by one of the nuclear Powers that a single weapon would be sufficient should therefore be 
vish to comment very briefly is the question whether in a particular region and at a 
exists a nuclear-weapon-free zone—establishes the zone—which is entitled to be 
s. As we see it, in the context of the present national community, this power or pre-
exclusively to the United Nations General 
the Assembly, the most representative and 
international community, should be rec-
whatsoever the effects of the establishment 
so-called "strategic balance" for one of the 
ern State. This is what happened in the case 
ion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 
, the Assembly, in resolution 2286 (XXII), 
that Treaty "with special satisfaction" 
imprisons an event of historic significance 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to 
and security", called upon "all States to 
to ensure that the régime laid down in the 
observation to which its lofty principles and 
le very general considerations which I have 
ian dozen of the principal aspects of the 
free zones may be of some use to the group 
its study here next month. 
merely add two points. 
important lessons to be derived from the suc-
sive culminating at Tlatelolco is that the 
the completion of such a task is the estab-
directly interested, of an ad hoc body whose 
the preparatory work which is necessary for 
posed Treaty. Thus, the key to the success of 
weapons in Latin America must be sought in 
kern for about two years by the Preparatory 
nuclearization of Latin America. 
ishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone should 
early, either in its preamble or in the appropri-
certain fundamental truths of special rele-
whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscrimin-
by military forces and the civilian population 
like constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they re-
ls, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately 
ay even render the whole earth uninhabitable.
That the existence of nuclear weapons in the territory of a State, far 
from contributing to its security, converts it inevitably into a target, a 
magnet which is bound to attract "first strikes" with those terrible 
struments of mass destruction.
That nuclear-weapon-free zones do not constitute an end in them-
seit, but a means of achieving, in a subsequent stage, general and 
complete disarmament under effective international control, which, in 
the terrifying situation created by the existing gigantic nuclear ar-
als, is now a vital demand of all the peoples of the world.

Executive Order 11850: Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of 
Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, April 8, 1975

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of 
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their 
domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installa-
tions or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of 
riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save 
lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under 
direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting 
prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used 
to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or 
avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions, in remotely isolated 
areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone 
of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, ter-
rorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by 
this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observ-
ance of such national policy.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as Presi-
dent of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary mea-
tures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States 

of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

Gerald R. Ford

The White House,
April 8, 1975.

Statement by ACDA Director Iké to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, April 8, 1975

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Findley, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you in support of my Agency's legislative program.

The President, in his letter transmitting the bill now before you, pointed out that the negotiation of effective arms control arrangements, especially in the area of strategic arms, continues to be a priority objective of this administration. To that end, the strategic arms limitation talks are continuing in Geneva with a view to implementing the Vladivostok accords.

Additional agreements are in the process of negotiation: On underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, on nuclear non-proliferation, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe.

As the President said in his letter,

By continuing these negotiations and by seeking solutions to the many complex and difficult problems involved, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities.

CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE COOPERATION IS IMPERATIVE

To move ahead on arms control, strong and effective cooperation between the Congress and the executive branch is imperative. Fortunately, both the legislative and executive branches generally agree today that

1 Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on HR 1359 and HR 1365, pp. 6-8.
2 ante, pp. 63-64.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746-747.
4 ante, p. 64.