

Documents from the U.S.-Soviet Summit

At the U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington, DC, from May 31 to June 3, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev discussed a broad range of issues and signed a number of arms control agreements and joint statements. Following are the complete texts of the joint statements on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and on possible future strategic arms negotiations, an agreement on chemical weapons destruction, joint statements on nonproliferation and the conventional force negotiations, and a summary of the nuclear testing verification protocols.

Strategic Nuclear Arms

Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms

The President of the United States George Bush and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mikhail S. Gorbachev discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the great progress which has been made in the negotiations on this Treaty. In particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues in the talks and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year. They instructed their negotiating teams in Geneva to accelerate their work to complete the Joint Draft Text recording the details of these solutions in order to fulfill this goal.

The START Treaty will be a major landmark in both arms control and in the relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It results from the recognition by both sides of the special obligation they bear to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, enhance strategic stability, and strengthen peace and international security. As such, the START Treaty will signal a turning point in U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts toward a more rational, open, cooperative, predictable and stable relationship. The Treaty will complement to a remarkable degree the important political changes which have recently begun to remove the hostility and suspicion and will facilitate the reduction of the sizeable stockpiles of strategic offensive arms which now exist.

The benefits of this Treaty are many. For the first time ever, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms—up to 50 percent in certain categories. More importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible. The result will be greater stability and a lower risk of war.

Major agreed provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 1,600; within this total deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be reduced to no more than 154;

The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6,000. Of these, no more than 4,900 will be warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1,540 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,100 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs;

The aggregate throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each side will be limited to an agreed level which will be approximately 50 percent below the existing level of the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of a date to be determined. This limit will not be exceeded for the duration of the Treaty;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear

ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and shall be attributed with an agreed number of warheads against the 6,000 limit. Existing and future U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 10 warheads each. Existing and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 8 warheads each;

Within the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles the United States of America may have no more than 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are attributed with 10 warheads each. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may exceed that number of heavy bombers by 40 percent. If the United States of America exceeds the 150 number, each additional heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exceeds 210 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, each such heavy bomber will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped;

Existing and future U.S. heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs; existing and future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs;

Long-range ALCMs will be considered those with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs will not be considered nuclear if they are distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There will be no restrictions on deploying such ALCMs on aircraft not limited by the Treaty.

Reductions will be carried out in three phases over a period of seven years. Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms will be achieved by the end of each phase of reductions;

The numerical limitations provided for by the Treaty will be achieved and complied with through conversion or elimination in accordance with agreed procedures.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in the START Treaty. Each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs and, annually for the duration of the Treaty, with unilateral declarations regarding its planned deployments of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e., those with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Those declarations will be politically binding. In the annual declarations the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the following five Treaty years will be specified, provided that the number declared will not exceed 880. In the declarations of policy it will be specified that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. The sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement to continue to seek "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification".

Except as specifically prohibited, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

The START Treaty will include specific prohibitions on certain categories of strategic offensive arms, basing modes and activities. The following are among the bans under the START Treaty:

- new types of heavy ICBMs;
- heavy SLBMs and launchers of heavy SLBMs;
- mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles;
- flight testing and deployment of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987;
 - rapid reload of ICBM launchers;
 - long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads.

The far-reaching reductions and other constraints contained in the Treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated.

Taken together, the START Treaty's comprehensive verification regime will create a degree of transparency in the military sphere which would have been unthinkable only a short time ago. It will not only provide for effective verification of the obligations of the Treaty, but will also greatly increase the mutual confidence which is essential for a sound strategic relationship. In addition, this verification system can provide a model which may be incorporated into future agreements. The verification regime under development includes:

- On-site inspections: For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the Treaty, each side will, on the basis of reciprocity, conduct twelve kinds of on-site inspections, as well as continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, in accordance with agreed procedures. *Inter alia*, each side will conduct short-notice inspections at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of reentry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles, inspections to verify elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities related to them, suspect site inspections, and various exhibitions.

- National technical means of verification: For the purpose of ensuring verification, each side will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The Treaty will include a series of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. There will be a ban on interference with such means;

- Ban on denial of telemetric information: The sides agreed to make on-board technical measurements on ICBMs and SLBMs and to broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. Except for strictly limited exemptions, there will be a ban on any practice, including the use of encryption, encapsulation or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information;

- Information exchange: Before signature of the Treaty the sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their strategic offensive arms. These data will be updated on a regular basis throughout the lifetime of the Treaty;

- A comprehensive agreement on the manner of deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles and appropriate limitations on their movements so as to ensure effective verification of adherence to the numerical limitations provided for in the Treaty. In addition, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers will be limited and mobile ICBMs will be subject to identification through the application of unique identifiers, or tags.

To promote the objectives of the Treaty, the sides will establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The sides have agreed that the Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. If the sides so agree, the Treaty can be extended for successive five year periods, unless superseded.

The progress outlined above fulfills the aim, set forth by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during their Malta meeting, of agreeing upon the basic provisions of the strategic offensive arms Treaty by the time of their Washington meeting. The two Presidents express confidence that the Foreign Ministers and the delegations of the two countries at the Geneva talks will be able to reach agreement in the remaining months on the outstanding issues that are still being negotiated.

Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, building on the results of the current negotiations, agree to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both

countries. This will be achieved by seeking agreements that improve survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defenses.

In order to attain these objectives, the sides have agreed as follows:

First. This year the sides will complete work on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Following the signing of the Treaty, the sides will hold consultations without delay regarding future talks and these important talks will begin at the earliest practical date. Both sides in these future talks will be free to raise any issues related to any strategic offensive arms.

Within the existing negotiating framework on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, the two sides will continue negotiations on ABM and space without delay. Thus, in the future talks the two sides will discuss strategic stability issues of interest to them, including the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, taking into account stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and development of new technologies. The sides will work toward the important goal of reaching an early outcome in these negotiations.

Second. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as is the case in the emerging START Treaty, will, in the new negotiations, seek to reduce their strategic offensive arms in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability. In the new negotiations, the two sides agree to place emphasis on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs. Effective verification will be provided by national technical means, cooperative measures, and on-site inspection.

Third. Having agreed on the need to ensure a predictable strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the sides will, for the entire duration of the START Treaty, exchange, at the beginning of each calendar year, information on planned changes in the numbers of strategic offensive arms as of the end of the current year.

Fourth. The sides will pursue additional measures to build confidence and ensure predictability of the military activities of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them.

Fifth. The sides believe that reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the responsibility not only of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that other States should also make their contribution toward the attainment of this objective, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They call upon all States to consider the new opportunities for engagement in mankind's common effort to remove the risk of outbreak of nuclear war worldwide.

Accordingly, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give these future negotiations the highest priority so that the benefits of strengthened stability can be realized as soon as possible.

Chemical Weapons

Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties,"

Determined to make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, hereinafter referred to as "the multilateral convention,"

Aware of their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament,

Desiring to halt the production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of the preponderance of their chemical weapons stockpiles, without waiting for the multilateral convention to enter into force,

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum,"

Recalling the bilateral commitment to cooperate with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, contained in the joint statement on chemical weapons issued at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, and

Mindful of the efforts of each Party aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons and desiring to cooperate in this area,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

- (a) to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;
- (b) not to produce chemical weapons;
- (c) to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;
- (d) to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and
- (e) to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.

2. Each Party, during its destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

Article II

1. To implement their undertaking to cooperate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific program of cooperation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The program may include matters related to: methods and specific technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons; measures to ensure safety and protection of people and the environment; construction and operation of destruction facilities; the appropriate equipment for destruction; past, current and planned destruction activities; monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons; or such other topics as the Parties may agree. Activities to implement this program may include: exchanges of visits to relevant facilities; exchanges of documents; meetings and discussions among experts; or such other activities as the Parties may agree.

2. Each Party shall, as appropriate, cooperate with other states that request information or assistance regarding the destruction of chemical weapons. The Parties may respond jointly to such requests.

Article III

Upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, each Party shall not produce chemical weapons.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 5,000 agent tons. In this Agreement, "tons" means metric tons.

2. Each Party shall begin its destruction of chemical weapons by no later than December 31, 1992.

3. By no later than December 31, 1999, each Party shall have destroyed at least 50 percent of its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons. The

aggregate quantity of chemical weapons of a Party shall be the amount of chemical weapons declared in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or declared thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum, as updated in accordance with paragraph 6(b) of this Article.

4. In the event that a Party determines that it cannot achieve an annual rate of destruction of chemical weapons of at least 1,000 agent tons during 1995, or that it cannot destroy at least 1,000 agent tons during each year after 1995, that Party shall, at the earliest possible time, notify the other Party, in accordance with Paragraph 10 of this Article.

5. Each Party, in its destruction of chemical weapons, shall also destroy the munitions, devices and containers from which the chemicals have been removed. Each Party shall reduce and limit its other empty munitions and devices for chemical weapons purposes so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the aggregate capacity of such munitions and devices does not exceed the volume of the remaining bulk agent of that Party.

6. Thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall inform the other Party of the following:

(a) its current general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement and its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force. The detailed plan shall encompass all of the chemical weapons to be destroyed during the calendar year, and shall include their locations, types and quantities, the methods of their destruction, and the locations of the destruction facilities that are to be used; and

(b) any changes, as of the entry into force of this Agreement, in the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum.

7. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than November 30, of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the following calendar year.

8. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than April 15, of the following:

(a) any further changes, as of December 31 of the previous year, to the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum;

(b) the implementation during the previous calendar year of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons; and

(c) any update to the general and detailed plans provided pursuant to paragraphs 6(a) or 7 of this Article.

9. Each Party shall limit its chemical weapons storage facilities so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the number of such facilities does not exceed eight. Each Party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations, including those under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

10. If a Party experiences problems that will prevent it from destroying its chemical weapons at a rate sufficient to meet the levels specified in this Article, that Party shall immediately notify the other Party and provide a full explanation. The Parties shall promptly consult on measures necessary to resolve the problems. Under no circumstances shall the Party not experiencing problems in its destruction of chemical weapons be required to destroy its chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than the Party that has experienced such problems.

Article V

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas within these destruction facilities for systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the

other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct, promptly after its receipt of the notification, an on-site inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are present at that facility. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year of the notification and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility for which it has received a notification pursuant to this paragraph, to determine that chemical weapons are not being stored there.

4. When a Party has completed its destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement, it shall promptly notify the other Party. In its notification, the Party shall specify the chemical weapons storage facilities where its remaining chemical weapons are located and provide a detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each of these storage facilities. Each Party, promptly after it has received such a notification, shall have the right to inspect each of the chemical weapons storage facilities specified in the notification, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons at each facility.

5. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year in which destruction begins and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility of the other Party that is not already subject to annual inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons that are being stored there.

6. On the basis of the reports of its inspectors and other information available to it, each Party shall determine whether the provisions of this Agreement are being satisfactorily fulfilled and shall communicate its conclusions to the other Party.

7. Detailed provisions for the implementation of the inspection measures provided for in this Article shall be set forth in the document on inspection procedures. The Parties shall work to complete this document by December 31, 1990.

Article VI

The Parties shall cooperate in making every effort to conclude the multilateral convention at the earliest date and to implement it effectively. Toward those ends, the Parties agree, in addition to their other obligations in this Agreement, to the following:

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than the end of the eighth year after entry into force of the multilateral convention, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 500 agent tons.

2. Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, *inter alia*, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years.

3. The Parties shall intensify their cooperation with each other and with other states to ensure that all chemical weapons-capable states become parties to the multilateral convention.

4. The Parties declare their intention to be among the original parties to the multilateral convention.

5. To gain experience and thereby facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the multilateral convention, the Parties agree to conduct bilateral verification experiments involving trial challenge inspections at facilities not declared under the Memorandum or subsequently. The detailed modalities for such experiments, including the number and locations of the facilities to be inspected, as well as the procedures to be used, shall be agreed between the Parties no later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.

Article VII

The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as they may agree.

Article VIII

1. After the multilateral convention enters into force, the provisions of the multilateral convention shall take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement in cases of incompatible obligations therein. Otherwise, the provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the provisions of the multilateral convention in its operation between the Parties. After the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to this Agreement shall consult with each other in order to resolve any questions concerning the relationship of this Agreement to the multilateral convention.

2. The chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, and chemical weapons production facilities subject to this Agreement are those that are subject to declaration under the Memorandum.

Article IX

Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article X

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each Party.

2. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration, unless the Parties agree to terminate it after the entry into force of the multilateral convention.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

President George Bush

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President Mikhail Gorbachev

Agreed Statement in Connection with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons

Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the Agreement stipulates that, "Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, *inter alia*, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years."

In this connection, the Parties agree that an affirmative decision would require the agreement of a majority of the states parties that attend the special conference, with such majority including those states parties attending the special conference that had taken the following three steps:

(a) presented officially and publicly, before December 31, 1991, before the Conference on Disarmament, a written declaration that they were at the time of that declaration in possession of chemical weapons;

(b) signed the multilateral convention within thirty days after it was opened for signature; and

(c) became a party to the multilateral convention by no later than one year after its entry into force.