

ment of which is under consideration. The committee should be authorized, where necessary, to conduct on-the-spot inspections conducted by the committee to investigate possible violations.

Measures of verification would be to check the objects of the Convention:

• Inspections to destroy stocks and dismantle production facilities. Such measures would be taken if no action had been eliminated;

• Undertakings prohibiting the manufacture of chemical warfare or chemical weapons and activities connected therewith. These measures would continue on a continuing basis so long as the convention

• Destruction of chemical agents and munitions and of production facilities would not be possible in the event of risks referred to by some who oppose the nature of the agents destroyed, violation of the destruction took place in proximity to the destruction of chemical warfare agents are in fact the installations for destruction would be carried out in isolated areas away from large in-

• Inspections should be effective, it would be necessary to be authorized to enquire into the nature of the destruction facilities. They should be able to check the destruction operations carried out in secret, since the need of secrecy need be involved, since the nature of the agents destroyed, when their task was completed. The nature of the agents destroyed, would seem to be the most acceptable.

• Measures provided for the verification of fulfilment of the convention or stockpile would be of a different nature. They normally require the presence of international inspectors. They should be based mainly on the analysis by the committee of statistical data furnished by the States parties on which those States might provide. If a State party had any doubt about the nature of the agents destroyed, the latter should be able to check the objects of a kind which the committee would be authorized to conduct on-the-spot inspection.

• Inspections, including our own, on the need for verification, inspections on their territory, and inspections of systematic distrust. On the contrary, the need for inspections on frontiers to international inspection would be based on the mutual trust there should be in the convention.

My Government attaches the greatest importance to the questions of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; it weighs the risks attaching to the existence of such weapons; it understands the legitimate concern felt in that respect within the international community. My delegation therefore welcomes the initiation of an examination of these questions by the Committee at informal meetings. We had already recommended discussions of this kind in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

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Statement by the British Representative (Summerhayes) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, April 3, 1981¹

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Turning now to chemical weapons, I should like first of all to stress our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Sweden for the energy, resourcefulness and commitment he has shown in his chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My Government considers that the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States is of the greatest importance. We are determined to do all we can to assist in that process. We shall be giving further serious thought to the discussion that has been taking place in that Group. My comments now are intended to show the direction of our thinking.

In tackling the question of chemical weapons, we are dealing not with some potential future weapon, but with armaments which exist in the world and which have been used in the past to terrible effect. The United Kingdom has always taken the view that in any disarmament treaty there must be appropriate and adequate measures of verification. Where the arms concerned are actually in existence, that view is reinforced; it takes on increased importance. The United Kingdom Government believe that a CW convention must be adequately verifiable. Without adequate verification States will not have confidence that such a convention would be observed. Indeed, it is mainly because we have been unable so far to agree on provisions for verification in which all States would have confidence, that better progress has not been made. Verification is and will remain the keystone of progress.

I should like, therefore, to take a few minutes to examine further what my delegation means when we talk of adequate verification. Obviously we cannot realistically hope for agreement on a verification system that would provide a 100 per cent certainty of compliance. Desirable as it would be to devise such a system, we recognize that this would not be possible—and this fact was admirably demonstrated in document

¹ CD/PV.121, pp. 13-16.

CD/CW/WP.9, submitted by Canada in the CW Working Group. But we must have provisions which will give all parties to a convention a good degree of confidence that all other States party are observing it. Moreover, if we incorporate such provisions, these will in themselves provide an incentive to all States to comply fully with the letter as well as the spirit of the agreement.

The question then is what activities will need to be verified if States are to [have] such confidence in the convention, and what form should this verification take? The United Kingdom considers that verification measures would be necessary for each stage of implementation of all the provisions of the convention relating to the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and of production facilities, and thereafter for monitoring the compliance of States with the provisions banning development and production, including monitoring the use for permitted peaceful purposes of chemical warfare agents and dual purpose chemical agents. The United Kingdom Government also considers it essential that the convention should have an effective complaints procedure.

I am sure that the United Kingdom position on these issues is well known. But I should like to take a little time to elaborate on one or two of the fundamental aspects of that position. One of the main elements of an adequate verification régime would in our view be the establishment of a consultative committee. The committee would, in our view, be most efficient if it were limited in numbers, its composition being drawn from the States parties to the convention. Such a committee would have the central role in the verification régime. Experts from the States parties would be in a position to play a constructive part in ensuring that the convention was being observed. The concept of a multilateral consultative committee also implies a willingness on the part of States parties to share expertise and information, to be open on issues relating to this crucial subject. A high degree of openness, of frank exchange of information between States, will provide a basis of confidence. Indeed, I would go further and say that it is essential to the creation of the climate of confidence which would be necessary for a CW convention to be successfully implemented.

My country has already put forward ideas on what some of the functions of the consultative committee might be. We believe that it should analyse and evaluate reports and information provided by States parties; it should have the power to call for supplementary information as necessary and to conduct inquiries. It would carry out required measures of verification and also conduct on-site and other inspections as provided for in the convention. It would inform all States parties of its findings and it would consult and co-operate with national authorities charged with domestic activities in connection with the fulfilment of the provisions of the convention.

The consultative committee should not merely be a bureaucratic or administrative body, but would also provide a forum for consultation and co-operation between States parties. Through their participation States parties would have confidence in the committee itself; its international membership would mean that it would not represent one particular State or group

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ties will need to be verified if States are convention, and what form should this verification considers that verification measures of implementation of all the provisions of declaration and destruction of stockpiles hereafter for monitoring the compliance of production and production, in permitted peaceful purposes of chemical agents. The United Kingdom is of the opinion that the convention should have an

position on these issues is well little time to elaborate on one or two of them. One of the main elements of an agreement in our view be the establishment of a committee would, in our view, be most effective if its composition being drawn from the States which a committee would have the central role. The States parties would be interested in ensuring that the convention was a multilateral consultative committee also States parties to share expertise and information relating to this crucial subject. A high level of information between States, will be required, I would go further and say that it is a matter of confidence which would be most successfully implemented.

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of States, but would be independent and impartial. None of these provisions would, however, detract from the right of States parties which have complaints to pursue them at a higher political level. But it would be our hope that the procedures for consultation and co-operation would mean that such measures were necessary only in extreme circumstances. In all events, the consultative committee would be a means of fostering the greater openness and confidence between States which the United Kingdom so earnestly desires.

Of course, a consultative committee would not operate on its own. States parties would have rights and obligations too. I have already referred to the need for openness and I should like to set out in a little more detail the form such openness might take. In the first place, States would make declarations on signature of or accession to the Convention. It has been suggested that these declarations could be made prior to signature, perhaps even during the negotiation of a convention. That is a possibility: if any State wished to make such a declaration in advance of a convention I am sure my authorities would welcome it as a sign of increasing confidence and trust. But as was demonstrated in document CD/142,² put forward by the Swedish delegation, the position of a State with regard to a CW capability could change very quickly. The United Kingdom therefore believes that the best time for declarations to be made is on the entry into force of the convention, or very shortly thereafter, so that at that time States acceding to it may make available and receive the most up-to-date information.

In our view, these declarations would need to be of a detailed and precise nature. They would need first to say whether a State possessed CW agents, precursors and munitions, and then to give details of the types of agents held and the quantity of each type. In addition, the location and types of all production facilities for CW would need to be listed. States would also need to make declarations either at the same time or soon after about the types and quantities of agents to be retained for permitted activities, and the production facilities to be maintained for that purpose. Until all CW stocks and facilities had been destroyed, further periodic declarations would need to be made; in the case of CW agents retained for peaceful purposes, declarations would probably need to be made annually. Such declarations would all be processed by the consultative committee, and would form the basis for their further work in verifying the convention.

The States parties would have various duties in respect of the consultative committee. In participating in the committee, States would be recognizing the value of co-operation. That co-operation would have to extend further than the straightforward exchange of data. There would also need to be provision for a degree of on-site inspection to ensure that the terms of the convention had been and were being complied with, that the declarations made were accurate and that stockpiles had been

² Feb. 10, *ante*.

destroyed and production facilities dismantled. A few countries have considered it regrettable that such measures should be thought necessary. We believe they are needed—but that they also offer a positive benefit in offering a way for States to remove any lingering doubts and to build confidence. The aim of the verification regime for a CW convention should, we believe, be to ensure that such doubts do not arise, or that if they do arise, they can be promptly allayed. Obviously we cannot hope to police the chemical industries of the world—the resources required, and the expense, would be immense. But it is right that every consideration should be given to opening to impartial and conscientious inspection those specific areas of activity which could give rise to concern or doubt. If there is nothing to hide, what objection can there be to this?

It has been suggested that inspection would be unacceptable because it would involve a breach of commercial confidence. But I believe members of this Committee will agree that where such potentially fearful weapons are involved, where so much is at stake, we cannot allow ourselves to be deflected by this problem. We can accept that maintaining commercial confidence is important—but I am sure that ways can be found of ensuring that commercial confidentiality is maintained, while all the steps necessary are taken to enhance the even more vital issue of confidence in a CW convention. The experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of inspections of commercial production facilities will be valuable when detailed consideration is given to this subject. The United Kingdom will be further developing its ideas on this aspect at a later stage.

I should like to turn now to a relatively new concept which has been under serious discussion for the first time this year in the CW Working Group, namely, the Swedish proposal to extend the scope of the treaty to cover areas of offensive CW capability such as planning, organization and training. The ideas of the Swedish delegation are set out in some detail in document CD/142. This is an interesting and far-reaching proposal, although one which also presents a number of difficulties. My authorities are still giving it detailed consideration, but I should like today to offer some preliminary comments.

The banning of what I might describe as the doctrinal, as opposed to the material, elements of an offensive CW capability is not in our view central or fundamental to a CW convention. It is more in the nature of a measure for building confidence—in this case confidence that a State party will not suddenly abrogate the Convention at some future date. As a first stage, as I understand it, States would make declarations of any aspects of a CW capability they might have. As a second stage, observers would be invited to attend military manoeuvres in general, and those involving NBC training in particular. In the latter case, observers would be permitted to monitor electronic communications. In the third stage, States would instruct their armed forces that no further activities specifically connected with the possession of a capability to conduct offensive CW operations were to take place. Finally, there could be provisions for the exchange of

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information and, most importantly, for on-site inspection of military in-
stallations, munitions stockpiles and airfields. That is how we have
understood the proposals in CD/142, as elaborated in CD/CW/WP.7.

This is a complex and detailed proposal. The United Kingdom has in the
past advocated the use of a confidence-building régime to help States to
prepare for a CW convention, and to reassure States about compliance
once such a convention has come into being. But the ideas contained in the
Swedish paper are of a rather different nature from these earlier proposals,
and need very careful thought. The United Kingdom is in favour of some
kind of confidence-building régime in connection with a ban on chemical
weapons—indeed, we have supported certain earlier proposals in this
field. But we need to give this question careful thought. In the first place, I
wonder whether the proposals are not too complex for inclusion in a con-
vention the primary and vital function of which would be to prohibit the
possession of chemical weapons. The negotiation of a convention limited
to this purpose will be a most complicated task, as we have seen from the
long discussions in this Committee and from the efforts of the two States
members of this Committee which have been involved in bilateral negotia-
tions. We should ask ourselves whether measures over and above those
essential to the main function of the convention might not be better treated
separately. In this way it might be possible to avoid the penalty of further
delays in progress in negotiating a ban on chemical weapons.

Secondly, I think we must ask ourselves what the measures proposed by
the Swedish delegation would achieve. Would they in fact build confi-
dence in the treaty régime? We can see that, if all States parties to a con-
vention were sure that all other States parties had entirely ceased all plan-
ning, training or organizing in relation to offensive CW operations, confi-
dence would be increased. But, despite the high degree of openness re-
quired by the measures proposed in CD/142, we really doubt whether it
would ever be possible to be certain that all doctrinal activities related to
offensive CW had ceased.

Thirdly, in view of a number of statements already made in the CW
Working Group, we think that there must also be some doubt whether the
measures proposed would ever be acceptable to a number of States whose
accession to a CW convention would be absolutely essential. We would
urge that in pursuing negotiations for a CW convention, we would do well
to limit ourselves to the basic issue of prohibiting the development, pro-
duction and stockpiling of these weapons.

Finally, I should like to say that the United Kingdom welcomes the work
that has been done in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during this session. In
particular, we have found the Chairman's set of working papers par-
ticularly useful in structuring the discussion of this important subject. We
feel, however, that the Working Group has not had sufficient opportunity
to discuss these papers as fully as is needed, let alone arrive at firm conclu-
sions. We shall be able to take advantage of the forthcoming recess to give
further consideration to a number of important points and will hope to be
able to make further detailed contributions in the next part of the session.