It is clear from the above definition and its specific content that:

(1) The definition proposed brings within its scope all chemical warfare agents.

(2) The definition proposed embodies the principle of using mainly the general-purpose criterion but combining it with the toxicity criterion. That is to say, that chemical warfare agents must possess some degree of toxicity, but toxic substances are not necessarily all chemical warfare agents. Therefore even though toxicity is an important criterion of chemical warfare agents, it is not the only criterion; whether or not a substance is a chemical warfare agent, should mainly depend on whether it is used for "hostile purposes". This is also the main indication for distinguishing dual-purpose chemical warfare agents.

(3) The definition proposed also reflects the scope of activities to be prohibited—that is all the stages of the entire process from the development right up to the use of chemical warfare agents. Some chemical substances can be determined as being chemical warfare agents, only when they are connected with certain specific activities, e.g. substances such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide can be clearly identified as chemical warfare agents only when they have filled munitions and developed into weapons, whereas irritants would be included as substances to be prohibited only when they are utilized on the battlefield. Proceeding from this characteristic of chemical warfare agents, it can also be clearly seen why in any convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the prohibition of use is an issue which cannot be evaded.

Chinese Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Dismantling of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, March 27, 1981

One of the most important measures for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons and the prevention of chemical warfare is the prohibition of producing chemical weapons and the dismantling of their existing production facilities/means of production. This is because the industrial production of chemical weapons accounts for the most crucial link among the various activities aimed at the attainment of chemical warfare capability and the use of chemical weapons, i.e. development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of chemical weapons. Only those countries which can produce chemical weapons on a certain industrial scale are able to stockpile and transfer these weapons as well as to engage in chemical warfare. This has been proven by the history of the two World Wars. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation is of the opinion that:

1. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, besides prohibiting in clear terms the production of chemical weapons, should

\[1\] CD/169.
stipulate the total dismantling of all types of their production facilities/means of production, rather than the shutting down and the conversion of these facilities. The Chinese Delegation has already indicated in Working Paper CD/102 that “shutting down the facilities for the production of chemical weapons or converting them to peaceful production is not the best approach”. The measures of converting the production facilities for chemical weapons to peaceful use is loaded with the potential risk of their reversion, since the plants thus converted can easily be reconverted to the production of chemical weapons and this will increase the work load of verification and make it more difficult. If it is argued that the dismantling of production facilities for chemical weapons could take years, and that an interim measure is required, we can agree to consider the use of the method of shutting down the facilities as an auxiliary measure of supervision.

2. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should also provide for limitations and dispositions regarding dual-purpose plants. There may be plants which have been designed and built originally for the purpose of producing chemical warfare agents, but during peace time are producing products for civilian use. In such cases, the entire dual-purpose plants or some of their units should be dismantled, if they or their units are identified as production facilities for chemical warfare agents, regardless whether they are engaged or not actually in producing chemical warfare agents, whether they are independent plants for the production of chemical warfare agents or just units producing chemical warfare agents in a large chemical complex. This is because the facilities and conditions of these plants exist to meet the requirement of producing chemical warfare agents, and they are ready to produce them at any time. If these plants produce products of civilian use, this might be a camouflage to cover up the production of chemical warfare agents or intended to make use of surplus production capacity of these plants. If such conversion is permitted, it will legalize these dual-purpose activities and thus offer an opportunity to the violators of the convention.

3. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should pay special attention to the problem of dismantling the munition-filling facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This is because of the fact that although the chemical warfare agents constitute the nucleus and the basis of the three components of chemical weapons, namely: chemical warfare agents munition and launching system, yet to make these agents usable in warfare, it is necessary to fill them into munitions which are capable of dispersing them into combat state. This is a salient feature, the presence or the absence of which determines whether a dual-purpose substance is being used for military purpose. These munition filling facilities are very often specifically designed. It is difficult to convert them to peaceful uses. Therefore, all these facilities should be totally dismantled and strict verification should be applied to their dismantling.

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