

# The Wyoming Papers: Documents from the Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for discussions on a range of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. Following are four documents from that ministerial meeting which Arms Control Today believes will be of interest to our readers: the section on arms control of the joint statement by Baker and Shevardnadze issued September 23, and the texts of three arms control agreements signed in Wyoming.

## Baker-Shevardnadze: Joint Statement on Arms Control

I. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough and productive review on the range of arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their May meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the ideas contained in the letters exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, guided by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM and SLCM issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the Nuclear and Space Talks,

the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and said that in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs, and noted its long-standing view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva.

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 1600 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a long-standing issue.

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty has been agreed ad referendum by their negotiators, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, as well as on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to make on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty. After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides. These agreements provide a framework for conclusion of the verification protocols, completing a process that began fifteen years ago. They instructed their delegations to continue intensive work to resolve all remaining issues so that these two documents can be submitted for ratification as quickly as possible.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with approval the work being done in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and called for rapid conclusion of an agreement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed in principle to the "Open Skies" concept proposed by President Bush in May, which could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-building. They noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject.

The sides noted the importance of joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on this pressing problem.

## Chemical Weapons: Verification and Data Exchange

### *Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Determined to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,

Convinced that increased openness about their chemical weapons capabilities is essential for building the confidence necessary for early completion of the convention,

Desiring also to gain experience in the procedures and measures for verification of the convention,

Have agreed as follows:

### I. General Provisions

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall conduct a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange shall be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall exchange general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the two sides shall exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspection to verify the accuracy of those data.

3. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons by:

(1) enabling each side to gain confidence in the data on chemical weapons capabilities that will be provided under the provisions of the convention;

(2) enabling each side to gain confidence in the inspection procedures that will be used to verify compliance with the convention; and

(3) facilitating the elaboration of the provisions of the convention.

4. Terms used in this Memorandum shall have the same meaning as in the draft convention text under negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft convention text that is current as of the date of the exchange of data shall be used.

5. Data shall be current as of the date of the exchange, and shall encompass all sites and facilities specified below, wherever they are located.

6. Each side shall take appropriate steps to protect the confidentiality of the data it receives. Each side undertakes not to divulge this data without the explicit consent of the side that provided the data.

### II. Phase I

In Phase I, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons;
2. the specific types of chemicals it possesses that are defined as chemical weapons, indicating the common name of each chemical;
3. the percentage of each of its declared chemicals that is stored in

munitions and devices, and the percentage that is stored in storage containers;

4. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;
5. for each of its declared chemical weapons storage facilities:

—the common name of each chemical defined as a chemical weapon that is stored there;

—the percentage of the precise aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons that is stored there; and

—the specific types of munitions and devices that are stored there;

6. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons production facilities, indicating the common name of each chemical that has been or is being produced at each facility; and

7. the precise location of each of its facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, including those currently existing, under construction, or planned.

In Phase I, each side shall permit the other side to visit some of its chemical weapons storage and production facilities, the exact number of which will be agreed upon as soon as possible. In addition, each side shall permit the other side to visit two industrial chemical production facilities. Each side will select the facilities to be visited by the other side.

### III. Phase II

In Phase II, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the chemical name of each chemical it possesses that is defined as a chemical weapon;

2. the detailed inventory, including the quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

3. its preliminary general plans for destruction of chemical weapons under the convention, including the characteristics of the facilities it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

4. the capacity of each of its chemical weapons production facilities;

5. preliminary general plans for closing and destroying each of its chemical weapons production facilities under the convention, including the methods it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

6. the precise location and capacity of its planned single small-scale facility allowed under the convention for the production, for non-prohibited purposes under strict safeguards, of a limited quantity of chemicals that pose a high risk, i.e., Schedule 1 chemicals;

7. the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 for development of chemical weapons, *inter alia*, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

### IV. Timing

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data shall be exchanged not later than 31 December 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 30 June 1990, provided that the sides have agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the number of visits, as well as on the programs and other detailed arrangements for the visits, and assuming that the sides have agreed by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility to be visited by each side in its first visit to the other side.

2. In Phase I each side may withhold temporarily, for reasons of security, data on the locations of storage facilities that together contain a total quantity of chemical weapons that is not more than two percent of the precise quantity of its chemical weapons. In addition, the other data pertaining to these locations, as specified in Section II, paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the heading "other storage locations" without reference to specific locations. Precise data pertaining to these locations shall be exchanged later in Phase I on a subsequent date to be agreed.

3. Phase II data shall be exchanged on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text of the convention. At that time, both sides shall formally and jointly acknowledge the possibility of initialing the convention within four months.



## V. Verification

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data.

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold consultations to discuss the information that has been presented and visits that have been exchanged. The sides will cooperate in clarifying ambiguous situations.

3. During Phase II, each side shall have the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase II data by means of on-site inspections. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapons capabilities of the sides.

4. Prior to the initialing of the convention, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities and chemical weapons production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side if their number is more than 10. Should either side as of the date of the Phase II exchange possess a single small-scale facility for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it shall be subject to an additional inspection.

Each side shall also have the opportunity to carry out up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. All inspections shall be carried out within the agreed four months from the date of the declaration pertaining to Phase II, referred to in Section IV.

5. While the signed convention is being considered by their respective legislative bodies, each side shall have the opportunity to request from the other side, and to obtain from it, updated data. Each side shall have the opportunity to conduct up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. During this process, the two sides will consult with their respective legislative bodies, as appropriate, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

For each side, these inspections shall be carried out within a four-month period, beginning with the date that it conducts its first inspection. The sides shall consult and agree on the dates when the first inspection will be conducted by each side. The dates shall be chosen to ensure that the inspections shall be conducted by both sides at approximately the same time. Once the inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual consent, extend the four-month periods for an additional specified period.

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections, shall be conducted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the draft convention, taking into account that these inspections are being carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve the bodies that will be established under the convention. If necessary, the two sides shall supplement the provisions of the draft convention by mutually-agreed procedures.

7. Challenge inspections may be made at any location or facility of the other side, as provided for in the draft convention text, except that, for the purposes of this Memorandum and without creating a precedent, challenge inspections at facilities not on the territory of the sides may be made only at military facilities of a side in a limited number of countries; the sides will agree later on these specific countries.

8. Challenge inspections conducted pursuant to this Memorandum shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the domestic law of the side being inspected and shall be based on a recognition by both sides of the need to resolve concerns and build confidence.

9. To clarify questions related to the data provided during Phase I and Phase II, the two sides shall employ normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as may be agreed upon.

## VI. Format

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

2. Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of

facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and significant geographical relief features in the vicinity of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the diagram shall clearly specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic coordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

## VII. Entry into Force

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: James A. Baker III

## Agreement on Verification and Stability Measures

*Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Principles of Implementing Trial Verification and Stability Measures That Would Be Carried Out Pending the Conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from their mutual interest in using every opportunity to strengthen international security and reduce the risk of war,

Seeking to provide, through stability and predictability in the military sphere, a solid foundation for concluding the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and with a view to expediting agreement on effective verification procedures for this Treaty,

Desiring to achieve maximum confidence that the measures being negotiated at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to verify compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty will be both practical and sufficient for effective verification,

Have agreed as follows:

1. In the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, the Parties agree to develop verification and stability measures to be implemented pending the conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

The purpose of the above measures is to conduct pilot trials with the aim of subsequently refining, during negotiations, the verification procedures to be included in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as enhancing confidence in order to facilitate early finalization of the Treaty text for signature.

2. Trial verification and stability measures shall involve agreed kinds of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the Treaty being drawn up and agreed facilities for such arms.

3. These measures shall be selected with a view to examining, refining and trying out agreed on-site inspection and continuous monitoring procedures from among those proposed by the Parties for consideration and inclusion in the Treaty being drawn up.

4. Trial verification and stability measures shall be worked out on the basis of reciprocity and in light of the procedures agreed upon in the draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as applied to some designated locations, facilities and arms of both Parties.

5. These measures shall be agreed upon concurrently with continuing efforts to work out the draft Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and must not slow down this work in any way whatsoever.

The implementation of these measures must not be a precondition for finalizing and concluding the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

6. Trial verification and stability measures shall be implemented as they are agreed upon, within the time periods established by the Parties.

7. Each specific measure may be formalized either through agreements concluded by the Parties or through other means as appropriate.

8. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: James A. Baker III

## Agreement on Notification of Strategic Exercises

*Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, Recognizing the necessity to promote the increase of mutual trust and the strengthening of strategic stability,

Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

## Article I

On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall notify the other Party no less than 14 days in advance about the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise which includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

## Article II

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications required by Article I through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

2. The notifications required by Article I shall be provided no less than 14 days prior to the date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during which the relevant exercise will commence.

## Article III

The Parties shall undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

## Article IV

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

## Article V

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.  
2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

## Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: James A. Baker III



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