with the experts in Geneva (1974),
of CWA was discussed, information
low type of weapon, the classification
CCD has not discussed as yet. The
"lethal" bomb intended for the prepa-
. The application of this weapon in
casualties due to its "ultra-lethal"
iting effect is based on the reaction
(component) and oxygen from the
ong, ethylene oxide instantly con-
tly thereby causes its shortage in the
due to asphyxiation.
the cause of death, which, in addi-
tion, is one of the consequences of
one of the opinion that also this type
perhaps as "multi-purpose chemical
the other name. It is quite clear that
urbances of physiological functions
al, being the result of the chemical
ethylene oxide and oxygen from the
on differs from the other weapons
such as high explosives, smokes and
of its main effects is death caused
cific as far as this bomb is concerned
case to cause asphyxiation"; while United
on 2603 A leaves possibility for dis-
"direct toxic effect".
any ambiguity to the minimum, we
ent the existing proposal for the
aking paper of the Yugoslav delega-
ily used in quantities which directly or
time, can produce physiological distur-
factions in man and animals, should be
iciently comprehensive and should
the definition of chemical warfare
for example:
according to application and their
ingle-purpose and dual-purpose
(c) Differential treatment of intermediaries in a synthesis and the
binary components in munitions,
(d) Inclusion in the chemical weapons also of those with "mixed"
effects, one of them being also toxic (direct or indirect), so as to cover
also such weapons as the above mentioned bombs.

In view of the aforementioned it seems to us appropriate to propose
the following definition:

All chemical compounds intentionally used in quantities and manner which
directly or indirectly, immediately or after some time, can produce physi-
o logical disturbances or cessation of physiological functions in man, animals
and plants, should be considered as chemical warfare agents.

We hope that this proposal of the definition contains relevant ele-
ments which might serve as a useful basis of the formulation of the
final text of the definition.

Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons,
July 6, 1976

This morning I would like to introduce the United Kingdom working
paper CCD/502 on the feasibility of extra-territorial surveillance of
chemical weapon tests by air monitoring at the border. 2

A major difficulty standing in the way of international agreement
on disarmament and control of chemical agents and weapons is the
problem of verification. Two possible ways of verifying that pro-
scribed field tests of chemical weapons are being carried out would be:

(a) Surveillance by a satellite which monitored chosen areas of
the earth's surface for the presence of chemicals of known military
significance. This has already been discussed in United Kingdom
working paper CCD/371; 3
(b) Surveillance, by ground stations sited outside national bound-
aries and equipped to detect the same chemicals, of air masses which
had passed over areas where chemical weapons were thought to be
produced or tested.

Once a reliable indication of an infringement of a convention had
been obtained by one of these surveillance techniques, then a case for
on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened. Techniques are
already available that would enable evidence of the production or
testing of chemical weapons to be obtained by examination of soil,
water and vegetation taken either from the suspect site or from its
immediate environs if the site itself was inaccessible.

1 CCD/PY.709, pp. 15-16.
2 Not printed here.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1976, pp. 408-415.
The present paper presents a theoretical assessment of the probability that chemical weapon tests would be detected by atmospheric monitoring at a national boundary.

From the analysis carried out it is concluded that:

(a) detection of a field test by instantaneous monitoring of the air at a national boundary is not feasible at a distance of 10,000 km from the source and could probably not be achieved beyond a distance of 500 km;

(b) a sample accumulation system positioned on a national boundary might theoretically detect an organophosphorus compound in a puff released 10,000 km upwind. However to establish the feasibility of this, experimental data are required on the degradation of puff concentration, during long-distance travel, by deposition, decomposition and wash-out;

(c) identification of organophosphorus agents by the system described will not be possible and in view of the risk of false alarms, resulting from the detection of commercial organophosphorus compounds, this system is considered not to warrant further investigation until identification can be achieved using 10 picogramsme of sample.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 6, 1976

As may be recalled, my delegation submitted in April 1974 a draft convention (CCD/420) on banning chemical weapons. As to the scope of the chemical warfare agents which should be ultimately banned, it indicated "chemical warfare agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes". As to the modalities of the ban, it proposed a stage-by-stage approach, beginning with a ban on super-toxic agents for which verification is of high feasibility by the use of off-site, chemical and physical means. As to verification, we have tried to contribute to the discussions on the subject by suggesting the parallel use of national means on the one hand in which the reporting of statistical data would be required and international means, on the other, in which inquiries and on-site inspection upon request would be conducted. On 13 April, Ambassador Martin of the United States made an extensive statement on this subject and made clear the position and the views of his country. As to the chemical warfare agents which should be banned from the outset, he said that "a first stage agreement should cover all lethal agents". As to the modalities of the ban, he said that "it would be necessary to construct a phased agreement on the basis of activities". As to verification, he observed that

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1 CCD/PV.709, pp. 16-19.