

because the United States strongly supports the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons. Together with most other States, we are of the firm view that, to become a reality, such a prohibition must include verification measures that would provide adequate assurance of implementation and compliance. Some States, however, refuse to accept international on-site verification, and their negative position on this issue remains the most important obstacle to the achievement of the objectives set forth in this draft resolution.

My Government is currently reviewing issues relating to chemical weapons and, pending the completion of that review, reserves its position regarding the way in which efforts to ban such weapons can be pursued in the most effective manner.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Adelman) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Chemical Weapons, November 24, 1984¹

In explaining the vote the United States delegation just cast on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35,² Ambassador Fields stated that the United States strongly supports the objective of the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.³ We also indicated that opposition by some States to effective international verification is the main obstacle to achieving that objective.

I reiterate that support in connexion with the draft resolution before us.⁴ As to the draft resolution itself, however, it duplicates a great deal of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35 and also contains points which, if the sponsors were really interested in ensuring the best conditions for progress towards a prohibition of chemical weapons, they should have raised a number of years earlier.

I remind this Committee that the United States ceased production of chemical weapons 12 years ago, in 1969. In fact, we are not producing such weapons even today, although in view of the continuing and massive Soviet chemical weapons programme we have no choice but to take steps soon to redress that balance. Despite the unilateral and drastic curtailment of United States chemical weapons capability since 1969, the Soviet Union has relentlessly continued to produce and deploy a variety of modern agents and multiple delivery systems for chemical weapons. Today, the United States has only one chemical weapons production facility. Even that facility, however, is inactive and in disrepair. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, maintains and operates at least 14 chemical-weapons facilities. A larger offensive chemical-warfare organization is an organic part of the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet Union includes, as part of its forces, about 100,000 personnel with specialized chemical-warfare training who are assigned down to

¹ A/C.1/36/PV.42, pp. 24-27.

² Adopted as G.A. res. 36/96 A.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ I.e., A/C.1/36/L.36/Rev.1, which was adopted as G.A. res. 36/96 B.

ports the objective of effective prohibition with most other States, we are of the view that a prohibition must include verification and adequate assurance of implementation. The refusal to accept international convention on this issue remains the most serious obstacle to the objectives set forth in this draft resolution.

g issues relating to chemical weapons, reserves its position regarding such weapons can be pursued in the future.

Statement (Adelman) to the General Assembly: Chemical

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s delegation just cast on draft resolution. It is stated that the United States has not achieved an effective prohibition of chemical weapons by some States to effective implementation of achieving that objective.

with the draft resolution before us.⁴ It duplicates a great deal of draft resolution. It contains points which, if the sponsors had taken into account conditions for progress towards a goal, could have raised a number of years ago.

United States ceased production of chemical weapons. In fact, we are not producing such weapons. The continuing and massive Soviet chemical weapons programme has no choice but to take steps soon to achieve a substantial and drastic curtailment of United States chemical weapons. In 1969, the Soviet Union has relentlessly expanded a variety of modern agents and weapons. Today, the United States has a chemical weapons production facility. Even that facility, however, is being expanded. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a large number of chemical-weapons facilities. A larger organic part of the Soviet armed forces, about 100,000 personnel, are assigned down to

as G.A. res. 36/96 B.

the company level. In contrast, at present the United States has only 5,700 troops trained in chemical-warfare defence. This is approximately a 15 to 1 ratio between the Soviet and American troops trained in this area.

As we all know, the issue of a chemical-weapons prohibition has been before the international community since the mid-1970s. In 1977 we also began bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to develop, for submission to the Committee on Disarmament, a joint initiative for a multilateral convention prohibiting the production, development and possession of chemical weapons. If the sponsors of this draft resolution are sincerely concerned that production of chemical weapons can impede negotiations on such a convention, why are they calling for restraint in this area only now and why are they asking that only new types of chemical weapons should not be produced, as if the older and more accident-prone types of such weapons were less lethal and irrelevant? The answer is obvious. The purpose of the sponsors of this draft resolution is not to facilitate achievement of a chemical-weapons prohibition. What they are attempting to do is to inhibit counter-measures required by the vast Soviet chemical-weapons programme by allowing that programme to proceed at full speed. Given the list of sponsors, this blatant disregard for the principle of balance and equity should surprise no one.

Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.36/Rev.1 is not only superfluous, but it is also clearly one-sided. Rather than to contribute to progress towards the objective of a chemical-weapons prohibition, it merely seeks to shift the blame for lack of such progress. The United States will accordingly oppose it.

Statement by the British Representative (Marshall) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, November 24, 1981¹

I should like to make a few remarks about draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.21 concerning the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development.²

The United Kingdom supported the initiation of this study and took a close and active interest in the work of the Group of Experts, and we have just joined in the adoption of the draft resolution submitting the report which the Experts made to the Secretary-General.³ However, there are a number of aspects about the conduct of the study which my Government finds disturbing.

It is a great pity that after three years of hard work by the Experts—and I should like here to pay a tribute to them for their efforts—it was not possible to produce a consensus report. No fewer than ten Experts, including the

¹ A/C.1/36/PV.42, pp. 33-36.

² Adopted by the G.A. as res. 36/92 G.

³ A/36/356.