

ements and notifications con-
stocks of chemical weapons or
the progress of the destruction
and of the completion of these

, agreement has been reached
lethal chemicals for nonhostile
l from stocks, and otherwise
given time, should be minimal.
ent, that amount should not
. A party to the convention
s for nonhostile military pur-
at a single specialized facility,
red and the capacity of which
regarding such a limit are under

at the fulfilment of the obliga-
ention must be subject to the
rification. The two sides have
sues relating to verification of
future convention. They are in
to such verification should be
international measures. There
g to international verification

uly 1979, the two sides believe
should include the creation of a
ts of the proposed functions of
rt are the subject of further

to believe that any party to a
bilateral basis, or through the
n another party with respect to
cting in violation of obligations
nation on the actual state of
on of the actual state of affairs
in support of the necessity of
ree to such a request or decide
nations.

type of on-site investigation,
es, would constitute a verifica-
quate assurance regarding the
is unresolved.

ecessary to develop procedures
isions regarding the rights and
and the rights and functions of
a are the subject of continuing

that it should also be provided

that any party could turn to the United Nations Security Council with a complaint which would include appropriate rationale. In case of suspicion that the convention is not being complied with, the Consultative Committee, upon request of any party, or of the Security Council, could undertake an investigation of the actual state of affairs.

17. National measures of verification would include the use of national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally accepted principles of international law. In this connexion, parties should not impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures, the national technical means of other parties carrying out the aforementioned verification functions.

18. The US and the USSR remain of the view that it would be advisable to reflect in a future convention the obligation of each party to take appropriate internal measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent, anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, any activity contrary to the provisions of the convention.

19. Possibilities for confidence-building measures continue to be explored.

20. The US and the USSR proceed from the premise that a future convention on chemical weapons would include a withdrawal provision similar to the relevant provisions contained in other arms control and disarmament agreements.

21. The question of the conditions for entry into force of a convention remains unagreed.

22. The two sides believe that inasmuch as an effective prohibition of chemical weapons requires working out a large number of technical questions it is advisable to deal with them in annexes to a convention. This matter remains a subject of discussion.

* * *

The United States and the Soviet Union wish to inform the member States of the Committee on Disarmament of their earnest intention to continue their persistent efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the extremely complex unresolved issues relating to a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to completing successfully the bilateral US-Soviet negotiations and presenting a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest possible time.

Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention, July 8, 1980¹

Chemical weapons would be quite useful for warfare under many circumstances and it is necessary that adequate verification measures

¹ CD/113.

be available and that international control of these measures be sufficient to ensure the security of all States. It has often been suggested and in fact agreed, as it appears in the 1970 [1980] joint report from the United States of America and USSR,² that a Consultative Committee supported by a secretariat should be available to monitor verification and compliance.

Due to the complex nature of chemical weapons, the numbers of toxic chemicals which are suitable for this role, and the variety of activities which must be monitored, it is unlikely that a Consultative Committee alone will adequately provide this service and the nature of its supporting elements requires further definition.

For example, one could contemplate the establishment of an international verification control agency for this purpose. It would be directed by an executive officer such as a Director General, and would contain a secretariat to provide for co-ordination of the necessary services and dissemination of information. It could also include inspection teams and other technical personnel to provide for the processing of economic information and various scientific data including the analysis of chemical samples. The agency would report to the Consultative Committee as well as to the United Nations. The Consultative Committee would meet regularly to review events and at other times in response to a challenge or other request by one or more signatory States.

Each Member State would be expected, as it has been suggested, to establish a national verification agency as well, to review national activities under the treaty and to report results and provide technical and other verification information to the international agency. It would also act as contacts and hosts for any international inspection teams which were required to enter the country and it would provide candidates for the international secretariat and its technical staff.

The monitoring of national activities such as stockpile destruction, agent production plant demolition, research and development activities for peaceful and defensive purposes, the non-transfer of agents, information and weapons to other nations, and eventually the non-production of new chemical weapons will require some on-site inspection. National agencies would have a role in carrying out this control but this should be done in conjunction with international arrangements, particularly at critical phases of some activities and in challenge situations. For some activities the taking of on-site and near site samples will be necessary. This must be done by standardized techniques and, on those occasions when international inspectors are present, duplicate samples would be taken for comparison analysis in laboratories of both the national and international agencies.

Other mechanisms of verification control which should occur under a convention, and may be assisted by the national and international agencies, will include the initial declarations, periodic exchanges of statements and review conferences to update definitions, criteria and agent lists, bilateral discussions, appeals to the Consultative Committee and if necessary, appeals to the United Nations Security Council or

² *Supra.*

international control of these measures be the security of all States. It has often been agreed, as it appears in the 1970 [1980] joint resolutions of America and USSR,² that a Consultative Secretariat should be available to monitor progress.

In the nature of chemical weapons, the numbers of weapons are suitable for this role, and the variety of weapons to be monitored, it is unlikely that a Consultative Secretariat could adequately provide this service and the nature of the service requires further definition.

It is not to be contemplated the establishment of an international agency for this purpose. It would be directed by a Director General, and would contain a staff for the co-ordination of the necessary services and administration. It could also include inspection teams and personnel to provide for the processing of various scientific data including the analysis of isotope ratios. The agency would report to the Consultative Committee of the United Nations. The Consultative Committee would be invited to review events and at other times in response to a request by one or more signatory States.

It would be expected, as it has been suggested, to be a verification agency as well, to review national declarations and to report results and provide technical information to the international agency. It would also be responsible for any international inspection teams that enter the country and it would provide technical secretariat and its technical staff.

Activities such as stockpile destruction, disarmament, research and development activities for non-proliferation purposes, the non-transfer of agents and technology to other nations, and eventually the non-proliferation of weapons will require some on-site inspection. The national agencies have a role in carrying out this control but this should be done in conjunction with international arrangements, particularly in some activities and in challenge situations. The carrying out of on-site and near site samples will be done by standardized techniques and, on-site, national inspectors are present, duplicate samples for comparison analysis in laboratories of both national agencies.

Verification control which should occur under the auspices of the national and international agencies. Initial declarations, periodic exchanges of information, references to update definitions, criteria and procedures, appeals to the Consultative Committee of the United Nations Security Council or

General Assembly. These mechanisms seem to be those which are necessary to provide adequate international control of the verification process and the degree of co-operation between national and international agencies as outlined should ensure that national interests are not compromised by this process.

Letter From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Carter: Sale of Trident I Missiles to the United Kingdom, July 10, 1980¹

As you are aware the United Kingdom Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent capability. It will be necessary to replace the present Polaris force in the early 1990s, and having reviewed the options, the Government has concluded that the Trident I weapon system best meets the need to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capability into the 21st century. I write therefore to ask you whether the United States Government would be prepared, in continuation of the cooperation which has existed between our Governments in this field since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963, to supply on a continuing basis, Trident I missiles, equipment and supporting services, in a manner generally similar to that in which Polaris was supplied.

The United Kingdom Government would wish to purchase sufficient missiles, complete with multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicles and less only the warheads themselves, together with equipment and supporting services, on a continuing basis to introduce and maintain a force of 4 British submarines (or 5 if the United Kingdom Government so prefer), close coordination being maintained between the Executive Agencies of the two Governments in order to assure compatibility of equipment.

The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, like the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, the successor force will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western alliance in all circumstances. It is my understanding that cooperation in the modernisation of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent in this way would be consistent with the present and prospective international obligations of both parties.

In particular, I would like to assure you that the United Kingdom Government continues to give whole-hearted support to the NATO Long-Term Defence Programme and to other strengthening of conventional forces. The United Kingdom Government has substantially increased its defence spending, in accordance with NATO's collective policy, and plans to make further such increases in the future in order to improve the effectiveness of its all-around contribution to Allied

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 21, 1980, pp. 1343-1344.