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Go for the Gold

President George Bush enters office with an historic START (Strategic Arms Reduction) treaty within his grasp. Whether he seizes the opportunity to reverse the buildup in strategic nuclear arms depends on his willingness to establish priorities and face up to difficult decisions early in his term. The years go fast in the Oval Office, and actions deferred now can be crowded out later by an expanding agenda.

The new administration's postponement of the START negotiations, previously scheduled for mid-February, could nevertheless serve a constructive purpose. In addition to allowing the new administration to get organized, a modest delay gives Bush time to modify Reagan's positions on strategic defense and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that have created the impasse on START. To reopen negotiations on the same basis would tend to lock the new administration into old non-negotiable positions. After a discreet interval, the United States can resume negotiations with a position that more realistically reflects the constraints of the budget, U.S. strategic interests, and the technical prospects for a Star Wars defense.

At the same time, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's estimate that it might take a year to review START policy may foreshadow serious problems to come. The well-known lack of enthusiasm for START shared by key members of the new administration, when coupled with the high priority being given to chemical and conventional warfare agreements, suggests that the new administration may be toying with the idea of deferring START while pursuing less important, and less readily attainable, objectives.

A START agreement stands out as the number one arms control priority. The treaty is not only by far the most important item on the arms control agenda but also the major accomplishment closest to fruition. President Bush has inherited a nearly complete framework for a treaty that could be signed in a year or so. The signing of the START treaty would be hailed at home and abroad as the turning point in the nuclear arms race. Failure to reach an agreement would be seen as a major setback to arms control regardless of what other agreements might be achieved.

To make a START treaty possible, however, President Bush will have to take a leadership role to resolve differences in the forthcoming policy review. Opponents of START within the administration can be counted on to attack the emerging treaty. Some will insist that the treaty should not be negotiated until there is a firm domestic consensus on modernization of the land-based leg of the strategic triad; in fact, START would permit any modernization within allowed numerical limits, including: rail-mobile MX, mobile Midgetman, or reduced numbers of warheads on new or old missiles in silos. Others will insist that START be linked to an agreement on conventional arms; in fact, the deterrent value of U.S. forces retained under START would be undiminished from what it is today. Still others will continue to insist that the Soviet Union must accept the erosion and scheduled destruction of the ABM Treaty as the price of START; in fact, the ABM Treaty is critical to the acceptability of START from the point of view of U.S. security.

During his campaign, Bush himself introduced a note of doubt as to his priorities when he said, "If I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons. . . That's my solemn mission." While a worldwide ban on the production and stockpiling of CW agents should be pursued to reinforce the ban on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it can by no stretch of the imagination be considered a substitute for a START agreement. Moreover, as a multilateral agreement with complex verification requirements, a chemical weapons accord would take longer to achieve than a bilateral START agreement.

President Bush must move expeditiously to establish the priorities of his arms control agenda. In doing so, he should heed the exhortation that President Reagan reportedly gave his advisers after the Washington summit to "go for the gold" by completing a START treaty for signature at the Moscow summit. The prize, which eluded Reagan because of his obsession with Star Wars, can be President Bush's if he decides to run the race.

—Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Chemical Arms Control After the Paris Conference

On January 13, 1989, two days after the adjournment of an international conference on chemical weapons (CW) held in Paris, the Arms Control Association sponsored a press briefing by a panel of chemical weapons and arms control specialists. An edited transcript of that briefing follows.

Participating in the briefing were: Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., president and executive director of the Arms Control Association and former deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Charles C. Flowerree, former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament and former chief of the International Relations Division of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Elisa Harris, guest scholar at the Brookings Institution; and James Leonard, former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, former deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, and former special representative to the Middle East peace negotiations.

The briefing was part of ACA's Media Information Project, sponsored jointly with the Committee for National Security. A news item on the Paris Conference appears on page 27.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.: The just-concluded Paris Conference on chemical weapons has focused attention on the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in warfare, and on the long, continuing efforts to develop a ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical warfare agents. The use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and U.S. charges that Libya is constructing a chemical weapons production plant have highlighted the risks of chemical warfare, the proliferation of chemical weapons, and the importance of the ongoing negotiations toward a global chemical weapons ban, being conducted in Geneva under the auspices of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD).

We have an excellent panel on this highly specialized field with us today. Ambassador Charles Flowerree will discuss the recent Paris Conference and the prospects for negotiations in Geneva. Elisa Harris will speak about chemical proliferation developments and possible solutions to the problem. And Ambassador James Leonard will comment on the U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons programs and the prospects for and significance of further agreements in this area.

Ambassador Charles C. Flowerree: Those of us who are considered experts in this field are somewhat like lizards who live under a rock most of the time, and when the rock is lifted, and the bright sunlight comes on us, we come out blinking. I participated

in the negotiations in Geneva for some years, and during the last decade and a half there were maybe four or five times that we had any press attention at all.

Initially, chemical weapons were perceived to be principally a U.S.-Soviet problem. In fact, we had bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union from 1978 to nearly the end of 1980, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put an end to that phase. Most of the other countries sat back and waited for the United States and the Soviet Union to settle their problems, which were mainly based on the reluctance of the Soviets to permit verification measures to our liking.

Then we entered a period of multilateral discussions. A working group formed in the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (now the Conference on Disarmament) where we discussed problems and even produced treaty-like language. Real negotiations began in the CD in 1983. Again, the Soviets showed reluctance to discuss the problems of verification.

Then there was the 1984 U.S. proposal with what was considered to have a rather Draconian verification measure—that is, mandatory on-site inspection. After serious arguments over that issue, it was finally brought to a point where the discussions could move forward in 1987, when the Soviets accepted, in principle, the idea of mandatory on-site inspections.

At that point, countries began to realize that everybody had a stake in this convention; even countries that don't produce chemicals in any quantity would be affected by the restrictions and the monitoring of world trade in chemical weapons. So the interest among countries that were not in the first rank of the economic field or in the military field grew considerably.

As to the problems that still remain, the main stumbling block has been the verification provisions. We hear a great deal these days about how a worldwide ban would be unverifiable. There are several ways to address this concern. First, there is the assumption that the majority of countries who adhere to this treaty will be doing so out of the conviction that it's good for them, and therefore they would not be averse to declaring whether they have chemical weapons, what kind they have, where they are, and where they would be destroyed. The same would be true with regard to their factories and other facilities that produce chemical weapons. They would be declared, they would be open to inspection, and after a certain period of time they would be dismantled.

As an aside, one of the things that makes this treaty so complicated is that destroying chemical weapons is not a simple process, and we have envisaged a period of eight years to destroy the weapons themselves, and another couple of years to get rid of the production facilities. Some of the production facilities are needed to destroy the weapons.

A major concern is what would happen if a country produced weapons in a facility that was not declared. It is possible that in the vast reaches of some of the countries we worry about, a clandestine facility could be constructed. To meet that problem, the United States proposed in 1984 that there be mandatory on-site inspection at the request of any state party or group of parties. The request

would be directed to an international authority, which would be staffed and prepared to conduct investigations. In some people's view the investigation would have to occur within 24 hours after the request was received. And those who followed the news recently recognized that that would have been vital in the case of Libya, had the treaty been in force.

There are still possibilities that countries could produce weapons without detection; however, there are other things that are required to have a chemical weapon capability, such as training and a considerable amount of knowledge of how to use the weapons. Unless one is considering suicide attacks, defensive equipment and clothing are required. So there are military indicators as well as commercial indicators.

In the view of many, the attainment of a significant chemical weapons capability on a clandestine basis among the larger powers is very difficult to imagine. Among the smaller countries, it is certainly conceivable that they could produce some. On the other hand, in most smaller countries, you don't have to look among a large number of chemical manufacturing installations, because they have very few. Therefore, any new activity would draw attention. If this treaty were in force, I believe the chances would be very small that someone would develop a surreptitious chemical weapons capability.

Let's look for a moment at the current situation and imagine that the chemical weapons treaty, as envisaged in the Geneva negotiations, were in force. First of all, the United States and the Soviet Union would have divested themselves of all their chemical warfare capabilities, which would of course improve the moral authority of their strictures against other countries that were attempting to evade the restrictions. But more practically, there would be in place a system for the monitoring and control of the international trade in chemical weapons which would apply to all countries party to the treaty. We would assume that the West Germans and our allies would be parties to the treaty, and their exports of critical materials would have been tightly controlled by the international authority which was set up under the treaty. With these factors in mind, our position would have been a great deal stronger in dealing with the German connection to the Libyan chemical facility.

Elisa Harris: I'd like to address the problem of chemical weapons proliferation and its relationship to the Geneva negotiations. One of the difficulties for those of us who study this issue is that governments are extremely reluctant to talk about specifics. They don't generally tell us who has the weapons, how they acquired the capability, and what the nature of the capability is. Instead, governments often speak in terms of the number of chemical weapons states, but even these estimates are often contradictory, both within governments and between governments. Having said that, I'd like to sum up what NATO and Western government officials have said in recent years, both on and off the record, about chemical weapons proliferation.

We're told that in the 1960s there were five countries that had chemical weapons. Now, in the 1980s, some 20 countries are believed to have these weapons, of which about a dozen are outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These are concentrated in two regions, in the Middle East and in Asia.

In the Middle East, the known chemical weapons state is clearly Iraq. Its use of these weapons in the Gulf war was confirmed on repeated occasions by the U.N. Probable Middle East chemical weapon states, according to U.S. officials, are Iran, Syria, Egypt, Israel, and Libya. In Asia, the probable chemical weapon states are Burma, China, North Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. South

"There's a good deal of heavy, detail work to be done, but I think it can be done successfully, and a good treaty can emerge."—James Leonard

Korea, we're told, is seeking to possess chemical weapons. Finally, Ethiopia is another probable chemical weapon state.

Although some of these countries probably acquired their chemical weapons from other CW states, a majority of them are now, we're told by U.S. officials, in a position to produce their own chemical weapons indigenously. This production is often based on equipment and material that's provided by Western chemical companies. We've seen this in the reports both on Iraq and Libya.

That's a basic outline of the nature of the problem that we face. Why is this of concern to us? I can suggest several reasons why proliferation would be a threat to international security. Very briefly, if chemical weapons become more fashionable through their proliferation, they may also become more attractive to terrorist organizations. This is one of the risks that the U.S. Government is articulating with respect to Libya's alleged acquisition of a chemical weapons capacity.

Second, proliferation may make conflict itself more likely. In 1988, there were reports that Israel was considering taking out a Syrian chemical weapons plant. And more recently, of course, we've had reports that the United States was considering, as one possible option, military action against this alleged Libyan facility.

Third, chemical weapons proliferation may make conflict more destructive, especially in areas where ballistic missiles are also proliferating, such as the Middle East and in Asia. If we marry chemical agents to ballistic missiles, the degree of destruction that those weapons could wreak would really be quite enormous.

Finally, if chemically armed ballistic missiles were used in, for example, the Middle East, there's a risk that the United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn into such a conflict on the side of their respective regional partners.

What can we do about it? One partial solution, pursued since Iraq's use of chemical weapons was confirmed in 1984, is export controls on sensitive precursor chemicals that could be used to make chemical weapons. Libya seems to have shown that export controls are not a solution to the problem. If a country is determined to acquire these weapons, it will be able to get around the export controls and develop its own chemical weapons capacity.

Another idea, suggested by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, is a chemical nonproliferation treaty. This would have allowed existing chemical weapon states to retain their weapons, but would have prevented non-CW states from acquiring them. Not surprisingly, the have-nots were totally opposed to the creation of another discriminatory, Nonproliferation Treaty-type of arrangement.

This leaves us with the idea of a complete ban on chemical weapons. That, it would seem to me and to many other people, including President Bush, is the best potential solution to deal with chemical weapons proliferation. Proliferation makes a chemical weapons ban much more desirable. On the other hand, chemical weapon proliferation makes it more difficult to achieve a treaty. It increases our monitoring requirements. If more countries have these weapons, the international verification agency that is created

under the treaty will have a greater task to pursue. More importantly, proliferation complicates efforts to achieve a treaty, because countries that possess chemical weapons may be reluctant to give up their capability unless they are sure that their adversaries are also parties to the treaty.

So, in conclusion, the largest obstacle to a chemical weapons ban is not verification, notwithstanding the difficulties we still face in that area, but rather this problem of proliferation. If we are going to have a chemical weapons treaty, it is essential that it encompass all chemical weapon states. Without that, I don't think the treaty would ever be ratified in this country and would not enter into force.

Ambassador James Leonard: I am very much encouraged by what has gone on in Paris, as well as the progress that has been made in Geneva. My guess is we will have a treaty ready for signing some two or three years from now. There's a good deal of heavy, detail work to be done between now and then, but I think it can be done successfully, and a good treaty can emerge.

However, I think it would be a tragedy if a CW treaty was allowed to obscure the need for doing something about nuclear weapons. Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are a sideshow. They are very important. They are a very deadly and terrible form of warfare, but they are nothing compared to nuclear weapons. If the opportunity that we have to get a START treaty is allowed to go by the boards while we're concentrating on chemicals, that really would be very unfortunate.

Let me give you a few facts with regard to the U.S. and Soviet positions on this issue. The U.S. position is that we have chemical weapons and will not disarm except in pursuance to the provisions of a verifiable treaty. We argue that we have to have a chemical weapons deterrent to deal with the danger of a Soviet first use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe. So we are maintaining a very large stockpile. We're destroying substantial amounts of that stockpile because it is obsolete or unsafe, but not because we say we don't need chemical weapons anymore.

At the same time, we are building some new chemical weapons—the famous binary systems. After a long battle in the Congress we are producing some new binary weapons in the form of artillery shells. We are also in the process of testing an aerial bomb, the "Bigeye." We are producing about 100 of them for testing purposes. But the General Accounting Office continues to criticize both the design and the testing program, and Congress seems reluctant to go beyond testing into production until the GAO says that there's something worth producing. The Defense Department is also engaged in research and development on a third type, a warhead for the MLRS (the multiple-launch rocket system), which is probably the most sensible from a military viewpoint, if any of these are sensible. But that is still in R&D and is not approaching the production level as yet. And finally, we are conducting some simple conceptual studies of the possibility of a chemical warhead

"If a treaty had been in force, it is far less likely that the German companies would have been able to supply Libya."—Charles Flowerree

for long-range cruise missiles. But again, that's not nearing even the genuine research and development stage.

The artillery shells are going to be stockpiled in this country. We've reached an agreement with the Germans that they won't be sent over there, and in fact that we will withdraw the small stockpile of chemical weapons that we have at present in Germany. That will be pulled out in the next couple of years. Our deterrent will be stockpiled in this country for use in the event of war. The U.S. weapon program is not affected in any way by what's just happened in Paris. As far as the U.S. Government is concerned, we are going forward with these various programs as we have been planning them all along.

The Soviets state that they have halted production of chemical weapons. Moreover, they state that they are already beginning the destruction of their chemical weapons. They have also declared the size of their stockpile, something we have been unwilling to do. The Soviets have said they have 50,000 tons of chemical weapons.

With regard to the first of their three points, I tend to believe that in fact they have halted production. As the Reagan administration points out, they have been producing weapons continuously, as far as we know, since 1969 when the United States halted production. We didn't produce any chemical weapons from then until just last year, when the Congress finally permitted the Defense Department to start on binaries. So, the Soviets have at least some weapons that are newer than the ones in our stockpile.

The Soviets almost certainly are going to destroy some of their chemical weapons. Whether it's anything more than what we're doing, that is destroying obsolete or unsafe weapons, I certainly don't know. I doubt that anyone in this country knows. The fact that they are beginning destruction is not proof that they are committed to go to the zero level unilaterally, by any means.

Finally, considerable skepticism is cast on their stockpile declaration, because the U.S. intelligence community has been saying for many years that the Soviet stockpile was much larger than 50,000 tons. Frankly, I tend to believe the Soviets. I think they would be making a ghastly political error to go forward and misdeclare and lie about the size of their stockpile and then eventually, in pursuance to a treaty, have that lie exposed. But no one will know until the verification provisions are brought into effect. The Soviets have indicated they might be willing to go ahead with verification even before the treaty is completed, which of course would be very desirable.

From both the U.S. position and the Soviet position, I draw the conclusion that both sides want a treaty and that a treaty is quite likely to come about some two or three years from now. That will not be a treaty that satisfies every government. It should be remembered, however, that we don't have to have every government in the world on board. And I don't think we even will decide at that point that we have to have every government that has a chemical weapons capability on board before we put a treaty into force.

The treaty is significant enough if the United States, the Soviet Union, and 100 or 120 other countries agree that it ought to be done. I think the U.S. decision at that time will be to go ahead with the treaty and to use the moral and political pressure that derives from such a widely supported treaty to try to bring the holdouts into line. We'll then have a situation very analogous to what we have today on the Nonproliferation Treaty. But there will be the very big difference that the United States and the Soviet Union will be committed to go to zero as, unfortunately, we are not in the case of nuclear weapons.

That brings me back to my reminder: as important as chemicals are, don't forget nuclear weapons. They are a far greater danger to the future of the human race than any chemical weapons.

Question and Answer Session

Q: Isn't Libya a test case of what happens when there is a violation? If there were a treaty at this point, and Libya was unbending to the world's moral authority, what do you think would happen?

Leonard: First of all, I don't have the full facts on the Libyan situation, so I don't feel I can really say what we ought to do. But let's assume our intelligence has clearly shown a chemical weapons facility to be there. The way to handle it would be through diplomatic pressure on the Libyans to dismantle it under a mounting international effort. Just the United States alone, or the U.S. acting as if it was the policeman of the world charged with handling situations like that on its own, will not, I think, be effective. But if we can mobilize world opinion to bring pressure to bear on the Libyans, then we would have a good chance of dismantling the capability and eliminating it without using weapons against it.

Flowerree: The Libyan case is an example where outside assistance was vital. The pressures that we have raised have had some effect, certainly on German export controls. As I said in my remarks, if a treaty had been in force, and we assume that the West Germans would be a party to it, there would have been a mechanism in place to oversee the transfer of critical chemical weapons materials, and it is far less likely that the German companies would have been able to supply Libya. Libya might have been able to find an alternate source, but it would have certainly been much more difficult.

Q: The U.S. Government in the past hasn't had the highest credibility on chemical weapons matters, if one reflects on the yellow rain and the anthrax outbreak, and so on. Is it the feeling of the panel that the current intelligence on the Libyan matter is significantly better, and much more believable? And also, if we do know this much by these means about Libya, does the U.S. Government indeed most likely know, to the same kind of detail, just exactly what Syria and all these other nations are indeed doing?

Harris: I haven't seen the intelligence information, so I can't say whether it is good and that they have a solid case. On the other hand, I think precisely because the United States has been burned before on its chemical weapons allegations with respect to yellow rain, and there is still controversy over the Sverdlovsk issue, I assume that the U.S. is being much more careful this time around, and that it would not have gone public unless it was fairly confident that it had a solid case. I was also encouraged to hear the British government say that they had independent evidence which also tracked with the U.S. assessment that this is a chemical weapons plant. In the past, Britain's proclamations on these issues—for example, on yellow rain—were based on U.S. evidence, not their own independent evidence.

Leonard: As an old intelligence officer in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, I think the State Department intelligence on chemical weapons was in a very unsatisfactory state, and from some viewpoints remains in an unsatisfactory state. But that's with regard to the Soviet capability. For us not to know what the chemical capacity of a country is, it has to be a very large country, and it has to have a closed system, one that produces everything involved in the process within its own borders.

Third World countries are for the most part not very large, and are extremely open in most ways. It is possible for a major power to know almost everything that goes on within the borders of any significant Third World country. I think the example of Egypt,

where we knew about their development of chemical weapons 20 years ago when they were using them against Yemen, is an example of how it is very difficult for a Third World country to conduct a serious chemical program and not have it become known to the U.S. and probably to the Soviets as well.

Flowerree: Having been in the government during the yellow rain and the Sverdlovsk incidents, I believe the current U.S. approach has been much more well thought out and restrained. In the case of yellow rain, then-Secretary of State Al Haig made a speech in Berlin to raise the alleged violations; and one got the impression that, to have something dramatic to say, he pulled this one out of the hat as a smoking gun at a time when it really had not been thoroughly vetted within the government.

I happened to be the head of the U.S. delegation to the Biological Weapons Review Conference at the time that Sverdlovsk broke, and that popped on us like a bolt from the blue. And once again, there seemed to be an awful lot of loose ends that hadn't been picked up. In the Libyan case, I think they have built the case over a period of months before making the public charges.

Q: It is often said that, unlike on-site inspection of military equipment, chemical weapons verification would mean the monitoring of widespread civilian industry—pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and so forth. How intrusive would that system of inspection have to be?

Flowerree: From the very beginning we attempted to keep the chemical manufacturers in our country and other countries abreast of where we were going with the treaty. The Chemical Manufacturers Association of the United States has endorsed the treaty. Several other countries have similar organizations that have also cooperated in developing measures that they feel would be effective but not burden the chemical industry worldwide unduly. They have met on several occasions, to develop papers that would prescribe, for example, how monitoring would take place, how reporting would take place. One of the most difficult problems is, of course, that chemicals like chlorine and sulphur compounds are made in enormous quantities for perfectly legitimate civilian purposes. But there are ways of keeping track of this production. One other thing I have to remind you of is that the chemical industry, probably more than any other, is used to some sort of regulation because of environmental considerations. And there is an international environmental regime. They find that the additional burden of what they would have to report under the chemical weapons regime is not that intolerable.

Q: I was quite struck by Ambassador Leonard's optimism in general about the treaty, thinking it would be signed in two or three years, even if there are holdouts like Syria and Libya. What would happen against those holdouts if, like Iraq, they used these weapons during that time when they were holding out? Do you think it was a mistake that no sanctions were taken against Iraq earlier?

Leonard: I do think it was a mistake. One of the positive developments that's come out in connection with this treaty is the statements made by the Secretary of State and others indicating that we would like to see sanctions instituted and we would like to have a regime that will automatically bring onto the table the question of using sanctions against a country which violates a treaty like this. I only wish we had been doing this while the war was going on and the Iraqis were using it. There were measures available to us then that could have helped to deter the massive Iraqi use of it. Maybe we realize now that that was a mistake and we're trying to set things up better for the future.

ACT

The Nuclear and Space Talks: The Reagan Legacy and the Path Ahead

Paul H. Nitze

Paul H. Nitze, the ambassador at large and special adviser to the President and the secretary of state on arms control matters, delivered the following speech to the Strategy and Arms Control Seminar at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs on November 30, 1988.

As the Reagan administration comes to a close, we can look back on a period of unprecedented activity in the arms control field. This activity has covered a wide agenda, including nuclear testing, conventional stability talks, and a ban on chemical weapons. But the heart of the U.S.-Soviet arms control agenda has been the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks. In that area, we and the Soviets have completed the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, have made significant progress toward conclusion of a Strategic Arms Reduction [START] treaty, and also have sketched out the framework for an agreement regulating defense and space activities.

Though much has been accomplished in the Nuclear and Space Talks, there is much yet to be done. Several difficult issues and many important details remain to be resolved in the START negotiations, and the sides have significant differences in the Defense and Space Talks. Even the INF problem will not be behind us until the treaty is successfully implemented. Thus, the incoming administration faces a full and challenging nuclear and space arms control agenda.

Let me review the Reagan record on the Nuclear and Space Talks, and then turn to the approach I recommend for the Bush administration. Because arms control efforts can only be judged in the context of the force structures involved, I will outline my views on U.S. force modernization efforts as well.

"START would provide us the rights necessary to deploy survivable ICBMs, and it would make the job easier by reducing the threat to such a force."

The Objectives of Arms Control

In a lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1985, I addressed the topic of the objectives of arms control. The main points were as follows.

We and our allies have long based our security policy on deterrence—that is, the prevention of conflict by convincing a potential opponent that the risks and costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible gains he might hope to achieve.

In seeking to strengthen deterrence, we must remember that arms control is but one element of our security policy. Arms control complements the measures we must take unilaterally, such as maintaining weapons and forces necessary for an adequate deterrent; it is not a substitute or replacement for adequate defenses. Indeed, experience shows that, while arms control can play an important role in enhancing our security and producing a more stable strategic relationship, what we and our allies are able and willing to do for ourselves is more important.

This point becomes particularly important when one assesses the contribution the prospective START treaty would make to our security—as I shortly propose to do.

With these thoughts in mind, and based on the fundamental goal of maintain-

ing and strengthening deterrence, one can posit several objectives for our arms control efforts.

First, we should seek to enhance stability; that is, we should work to reduce the incentives that a side might have to strike first in a crisis or to provoke a crisis that might lead to a military confrontation. To dissuade the Soviet Union from contemplating reckless action, our military forces as a whole should have the necessary characteristics of effectiveness, flexibility, diversity, and survivability against an attack focused directly on those forces.

Second, and related to the first objective, we should seek to assure parity or at least rough equivalence between the capabilities of the two sides. We could not be confident that U.S. and allied forces clearly inferior to those of the Soviet Union would provide an adequate deterrent to reckless action in a crisis. In seeking parity, we can enhance stability by reaching rough equivalence at substantially lower levels of arms. Of course, reductions *per se* are not necessarily good. If the remaining forces are more vulnerable to a first strike, stability is reduced, but properly structured reductions can indeed do much to enhance stability.

A third objective is to seek agreements that are reasonably precise and unambiguous, but the less ambiguity, the better.

Fourth, we should have confidence in our ability to verify compliance with the agreements that are reached.

Fifth, we should seek to provide incentive to the Soviets to comply with negotiated agreements, by demonstrating our will to react to any violations in a way that will deny them the benefits they might hope to gain from such noncompliance.

And finally, our arms control policy must merit sustained support from Western publics and from Western legislative bodies; this is necessary not only to buttress our positions in the negotiations, but also to carry out the defense programs that must proceed in parallel with arms control.

What Next For Arms Control?

Building on the Achievement. With the ratification of the INF Treaty, the Reagan administration took a positive step for arms control. The strong bipartisan support for arms control rekindled during the ratification process has improved the prospects for an historic agreement on strategic arms reductions, despite emerging resistance in some quarters. The Bush administration will face a broad agenda of other important issues, including conventional forces in Europe, chemical weapons, nuclear test limitations, and nonproliferation.

Protecting the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Amid these hopeful developments, the future of the ABM Treaty remains in doubt. President Bush has not yet revealed how he will handle the Strategic Defense Initiative, which continues to threaten the ABM Treaty and obstruct progress toward a START agreement.

Keeping the Arms Control Vigil. During the crucial transition months, it will be important for arms control supporters to keep a careful watch over developments. The Arms Control Association analyzes unfolding events in all areas of arms control, and disseminates this information through its press and public education programs.

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