

It is clear from the above definition and its specific content that:

(1) The definition proposed brings within its scope all chemical warfare agents.

(2) The definition proposed embodies the principle of using mainly the general-purpose criterion but combining it with the toxicity criterion. That is to say, that chemical warfare agents must possess some degree of toxicity, but toxic substances are not necessarily all chemical warfare agents. Therefore even though toxicity is an important criterion of chemical warfare agents, it is not the only criterion; whether or not a substance is a chemical warfare agent, should mainly depend on whether it is used for "hostile purposes". This is also the main indication for distinguishing dual-purpose chemical warfare agents.

(3) The definition proposed also reflects the scope of activities to be prohibited—that is all the stages of the entire process from the development right up to the use of chemical warfare agents. Some chemical substances can be determined as being chemical warfare agents, only when they are connected with certain specific activities, e.g. substances such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide can be clearly identified as chemical warfare agents only when they have filled munitions and developed into weapons, whereas irritants would be included as substances to be prohibited only when they are utilized on the battlefield. Proceeding from this characteristic of chemical warfare agents, it can also be clearly seen why in any convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the prohibition of use is an issue which cannot be evaded.

Chinese Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Dismantling of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, March 27, 1981¹

One of the most important measures for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons and the prevention of chemical warfare is the prohibition of producing chemical weapons and the dismantling of their existing production facilities/means of production. This is because the industrial production of chemical weapons accounts for the most crucial link among the various activities aimed at the attainment of chemical warfare capability and the use of chemical weapons, i.e. development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of chemical weapons. Only those countries which can produce chemical weapons on a certain industrial scale are able to stockpile and transfer these weapons as well as to engage in chemical warfare. This has been proven by the history of the two World Wars. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation is of the opinion that:

1. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, besides prohibiting in clear terms the production of chemical weapons, should

¹ CD/169.

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stipulate the total dismantling of all types of their production facilities/
means of production, rather than the shutting down and the conversion of
these facilities. The Chinese Delegation has already indicated in Working
Paper CD/102² that "shutting down the facilities for the production of
chemical weapons or converting them to peaceful production is not the
best approach". The measures of converting the production facilities for
chemical weapons to peaceful use is loaded with the potential risk of their
reconversion, since the plants thus converted can easily be reconverted to
the production of chemical weapons and this will increase the work load
of verification and make it more difficult. If it is argued that the dismant-
ling of production facilities for chemical weapons could take years, and
that an interim measure is required, we can agree to consider the use of the
method of shutting down the facilities as an auxiliary measure of
supervision.

2. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should also
provide for limitations and dispositions regarding dual-purpose plants.
There may be plants which have been designed and built originally for the
purpose of producing chemical warfare agents, but during peace time are
producing products for civilian use. In such cases, the entire dual-purpose
plants or some of their units should be dismantled, if they or their units are
identified as production facilities for chemical warfare agents, regardless
whether they are engaged or not actually in producing chemical warfare
agents, whether they are independent plants for the production of
chemical warfare agents or just units producing chemical warfare agents in
a large chemical complex. This is because the facilities and conditions of
these plants exist to meet the requirement of producing chemical warfare
agents, and they are ready to produce them at any time. If these plants
produce products of civilian use, this might be a camouflage to cover up
the production of chemical warfare agents or intended to make use of
surplus production capacity of these plants. If such conversion is permit-
ted, it will legalize these dual-purpose activities and thus offer an oppor-
tunity to the violators of the convention.

3. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should pay
special attention to the problem of dismantling the munition-filling
facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This is because of the
fact that although the chemical warfare agents constitute the nucleus and
the basis of the three components of chemical weapons, namely: chemical
warfare agents munition and launching system, yet to make these agents
weapons usable in warfare, it is necessary to fill them into munitions
which are capable of dispersing them into combat state. This is a salient
feature, the presence or the absence of which determines whether a dual-
purpose substance is being used for military purpose. These munition fill-
ing facilities are very often specifically designed. It is difficult to convert
them to peaceful uses. Therefore, all these facilities should be totally
dismantled and strict verification should be applied to their dismantling.

² Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 252-253.