obviously reaffirm the aims on which there
is already a broad consensus: general prohibition of the use, manufac-
ture and transfer of chemical weapons, destruction of existing stocks,
and the destruction or conversion of factories producing them.

I would make a distinction between the following five points.

1. Use:

The cornerstone of the operative part of the text will obviously be
the general and absolute prohibition of the use of all toxic substances for
military purposes. The prohibition of use should be based on a combi-
nation of two criteria: the toxicity threshold (the minimum dose pro-
ducing a toxic effect in the organism) would be the first criterion; the
second would be a safety factor, which might be defined as the ratio
between the effect threshold and the lethal dose (the effect threshold
would be defined as the minimum dose producing transient physiologi-
cal effects without consequences for the organism); this criterion
would be the basis for adjusting the toxicity threshold adopted to the
properties of each toxic substance.

2. Manufacture:

Toxic substances clearly fall into three categories:

- (a) Toxic substances with specifically military uses;
- (b) Dual-purpose substances in widespread civilian use which
readily lend themselves to military applications;

- (c) Toxic substances of no military interest, that is, substances which cannot be turned into a weapon of any kind.

The French delegation considers that it would be unrealistic to seek to prohibit the manufacture of the dual-purpose substances, but that there should be a complete ban on toxic substances with specifically military uses and on their means of delivery.

We believe, however, that such a prohibition should be accommodated to the retention of a protection capability and a passive deterrent against the use of chemical weapons, not only temporarily for security pending the destruction of stocks and the conversion of manufacturing plants, but also permanently to safeguard defence potential in the event of a breach of the convention by an adversary. Such a derogation should permit the maintenance of an adequate level of research on passive defence against chemical weapons.

The problem raised by herbicides, incapacitants and irritants is quite specific, in the French delegation's opinion, and should be the subject of a special study.

3. Transfers of weapons, know-how and technology:

In our opinion, a distinction should be made between transfers of weapons and manufacturing and delivery technology, which would be strictly prohibited, and transfers of know-how for purposes of protection, which would only be authorized between countries which have signed the convention, to the exclusion of all others.

4. Destruction of stocks and manufacturing plants:

One of the provisions of the convention should require each signatory country to furnish a detailed qualitative and quantitative inventory of toxic substances in its possession and a provisional time-table for the destruction of stocks. It would be desirable for weapons containing highly toxic substances to be destroyed first. A similar detailed inventory should be required for the destruction or conversion of plants manufacturing such toxic substances.

5. Verification:

The effective verification of chemical disarmament is, in our opinion, a crucial aspect of the convention. It also raises the most difficult problems. Various proposals made and experiments carried out so far give us reason to believe that effective on-site verification of chemical disarmament measures is technically feasible.

It is indispensable, in our opinion, for any verification to be of an international character.

On-site verification should, in particular, ensure:

Observance of the clause prohibiting the manufacture of toxic substances with specifically military uses and their means of delivery;

Observance of time-tables for the destruction and conversion of stocks and manufacturing plants;

Control of the products of laboratories still authorized to carry

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¹ *Military Inve
and Protocol T
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pp. 160-163.*

to military interest, that is, substances converted into a weapon of any kind.

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such a prohibition should be accommodated to protection capability and a passive deterrent weapons, not only temporarily for the production of stocks and the conversion of manufacturing to safeguard defence potential of the convention by an adversary. Such a maintenance of an adequate level of restraint against chemical weapons.

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know-how and technology:

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manufacturing plants:

the convention should require each signatory to ensure qualitative and quantitative inventory and a provisional time-table for destruction would be desirable for weapons conversion to be destroyed first. A similar deadline should be desired for the destruction or conversion of toxic substances.

chemical disarmament is, in our opinion, the most difficult. It also raises the most difficult technical and experimental problems carried out so far. Effective on-site verification of chemical disarmament is technically feasible.

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for the destruction and conversion of manufacturing plants;

laboratories still authorized to carry

out pure research and research required for maintaining a protection capability.

Verification of the basic chemicals used for the manufacture of toxic substances with military uses and verification of the non-diversion of dual-purpose substances to military ends are problems which raise immense difficulties, and are substantially different from the problem of verification of substances with specifically military uses. An answer to that problem has been found within the Western European Union. This precedent might perhaps be studied if a regional type of solution seems appropriate.

In conclusion, the French delegation wishes to emphasize again the importance, if not solemn, character of our discussion here. At this session we can, of course, only take the first step in what will be a long-term undertaking. But it is the first disarmament undertaking on a world-wide scale. It is therefore important to make this step and to have something to show for it. The credibility of the Committee and the international community's confidence in it are at stake.

Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward) Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: SALT II Treaty, July 24, 1979¹

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss the SALT II Treaty — an agreement of great significance to this country and, indeed, to the whole world.

Important as the treaty is, however, I would emphasize at the outset that it is only one of many factors affecting the overall strategic and conventional force balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that I believe any assessment of its value must be made in that broader context. A fundamental issue, in my judgment, is whether the treaty helps us in maintaining an adequate security posture. If the answer is yes, then the treaty warrants support, whatever deficiencies it may have — and there is no question but that it has deficiencies. However, I believe those deficiencies can be accepted provided the agreement, on balance, contributes positively to our efforts to maintain a stable balance of military power. If it accomplishes this, then it is accurate to say we are better off with it than without it.

The second point I would like to stress is that, in my view, this treaty as negotiated makes sense only if SALT is viewed as a continuing process, with SALT II a useful stepping stone on the route to a larger, long-range objective — that is, substantial and continuing reductions in the strategic systems of both sides. SALT II is not an end in itself.

¹ *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session, Pt. 1, pp. 160-163.*