with the experts in Geneva (1974),
of CWA was discussed, information
w type of weapon, the classification
CCD has not discussed as yet. The
losive" bomb intended for the prep-
. The application of this weapon in
casualties due to its "ultra-lethal"
ting effect is based on the reaction
component) and oxygen from the
ng, ethylene oxide instantly con-
l thereby causes its shortage in the
due to asphyxiation.
the cause of death, which, in addi-
fects, is one of the consequences of
e of the opinion that also this type
erhaps as "multi-purpose chemical
e other name. It is quite clear that
urbances of physiological functions
l, being the result of the chemical
ylene oxide and oxygen from the

on differs from the other weapons
ich as high explosives, smokes and
of its main effects is death caused

ific as far as this bomb is concerned
cause asphyxiation", while United
n 2603 A leaves possibility for dis-
"direct toxic effect".
any ambiguity to the minimum, we
ent the existing proposal for the
ing paper of the Yugoslav delega-

ly used in quantities which directly or
time, can produce physiological disturb-
nctions in man and animals, should be

ficiently comprehensive and should
the definition of chemical warfare
for example:

according to application and their

ingle-purpose and dual-purpose

(c) Differential treatment of intermediaries in a synthesis and the binary components in munitions,

(d) Inclusion in the chemical weapons also of those with "mixed" effects, one of them being also toxic (direct or indirect), so as to cover also such weapons as the above mentioned bombs.

In view of the aforementioned it seems to us appropriate to propose the following definition:

> All chemical compounds *intentionally* used in quantities and *manner* which directly or indirectly, immediately or after some time, can produce physiological disturbances or cessation of physiological functions in man, animals and plants, should be considered as chemical warfare agents.

We hope that this proposal of the definition contains relevant elements which might serve as a useful basis of the formulation of the final text of the definition.

Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 6, 1976 [1]

This morning I would like to introduce the United Kingdom working paper CCD/502 on the feasibility of extra-territorial surveillance of chemical weapon tests by air monitoring at the border.[2]

A major difficulty standing in the way of international agreement on disarmament and control of chemical agents and weapons is the problem of verification. Two possible ways of verifying that proscribed field tests of chemical weapons are being carried out would be:

(a) Surveillance by a satellite which monitored chosen areas of the earth's surface for the presence of chemicals of known military significance. This has already been discussed in United Kingdom working paper CCD/371; [3]

(b) Surveillance, by ground stations sited outside national boundaries and equipped to detect the same chemicals, of air masses which had passed over areas where chemical weapons were thought to be produced or tested.

Once a reliable indication of an infringement of a convention had been obtained by one of these surveillance techniques, then a case for on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened. Techniques are already available that would enable evidence of the production or testing of chemical weapons to be obtained by examination of soil, water and vegetation taken either from the suspect site or from its immediate environs if the site itself was inaccessible.

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[1] CCD/PV.709, pp. 15–16.
[2] Not printed here.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 408–415.

The present paper presents a theoretical assessment of the probability that chemical weapon tests would be detected by atmospheric monitoring at a national boundary.

From the analysis carried out it is concluded that:

(a) detection of a field test by instantaneous monitoring of the air at a national boundary is not feasible at a distance of 10,000 km from the source and could probably not be achieved beyond a distance of 500 km;

(b) a sample accumulation system positioned on a national boundary might theoretically detect an organophosphorus compound in a puff released 10,000 km upwind. However to establish the feasibility of this, experimental data are required on the degradation of puff concentration, during long-distance travel, by deposition, decomposition and wash-out;

(c) identification of organophosphorus agents by the system described will not be possible and in view of the risk of false alarms, resulting from the detection of commercial organophosphorus compounds, this system is considered not to warrant further investigation until identification can be achieved using 10 picogrammes of sample.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 6, 1976 [1]

As may be recalled, my delegation submitted in April 1974 a draft convention (CCD/420) on banning chemical weapons. As to the scope of the chemical warfare agents which should be ultimately banned, it indicated "chemical warfare agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes". As to the modalities of the ban, it proposed a stage-by-stage approach, beginning with a ban on super-toxic agents for which verification is of high feasibility by the use of off-site, chemical and physical means.[2] As to verification, we have tried to contribute to the discussions on the subject by suggesting the parallel use of national means on the one hand in which the reporting of statistical data would be required and international means, on the other, in which inquiries and on-site inspection upon request would be conducted. On 13 April, Ambassador Martin of the United States made an extensive statement on this subject and made clear the position and the views of his country. As to the chemical warfare agents which should be banned from the outset, he said that "a first stage agreement should cover all lethal agents". As to the modalities of the ban, he said that "it would be necessary to construct a phased agreement on the basis of activities". As to verification, he observed that

[1] CCD/PV.709, pp. 16–19.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 99–106.