The Wyoming Papers: Documents from the Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for discussions on arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their last meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the idea of exchanging letters on a " burning issue" exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense Against Threats agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. decision to introduce this issue reflects the concern of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agree that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would continue to discuss U.S. and Soviet government experts to invite two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, granted by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krantsky radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs, contingent on the funding of the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need to further develop provisions for each other's use of mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the efforts agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

In addition, the Secretary expressed the U.S. willingness to work with the SAC and LCMC side issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea that could contribute to the solution of this problem.

In summary, the two sides agreed that: the U.S. side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and said that, in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside the text of a START treaty on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and self-help, and this idea, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs, and noted its strong-standing view that the United States would be willing to work closely on the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging such an initiative, with agreement on specific and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notice required for such a verification system. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore their further use.

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 160 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus rendering a long-standing issue.

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons as this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the potential posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1990 Washington Agreement was still to be negotiated, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamics and seismic monitoring, as well as an on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1994 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of samples, this agreement allows for testing up to five years after the test. The sides agreed to the verification of the last test conducted during this period.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed to continue the nuclear testing negotiations in a constructive atmosphere.

In the next round of meetings, the two sides agreed to continue the work on the verification protocol for the 1994 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of samples, this agreement allows for testing up to five years after the test. The sides agreed to the verification of the last test conducted during this period.

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V. Verification

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data. During Phase I, the sides shall consult on the introduction of new means of on-site inspection. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapon production facilities.

4. Prior to the initiation of the convention, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities or chemical weapon production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side if their number is more than 10. Should either side be unable to inspect any of the declared facilities, the inspection process may be extended.

VI. Format

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and relevant geographical relief features in the vicinity of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the structure diagram shall specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic coordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

VII. Entry into Force

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.


Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as enhancing confidence in order to achieve early normalization of the Treaty text for signature.

2. Trial verification and stability measures shall involve agreed kinds of strategic Offensive Arms as shall be covered by the Treaty being drawn up and agreed facilities for such arms.

3. These measures shall be selected with a view to examining, refining and trying out agreed on-site inspection and continuous monitoring measures from among those proposed by the Parties for consideration and inclusion in the Treaty being drawn up.

4. Trial verification and stability measures shall be worked out on the basis of reciprocity and in light of the procedures agreed upon in the draft Treaty and the concept of Strategic Offensive Arms. They shall be in line with some designated locations, facilities and arms of both Parties.

5. These measures shall be agreed upon concurrently with continuing efforts to work out the final draft Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and must not slow down this work in any way whatsoever.

The implementation of these measures must be not a precondition for finalizing and concluding the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Parties shall continue to negotiate.

6. Trial verification and stability measures shall be implemented as they are agreed upon, within the time periods established by the Parties.

7. Each specific measure may be formalized through agreements concluded by the Parties or through other means as appropriate.

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.


Agreement on Verification and Stability Measures

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Principles of Implementing Trial Verification and Stability Measures That Would Be Carried Out Pending the Concluding the U.S. Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

1. Proceeding from their mutual interest in using every opportunity to strengthen international security and reduce the risk of war.

2. Seeking to provide, through stability and predictability in the military sphere, a solid foundation for concluding the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, it is agreed to exchange agreement on effective verification procedures for this Treaty.

3. Desiring to achieve maximum confidence that the measures being negotiated at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to verify compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty will be both practical and sufficient for effective verification,

have agreed as follows:

1. In the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, the Parties agree to develop verification and stability measures to be implemented pending the conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

The purpose of the above measures is to conduct pilot trials with the aim of subsequently refining, during negotiations, the verification and monitoring procedures to be included in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as enhancing confidence in order to achieve early normalization of the Treaty text for signature.

Agreement on Notification of Strategic Exercises

Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

1. Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity,

2. Recognizing the obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

have agreed as follows:

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifici-

ations pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.


This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.
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