It is a quite some time ago, and what we have done is not put the actual neutron part of the Lance missile. And so you stored here, in time of need and necessity would not make very much sense.

Now we’re going to continue warehousing the casing and warehouse it as a unit in-

The eventual deployment of the neutron bomb perhaps changing the balance of power, might we become the first to strike with that weapon?

Something that seems to be overlooked in all the debate about this weapon, and that is that weapons stationed in Europe are twice as effective, far longer in rendering areas uninhabitable, than the neutron weapon. So, we’re on both sides already, and this is an effective version.

Those who are crying the loudest, the so-called pacifists under the name of pacifism in things like this and opposing the use of the neutron, I’m sure they are carrying the propaganda ball for the position made of 200 SS-20’s, strategic missiles aimed at the cities of all of Europe, considered in any of the talks of the West—just as in SALT II the Soviet Union would get a strategic weapon but did not call their weapon

Chinese Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament:
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, August 13, 1981

The question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been one of universal concern to the peoples of the world for a long time. Paragraph 75 of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament points out: “The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.”

As is well known, during the First World War nearly 1,300,000 people were injured or killed by poisonous gases. Since then, the chemical weapons developed have been more numerous in type and characterized by their greater capacity for mass destruction.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 already provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war; nevertheless, in many wars, including some wars that took place recently in the Asian region, chemical weapons have been used all along.

Chemical weapons possess these characteristics: they are multiple in their effects, low in cost, easy to manufacture and convenient to proliferate. The rapid development of modern science and technology has provided various necessary conditions and new possibilities for the production of chemical weapons. The appearance of new chemical warfare agents of higher toxicity that are more rapid in their effects, and whose physical and chemical characteristics are more suitable to the requirements of utilization, and the improvement of dissemination techniques will all substantially increase the lethal and injurious capabilities of chemical weapons. In particular, after the emergence of binary chemical weapon technology the production of chemical warfare agents has already become part of general chemical and industrial production, thus enabling preparations for chemical warfare to be conducted in greater secrecy and with greater ease. The Superpowers are developing and stockpiling large quantities of chemical weapons and have made chemical weapons one of their important means of warfare. Under these circumstances, it is all the more
urgent that a convention completely prohibiting chemical weapons be concluded.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In various United Nations forums, the Chinese delegation has clearly stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons, and the conclusion, as soon as possible, of an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons. In 1980, after participating for the first time in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chinese delegation put forward working paper CD/1024 in which we clearly indicated our basic position on the main contents of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The following are some further comments on certain substantive issues relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons:

1. The Chinese delegation proposes that the scope of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons should include the prohibition of their development, production, stockpiling, acquisitions, transfer and use. Our proposal to include use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention is based on the following considerations:

Firstly, the Committee on Disarmament is engaged in negotiations on the conclusion of a separate convention which has not been in existence, aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. It is very important that such a convention should be truly comprehensive in nature.

Secondly, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Cases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare concluded in Geneva in 1925 only provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war, but does not provide for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in other armed conflicts apart from wars. This no longer corresponds to the realities of the international situation.

Thirdly, with the ceaseless development and evolution of military technology and methods of warfare, there can be found many examples of international treaties regulating wars reaffirming and supplementing each other. For example, in the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which were elaborated in 1977, there are some articles which reaffirm the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and others which supplement and develop the Geneva Conventions. The 1925 Geneva Protocol itself is also a reaffirmation of and complement to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Poison and Poisoned Weapons. It can thus be seen that the strengthening of existing protocols or treaties by reaffirming and supplementing them with new international instruments is after all a normal phenomenon in the constant development of international treaties.

5 International Legal Materials, 16 Nov. 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff., 1442 ff.
6 1 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516; TIAS 8362, 3363, 3364, 3365.
7 56 Stat. 2277; TS 559, 1 Bevans 631.
The Chinese delegation, like many other delegations, has consistently favoured stringent and effective international monitoring and verification measures for prohibiting chemical weapons. The view expressed in working paper CD/106 put forward by the French delegation that "it would be more dangerous for the security of the countries affected to prohibit the manufacture and possession of chemical agents and weapons without providing means of verifying the strict application of the prohibition than to have no agreement whatsoever" is completely in accord with the actual situation. The fact that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not contain articles on complaint and verification procedures with regard to violations of the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons has resulted in there being no investigation and confirmation of chemical weapons having been used in many wars and armed conflicts. This has emboldened some countries to use chemical weapons unbridled.

In its working paper CD/102, the Chinese delegation also clearly states that there should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions regulating wars. This has been done in the past, and will certainly be done again in the future.

In accordance with the above considerations, the inclusion of use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons could only strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Such a convention will strengthen trust between countries, and we believe that more countries will accede to it as a result.

2. The Chinese delegation is of the view that in drafting a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, it is imperative first to arrive at a clear definition of the chemical warfare agents to be prohibited. The question of definition not only concerns the scope of prohibition and the contents of the convention, but also has a bearing upon the relevant means and methods of verification.

The definition of a chemical warfare agent must be both comprehensive and accurate. Its comprehensiveness is designed to ensure that all chemical warfare agents which should be prohibited are brought within the scope of the prohibition. It should include not only supertoxic lethal agents but also incapacitating agents and irritant agents; it should include not only single-purpose chemical warfare agents but also dual-purpose chemical warfare agents and precursors which can turn into chemical warfare agents during the process of their use. The accuracy of the definition is designed to avoid erroneously including in the scope of the prohibition chemical substances which should not be prohibited, since that would adversely affect the development of the industrial and agricultural production of States and their scientific and technological progress.

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of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose, charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production. The organ should also be empowered to investigate charges on the use of chemical weapons and on any other violations of the convention. Appropriate measures should be spelled out to deal with verified cases of violations of the convention with a view to bringing about their prompt cessation. Moreover, the organ should provide strong resistance to imperilled contracting parties. The organ of international control should have qualified experts and advanced and effective verification techniques and devices to enable it to discharge the function of clear verification with which it is charged. In this way all contracting parties will be subject to equal control, thereby ensuring the strict implementation of the convention.

Many delegations attach very great importance to the question of on-site inspection, and have put forward quite a number of specific proposals. The Chinese delegation is of the view that in order to ensure strict implementation of the articles of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, provision must be made for certain necessary on-site inspection measures. For instance, there should be international on-site inspection measures with regard to charges on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

4. Various delegations have suggested three methods of dealing with the question of production facilities for chemical weapons: dismantling, conversion to peaceful purposes and shutting them down. We consider dismantling to be conducive to enhancing a sense of security and trust between States and that it is the most appropriate method for dealing with facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Converting them to peaceful production and shutting them down are not ideal measures since they would not only make verification more difficult but would also carry the potential risk of the facilities being utilized again within a short period of time to renew production of chemical weapons.

**Statement by the U.S. Representative (Flowerree) to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], August 13, 1981**

It will not have escaped the notice of members of the Committee that the United States delegation has been relatively silent during our 1981 session.

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1 CD/PV.146, pp. 10-16.