sive from a weapon is primarily the intent and location where it was exploded. For countries highly advanced in nuclear weapons technology, it is conceivable to develop arrangements so that no further advances are made in their weapons technology, even though they go ahead with peaceful nuclear explosives. But for a country that is beginning with a nuclear program, the distinction does not hold up.

Q: Because any explosion has the value of a test?

A: It has the characteristics of being a device that can destroy a city.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Nisibori) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, March 25, 1975

In my statement today, I would like to present the views of the Japanese delegation on the question of banning chemical weapons, an important item pending in this Committee.

As representatives well know, my delegation submitted a draft convention on this question in the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament last year. Since then, especially in the informal meetings with the participation of experts on this question, which were held in the summer session last year, various comments have been made on this draft convention by many delegations. The interest expressed by so many countries—Western, socialist or others alike—shows that there is an earnest desire for a solution to this question. I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for these comments.

Now, in the statement that follows, I intend to try to offer some explanations in response to the questions and observations posed in the aforementioned comments.

First of all, I recall that a question was raised by the Swedish expert about the possible use of the expression “chemical warfare agents” instead of the term “chemical agents” which is stipulated in our draft convention. Also, proposals on the definition of chemical warfare agents were made by the Swedish, Yugoslav and Polish experts. As for the definition, I suggested it would be desirable to decide on this at the time of concluding the treaty in order to avoid unnecessary disputes in future as to what is prohibited.

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1 CCD/PV.661, pp. 6-8.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 99-106.
3 Ibid., pp. 224-225.
The Deputy Special Representative (Nisibori) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons

I would like to present the views of the Japanese delegation on the question of banning chemical weapons, an important item for discussion.

I know, my delegation submitted a draft convention on the question in the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament and I was informed that the Committee would consider it in the informal meetings. Several experts on this question, which were held in the past year, various comments have been made on the text of the convention. The interest expressed by all experts, socialist or others alike—shows that we need a solution to this question. I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the efforts that are being made.

The question was raised that, since the question of chemical weapons is so important, we need a document that is self-contained and is a treaty that prohibits the use of all chemical weapons in a comprehensive manner. The Swedish, Yugoslav and Polish experts, as proposed in their draft, is the only one that meets this test.

I believe that at the time of concluding the treaty in order to achieve a full and complete convention, it is necessary to ensure an effective means of verification for the chemical agents to be prohibited in order to decide the scope of chemical agents which are to be prohibited from the beginning. Therefore, if an effective means of verifying the binary components could be found and its application to them be agreed upon, it would be quite possible to provide a result that is self-contained and is a treaty that prohibits the use of all chemical weapons in a comprehensive manner.

1. Ibid., 1974, p. 520-524.
4. For the working paper, see ibid., 1974, pp. 306-325. Records of informal meetings are not published.
5. Ibid., p. 412.
In the meetings with the participation of experts last summer, the Swedish expert suggested that if annex 1(B) to our draft convention be adopted, it should have a list of chemical agents exempted from the ban in addition to a list of chemical agents obligatorily banned. Referring to this statement, the Swedish delegate suggested on 15 August last year that the two different lists provided for in the proposed alternative annexes of our draft convention might be put together in one annex, and that such an annex would thus include the two lists both of agents obligatorily banned and of those exempted from the ban and, in this way other unknown agents could be generally forbidden under the convention. She stated further that another advantage would be that no newly developed or recently discovered agents could be produced as chemical warfare agents until explicitly suspended from the ban.\(^{10}\)

The idea of annex 1(B) to our draft convention is, in principle, based on the recognition that the prohibition of chemical agents which are to be prohibited from the beginning must be secured by effective verification measures. As for unknown chemical agents, when their existence has become generally known, we would examine whether any effective verification measures could be available for them or not; then, we would proceed to study, at the review conference, whether they could be included in the list of chemical agents obligatorily banned. However, following this idea, I cannot but admit the defect that new chemical warfare agents, which are clandestinely developed, produced and stockpiled, might be left free from the control.

In this connexion, the idea suggested by Sweden—to put the two different lists of obligatorily prohibited agents and of suspended agents into one annex, and then temporarily prohibit, even though without available verification measures, the group of agents not falling into either list but belonging to the so-called twilight zone between the said two groups of agents—would deserve full consideration since this formula might work as a moral restraint for a State which is going to develop new chemical agents, and furthermore this certainly meets the purpose of our draft convention which aims at a comprehensive ban.

As for the so-called joint initiative promised by the United States and the Soviet Union last July,\(^{11}\) the Polish representative, Mr. Wyzner, stated on 18 March that

we welcome the information that measures have now been taken to implement the Soviet-American Agreement concerning a joint move in the CCD to conclude, as a first step, an international convention.\(^{12}\)

Although I wish to associate myself with him in extending my heartfelt welcome to such information, yet at the same time I earnestly hope to listen to further concrete views from the two States concerned on the information referred to by the Polish representative.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 413.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 236.

\(^{12}\) CCD/PV.659, p. 12.
In conclusion, my statement, I wish to express the hope that I shall have another chance to take the floor on this subject.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, March 25, 1975

As we all know, the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts provided for in General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 will very shortly be starting work in Geneva with a view to carrying out, under the auspices of CCD,

a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.¹

My delegation therefore considered it appropriate in this statement to express a few general considerations about this question, to which Mexico attaches particular importance, as is evidenced by the part which it had the privilege of playing in the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). By virtue of this Treaty there already exists in the world a nuclear-weapon-free zone whose area covers approximately 8 million square kilometres and whose constantly growing population at present numbers about 150 million.²

Even though we fully realize that many of the “aspects” which the group of experts will be called upon to study will vary according to the zone dealt with in each case, we also believe that there are other aspects which are of a general nature and about which a number of conclusions may be reached, on the basis of the conscientious preparatory work and lengthy negotiations undertaken for approximately three years in connexion with the Treaty of Tlatelolco—conclusions which it would, in our opinion, be useful to consider.

By way of introduction, I should like to say a few words about the various types of militarily denuclearized zones which may in principle be envisaged.

Firstly, there may be a zone of the size of a continent, sub-continent or region with geographic continuity, which is intended to comprise all the States included therein. This is undoubtedly the ideal type of zone.

However, since geographic continuity is not, and indeed, should not be an essential element for the establishment of a militarily denuclearized zone, a second type of zone would be one which comprises several

¹ CCD/PV.661, pp. 8-15.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 808-809.
³ Ibid., 1967, pp. 69-83.