Documents from the U.S.-Soviet Summit

At the U.S.-Soviet Summit in Washington, DC, from May 31 to June 3, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the great progress which has been made in the negotiations on this Treaty. In particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues in the talks and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year. They instructed their negotiators in Geneva to accelerate their work to implement an early signature agreement in order to fulfill this goal.

The START Treaty will be a major landmark in both arms control and in the relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It results from the recognition by both sides of the special obligation they bear to reduce the risk of nuclear war, enhance strategic stability, and strengthen peace and international security.

As such, the START Treaty will signal a turning point in U.S.-Sov. arms control efforts and create a new, more rational, open, cooperative, predictable, and stable relationship. The Treaty will complement a remarkable degree of improvement in the important policy relationship which has evolved over the past decade, and the Treaty will facilitate the reduction of the sizable stockpiles of strategic offensive arms which now exist.

The benefits of a START Treaty will be substantial. For the first time ever, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms—up to 50 percent of each side's current levels. These reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible. The result will be greater stability and a lower risk of war.

Major provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

- The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their submarines and the number of warheads will be reduced to no more than 1,600, within this total the deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will account for no more than 800.

- The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6,000. Of these, no more than 4,000 will be attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1,500 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 500 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs.

- The aggregate throw weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each side will be limited to an agreed level which will approximately correspond to the U.S. inventory of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and the U.S. inventory of heavy ICBMs (lowered to the level of December 1982) under the Reagan-Gorbachev Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

- Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted on a delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

- Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted on a delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

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Article I

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

(a) to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;

(b) not to produce or hold any chemical weapons stockpiles, subject to conditions determined by the Parties;

(c) to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to low levels, by cooperation in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and

(d) to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.

2. Each Party, during its destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to efforts to reduce the population of the area where it is operating, and to the protection of the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

Article II

1. To implement their undertaking to cooperate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific program of cooperation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The program may include matters related to:

(a) methods and technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons;

(b) measures to ensure that the appropriate environment for destruction is met, including the maintenance of destruction of chemical weapons on their national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations under international law, including those in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

2. Each Party shall cooperate as requested by the other Party, with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, to the extent that such cooperation is necessary to solve the problems under the paragraph shall the Parties not exhaust these problems in determining that the sole purpose of each Party’s actions is to destroy their chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than that the Parties have experienced such problems.

Article V

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities. Each Party shall provide the mechanisms for ensuring that all such facilities are subjected to the inspections.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas that it has designated as locations where the mission to destroy the chemical weapons shall be undertaken. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors on-site, with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the site where the chemical weapons declared to be removed from that facility are stored, not later than December 31, 1999, or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Article VII

1. The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or other means as they may agree.