Event and Conference Summaries

Compilation

CWC Civil Society Proposals and Recommendations

Brett Edwards (University of Bath) and Stefano Costanzi (American University) are compiling a collection of papers and reports from civil society, including NGOs, academia, think tanks, etc., with specific recommendations for the 5th Review Conference (May 2023).

The goal of this effort is to make these proposals clearly visible to the relevant CWC stakeholders well before next year’s review conference, thus giving civil society a better chance to contribute to the outcome of the review conference.

If you have or are aware of a paper or report that should be included in this collection, please fill out this Google Doc with the title, author, link, and the main recommendations in bullet point form.

Civil society representatives lead a discussion on "Legacy Issues of Chemical Weapons" at the 3rd Review Conference in 2013. Source: OPCW Flickr

CWC-Related Initiatives

Stefano Costanzi (American University) and Gregory Koblentz (George Mason University)

Main Recommendations: 

  • Add families of Novichok agents with guanidine branches to CWC Schedule 1.
  • Consider adding Novichok precursors to CWC Schedules.

Ralph Trapp and Cheng Tang (UNIDIR)

Main Recommendations: 

  • Enhance OPCW forensic and analytical capabilities to support verification, investigation, and technical assistance. 
  • The OPCW Executive Council should more systematically review the status of compliance with the CWC. 
  • Study the legal, institutional and operational aspects of establishing a generic attribution mechanism based on the provisions of the CWC.
  • CWC States Parties should review the measures they have adopted to enact and enforce the CWC mandates to ensure that those responsible for crimes involving chemical weapons will be brought to justice. 
  • CWC States parties should conduct a broad review of the design and application of the CWC industry verification regime as well as corresponding national implementation measures.
  • Coordinate activities with the broader international framework in the fields of prevention and response to violations of the norm against chemical weapons.

Rebecca Hersman (CSIS); Suzanne Claeys (CSIS); and Cyrus A. Jabbari (CSIS)

Main Recommendations: 

  • Enhance the regime to address small-scale, limited-quantity, limited-use, newer, and improvised agents.
  • Add new chemicals to the CWC Schedules.
  • Reframe the mission of the CWC to address how to manage chemical threats to security instead of focusing exclusively on preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons.
  • Improve and support OPCW laboratories to improve technical capabilities and resources for diagnostic purposes.
  • Consider establishing an Additional Protocol to the CWC to reward states that engage in higher levels of transparency, control, and compliance – for instance by giving greater safe and secure access to commercial opportunities afforded by chemical science.
  • Awaken the “quiet middle,” as there is a large number of nonvoting and abstaining countries in the OPCW.
  • Build and enhance capabilities to investigate and attribute CW events. Enhance national and international technical and operational investigative and response capacities.
  • Provide greater educational opportunities and training within and outside of The Hague.

Tuan H. Nguyen (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

Main Recommendations: 

  • Challenge inspections should be thought of not only as a mechanism for cases where there is clear evidence and violations but also as an instrument to clarify ambiguities.
  • The OPCW needs to enhance technical competencies in forensic science, evidence collection, data management, and crime-scene reconstruction. 
  • OPCW inspectors must be aware of new chemical synthesis technologies and understand the potential for CW production.
  • OPCW inspectors do not have the authorization to detect chemicals other than scheduled chemicals. The industry verification paradigm should become more qualitative to provide a more comprehensive picture of activities at declared facilities.
  • Instead of relying solely on data from site inspections and declared information, more comprehensive assessments can be made with data analytic tools being adopted in the commercial sector, including data aggregation tools, space-based assets for “eyes on the ground” capabilities, and open-source information products.

National Implementation Measures Programme (VERTIC)

Main Recommendations: 

  • National implementation is a requirement under Article VII of the CWC. The analysis of existing legislation is important, because it allows states to examine which legislative measures are necessary to fully implement their international obligations.
  • The legislation survey template for the CWC identifies 163 distinct measures that are relevant for the implementation of the CWC.
  • In addition, a ‘survey overview’ template provides a place to summarise the survey’s main findings and formulate recommendations to strengthen legislation.

Brett Edwards (University of Bath), Tatyana Novossiolova (Centre for the Study of Democracy), Michael Crowley (University of Bradford), Simon Whitby (London Metropolitan University), Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford), and Lijun Shang (London, Biological Security Research Centre)

Main Recommendations: 

BTWC

  • States Parties should further develop and enhance the implementation of the BTWC Cooperation Database.
  • States Parties should ensure that the security implications of life sciences research are effectively assessed and managed in an agreed review process. The full and effective implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for life scientists can strengthen the review process of relevant scientific and technological advances.
  • State Parties Should promote the full and effective national implementation of the BTWC by improving the system of Confidence Building Measures (2020), enhancing stakeholder engagement with the Convention, and strengthening the utility of Peer Review Exercises.
  • State Parties Should promote the implementation of an integrated approach to countering the threat of deliberate disease. Strengthening international coordination, cooperation, and capacity building under the BTWC can advance global health security and prevent the hostile misuse of life sciences.
  • State Parties should consider possible approaches and measures for the institutional strengthening of the Convention. It is essential that an Intersessional Programme of Work is agreed at the Ninth Review Conference in 2021 and that the mandate and resources of the Implementation Support Unit are expanded.
  • National implementation is a requirement under Article VII of the CWC. The analysis of existing legislation is important, because it allows states to examine which legislative measures are necessary to fully implement their international obligations.
  • The legislation survey template for the CWC identifies 163 distinct measures that are relevant for the implementation of the CWC.
  • In addition, a ‘survey overview’ template provides a place to summarise the survey’s main findings and formulate recommendations to strengthen legislation.

CWC

  • There remains a need for sustained plurilateral State support for a wide range of investigatory, archival and criminal mechanisms which will ensure that those who have breached the global chemical weapon prohibition are identified and held accountable.
  • States must support intelligence sharing, international investigative and criminal procedures in relation to recent uses of Novichoks and support OPCW expert review and updating of CWC verification schedules and declaration processes to address challenges posed by this group of agents.
  • All CWC States Parties should fully implement the CSP-26 Decision on aerosolised CNS-acting chemicals, specifically prohibiting all such use in law enforcement, and reporting and verifiably destroying existing agent stockpiles and means of delivery intended for such purposes. Given previous State research into and/or development of CNS-acting weapons employing pharmaceutical chemicals, toxins and bioregulators, and the danger that biotechnological developments will facilitate the search for, or development of, new types of candidate CNS-acting agents, it is important that the implementation of the Decision is not restrictive in scope of CNS-acting chemicals covered. The OPCW should establish implementation guidance defining “CNS-acting chemicals”, and clearly demarcating between such chemicals and riot control agents (RCAs), whose use is permitted for law enforcement purposes.
  • All CWC State Parties must ensure that use of riot control agents for law enforcement purposes is consistent both with international human rights law and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
  • All CWC State Parties should collectively establish an OPCW process to determine those RCA delivery mechanisms that are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention and develop guidance on appropriate use of permitted RCA delivery mechanisms.

Alexander Kelle (UNIDIR)

Main Recommendations: 

  • CWC states parties should re-affirm and clarify the general-purpose criterion as going beyond inter-state use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Note: the general purpose criterion defines all toxic chemicals as CW whenever they are used to cause harm to humans or animals, “except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.”
  •  The OPCW should discuss the following topics in greater detail: 
    • Under which circumstances states parties would be willing to make use of tools foreseen in the CWC to ascertain compliance with its provisions
    • How new initiatives and mechanisms developed in recent years – such as the Fact-Finding Mission, Declaration Assessment Team, and Investigation and Identification Team – could be streamlined into regular operation of the OPCW
    • Whether there is a willingness among OPCW member states to develop new tools for addressing the use of chemical warfare agents against individuals
    • How new and innovative ideas generated by key stakeholders in the chemical industry and the scientific community could be better used for improving compliance with the CWC
    • What lessons we can learn from the biological weapons prohibition regime or the implementation of other relevant treaties for strengthening compliance with the CWC