11. As regards the form, number and binding character of the arrangements, there was recognition that search should continue for a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. In that connexion the question of an international Convention was widely discussed. There was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. There was also discussion on the question of a General Assembly resolution as well as reference to Security Council resolution and declarations to be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations as an interim arrangement.

CONCLUSION

12. There was wide recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group was able, in the short time available to it, to begin meaningful consideration of, and negotiate on, some of the elements which fell within its mandate. Preliminary exploration of areas of agreement and disagreement clarified issues and at the same time underlined the complexity of the elements which have to be further considered and negotiated on.

13. The Ad Hoc Working Group recommends that at the beginning of its 1980 session the Committee on Disarmament should continue negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Joint Report by the United States and the Soviet Union to the Committee on Disarmament: Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, August 7, 1979

During the Vienna meeting of the leaders of the United States and the USSR in June 1979, both sides affirmed the importance of a general, complete, and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and agreed to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for presentation to the Committee on Disarmament. The USSR and United States delegations are guided by this provision at the 10th series of the bilateral negotiations, which began on 16 July 1979.

In the negotiations, the United States and USSR delegations take into account the fact that prohibition of chemical weapons is, as was stressed in the Final Document of the United Nations General

1 CD/48. The report was first submitted by the Soviet representative in the plenary meeting of July 31, 1979 (see PV.46).
2 Joint Communiqué issued by the United States and the Soviet Union, June 18, printed above.
form, number and binding character of the arrangements that should continue for a acceptable to all which could be included in an international convention was widely discussed. The difficulties involved were also pointed out. In conclusion, the idea of an international arrangement should enhance rather than diminish the stability of the parties.

The USSR and United States delegations, taking into consideration the interest expressed by many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament concerning the status of the bilateral negotiations on a prohibition of chemical weapons, present the following Joint Report:

1. The two sides believe that the scope of the prohibition should be determined on the basis of a general purpose criterion. Parties to the convention should assume the obligation never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or retain super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their precursors, with the exception of chemicals intended for permitted purposes of such types and in such quantities as are appropriate to these purposes, as well as chemical munitions or other means of chemical warfare. Negotiations are continuing on several issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

2. Permitted purposes are understood to mean non-hostile purposes (industrial, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, and purposes of development and testing of means of protection against chemical weapons), as well as military purposes not related to chemical warfare.

3. In order to facilitate verification, it would be appropriate to use, in addition to the general purpose criterion, toxicity criteria and certain other provisions.

4. Agreement has been reached on the following approximate values for the additional criteria of toxicity mentioned above:

   (a) LC₅₀ = 2,000 mg min/m³ for inhalation and/or
   LD₅₀ = 0.5 mg/kg for subcutaneous injections;

   (b) LC₅₀ = 20,000 mg min/m³ for inhalation and/or
   LD₅₀ = 10 mg/kg for subcutaneous injections.

On the basis of these criteria, it will be possible to separate chemicals into appropriate categories, to each of which the general purpose criterion would be applied.

5. Different degrees of prohibition and limitation as well as differentiated methods of verification would be applied on the basis of these toxicity criteria and certain other provisions. These issues continue to be subjects of negotiations.

6. Negotiations are also continuing on definition of terms and several other issues.

7. The two sides have agreed that parties to the convention should assume an obligation not to transfer to anyone, whether directly or indirectly, the means of chemical warfare, and not in any way to

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The United States and the Soviet Committee on Disarmament: Progress Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, August 7, 1979

Meeting of the leaders of the United States and USSR, both sides affirmed the importance of a verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for a Committee on Disarmament. The USSR and the United States and USSR delegations take the prohibition of chemical weapons is, as was submitted by the Soviet representative in the U.S. delegation.

U.S., Moscow, August 7, 1979, p. 425.
assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or any organization to carry out activities which parties would undertake not to engage in pursuant to the convention.

8. The two sides have come to an understanding regarding the necessity for States to declare, immediately after they become parties to the convention, both the volumes of acquired stocks of means of chemical warfare and the means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. Plans for destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons should also be declared. These declarations should contain information on the volume and timetables for destruction of such stocks. Plans for destruction or dismantling of relevant means of production should also be declared. In the course of the bilateral negotiations, the two sides are continuing to make efforts to agree on the specific content of the declarations concerning stocks of means of chemical warfare and concerning means of production. In this connexion, the basic concept of means of production is also a subject that remains to be resolved.

9. Agreement has been reached that stocks of means for chemical warfare should be destroyed or diverted for permitted purposes within ten years after a State becomes a party. Means of production should be shut down and eventually destroyed or dismantled. The destruction or dismantling of means of production should begin not later than eight years, and should be completed not later than ten years, after a State becomes a party.

10. In this connexion, the United States and the USSR believe that a future convention should contain provisions in accordance with which parties would periodically exchange statements and notifications concerning: the progress of the destruction of stocks of means of chemical warfare or their diversion for permitted purposes, the progress of the destruction or dismantling of means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention, and of the completion of these processes.

11. The USSR and the United States believe that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the future convention should be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification. They also believe that measures with respect to such verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures.

12. International verification measures should include the creation of a consultative committee. This committee could be convened as appropriate by the depositary of the convention, as well as upon request of any party.

13. The activities of the consultative committee in the interval between meetings should be carried out by a secretariat. The mandate of the secretariat is a subject of negotiations.

14. The participants should exchange, through the consultative committee or bilaterally, certain data on super-toxic lethal chemicals produced, acquired, accumulated, and used for permitted purposes, as well as on important lethal chemicals and the most important precursors used for permitted purposes. To this end, it is envisaged to
The United States and the USSR believe that the fulfilment of these requirements would be of adequate verification. They also believe that such verification should be based on national and international measures.

Verification measures should include the creation of a consultative committee in the interval between the signing of the convention, as well as upon request by a secretariat. The mandate of the secretariat is to expedite negotiations.

The exchange of data on super-toxic lethal chemicals and their precursors, which are not yet listed in chemical conventions, is an important prerequisite for agreement on a second protocol. To this end, it is envisaged to compile lists of the relevant chemicals and precursors. The two sides have reached a significant degree of mutual understanding in developing agreed approaches to the compilation of such lists. The specific data to be presented remain unresolved.

Additional functions for the consultative committee remain under discussion.

In order to ensure the possibility of beginning the work of the consultative committee immediately after entry into force of the convention, the United States and the USSR believe it appropriate to begin the creation of a preparatory committee upon signature of the convention.

The question of other international verification measures remains unresolved.

National measures would include the use of national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally accepted principles of international law. In this connexion, parties should not be precluded from using deliberate concealment measures, the national technical means of other parties in carrying out the aforementioned verification functions.

The USSR and the United States believe that a future chemical weapons convention should reflect the obligation of each party to take appropriate internal measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent any activity contrary to the provisions of the convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Possibilities for confidence-building measures are being explored.

A future chemical weapons convention should include a withdrawal provision of the type included in other arms control and disarmament agreements.

The question of the conditions for entry into force of the convention remains unresolved.

The two sides believe that an effective prohibition of chemical weapons will require working out a large number of technical ques-
tions which would be dealt with in annexes to the convention and which are now being studied.

* * *

The United States and the Soviet Union note the great importance attached to the elaboration of a convention by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament which manifested itself, in particular, in the identification of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the priority items on the agenda adopted for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. Both sides will exert their best efforts to complete the bilateral negotiations and present a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament on this most important and extremely complex problem as soon as possible.

Statement by the Group of 21 to the Committee on Disarmament: Conclusion of the 1979 Session of the Committee, August 9, 1979

The Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament recognized the inadequacy of the results of the then existing multilateral disarmament machinery and established, inter alia, the Committee on Disarmament, as a single multilateral negotiating body with a wider representative character, in order to revitalize disarmament negotiations.\(^2\) It was the expectation of the Group of 21 that this, together with the consensus adoption of the Programme of Action at the Special Session, would lead to concrete progress in disarmament negotiations particularly on the priority issues.

During this, its first annual session, the Committee on Disarmament worked intensively. In the light of past experience, the adoption by the Committee of its rules of procedure is a significant achievement.\(^3\) The discussions on this subject reflected the general desire of all States to participate effectively in the process of disarmament negotiations. Likewise, the adoption by the Committee of its agenda is an advance since it reflects a consensus of the Committee, on the one hand, regarding the broad framework of its responsibilities and, on the other, on those issues which require urgent negotiations by the Committee having been repeatedly so recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Group reiterates the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Unfortunately, during its 1979 session, the Committee was unable to give substantive consideration to the question of a nuclear test ban despite the repeated resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly and its request

\(^1\) CD/50.
\(^3\) See above, Feb. 28.